The
Transcendental Argument for God's Existence
Michael R. Butler
See also our blog.
If, therefore, we observe the dogmatist coming forward with ten proofs, we can be quite sure that he really has none. For had he one that yielded . . . apodeictic proof, what need would he have of the others?
–Immanuel Kant
Cornelius Van Til revolutionized Christian apologetics in the twentieth century. His system of the defense of the faith rejected the common practice among Christian apologists of assuming a neutral, autonomous point of view when confronting unbelief. In its place he urged a presuppositional, theonomic approach of establishing the truth of Christian theism. He maintained that because God, speaking in his word, is the ultimate epistemological starting point, there is no way of arguing for the faith on the basis of something other than the faith itself. God's authority is ultimate and thus self-attesting. To argue for the faith on any other authority is to assume there is a higher authority than God himself to which he must give account. But the very attempt to do this is self-defeating. Consequently, the Christian apologist must stand upon God's authoritative word and presuppose its truth when contending for the faith. This stand does not relegate the apologist to fideism. Indeed, the very opposite is the case. Upon the rock foundation of God's word the Christian is able to demonstrate the foolishness of unbelieving thought while at the same time vindicate the greatness of divine wisdom.
Put in historical context, we see in Van Til
the confluence of two great streams of Christian thought: the apologetic
tradition that seeks to establish as beyond question the truth of Christianity
and the epistemological tradition that subjugates man's intellect to God's
revelation. Secularists and even many
Christians have rejected this synthesis as impossible. Such critics maintain that either
Christianity must be based on faith to the exclusion of reason or Christianity
must be tested by the deliverances of reasons in order to establish its
truth. Van Til
showed that only on the basis of faith can there be reason (credo ut intelligentum). In thus combining a biblical, Reformed
epistemology together with a non-compromising apologetic argument, Van Til brought about a "Copernican Revolution" in
Christian thought.
Over the years, however, Van Til's revolutionary thought has been subjected to criticism from many quarters. As a seminal thinker Van Til concentrated on the major components of apologetic system, but neglected to develop and elucidate a number of its more intricate features. Consequently, Van Til bequeathed the task of tying together the loose ends of his system to his followers.
It, thus, fell to Van Til's
successors to fill the gaps in his seminal and programmatic apologetic
system. Unfortunately, while Van Til's followers have been numerous, most have either been
uncritical and have contented themselves with merely regurgitating Van Til's slogans or, at the other extreme, have so
fundamentally departed from their mentor that their apologetic methodology only
bears superficial resemblances to Van Til's approach.[1]
Of Van Til's disciples that
remained in basic agreement with him, only two can rightly be considered to
have further refined and elaborated his apologetic outlook: Greg L. Bahnsen and John M. Frame.
Since this article is written in honor of the former, it is his
contribution to Van Til's apologetic methodology that
I will be concerned with.[2]
As a student of Van Til, Bahnsen understood from Van Til himself what the fundamental difficulties or gaps were with his apologetic system.[3] Much of Bahnsen's career was devoted to firming up the foundation that Van Til had so carefully laid. Bahnsen's defense and elaboration Van Til's apologetic methodology can be seen in five main areas: the practice of the presuppositional method; the biblical defense of presuppositional apologetics; organizing and explaining Van Til's system; analysis of the phenomenon of self-deception; and the elaboration of the Transcendental Argument for God's Existence.
While Van Til wrote extensively
about apologetic methodology, he seldom engaged in the actual practice of
apologetics. Only in his short track,
"Why I Believe in God" does he set forth a defense of the faith
directed against the unbeliever.[4] Aside from this work, Van Til
confined himself to the more theoretical aspects of apologetics. This relative neglect of the practice of the
defense of the faith and concentration on abstract and meta-apologetic issues
is perhaps one of the main reasons why Van Til's
methodology is so neglected and misunderstood in the church today.
Bahnsen realized this lack of
practical apologetics was a deficiency in Van Til. "¼ I ¼ wish that Van Til had given more attention to making practical
applications of his presuppositional method – to
actually defending the faith against the enemy, rather than debating
methodology so much within the family of faith."[5] To rectify this, Bahnsen
dedicated much of his career to the practice of apologetics. He did this by conducting many classes,
seminars and conferences instructing Christians how to defend the faith (as he
liked to say, "taking it to the street"). He was also involved in numerous debates with
such well-known atheists as Gordon Stein, George H. Smith and Edward Tabash.[6] Bahnsen's clear and
powerful defense of Christianity on these occasions serve as a model of the
practice of presuppositionalism. Apart from the pedagogical value of these
debates, Bahnsen's performances established his
reputation as one of the foremost Christian apologists of his day. Frame's tribute is fitting, "¼Bahnsen is one of the sharpest apologists working
today. In my view, he is the best
debater among Christian apologists of all apologetic persuasions."[7]
The one criticism that perhaps disturbed Van Til the most was that of G. C. Berkouwer.[8] Berkouwer notes,
with a good deal of irony, that although Van Til
claims to have arrived at his apologetic system from the Bible itself, there is
a conspicuous absence of biblical exegesis in his writings. To this charge Van Til
readily confessed: "This is a defect.
The lack of detailed scriptural exegesis is a lack in all of my
writings. I have no excuse for
this."[9] He later added, "¼ I would like to be more
exegetical than I have been. Dr. G. C. Berkouwer was right in pointing out my weakness on this
point."[10]
Bahnsen helped fill in this lacuna with the publication of a syllabus on biblical apologetics.[11] In the syllabus he demonstrates not only must our apologetic methodology come from Scripture, but that Scripture teaches the necessity of defending the faith in a presuppositional manner. Bahnsen furthers this case in his comparison of the Socratic method of philosophy with the presuppositional method practiced by Paul and other biblical writers.[12] Socrates' autonomous search for truth is shown to be completely out of accord with biblical principles of epistemology. For Paul, Christ is the foundation of all truth and knowledge and apart from him there is only ignorance and darkness. Beyond these biblical studies of the proper theory of apologetics, Bahnsen's looks at the actual practice of apologetics in in the New Testament in his important exegetical study of Acts 17.[13] This article shows in painstaking detail that Paul's defense of the faith before the Areopagus, far from being a display of the evidential or "classical" method of apologetics, is thoroughly presuppositional in nature. Through these studies Bahnsen demonstrates explicitly what Van Til took for granted: that presuppositional apologetics, when properly understood, is synonymous with biblical apologetics.
One of the major obstacles in the way of promoting presuppositionalism has been Van Til's
own writing style. Friends and critics
alike have expressed chagrin at his "tortuous English," his redundant
and unclear style, his penchant for sloganizing and
his disorganized presentation of themes.[14] Though he considered these criticism
overstated, Bahnsen likewise recognized these shortcomings
in Van Til.
"'[I]ssues of communication' did
sometimes become a problem for Van Til."[15] Bahnsen's publication
of Van Til's
Apologetic: Readings and Analysis goes a long way in correcting these
deficiencies. In the book, Van Til's apologetic writings are logically organized and given
extensive introductions that both explain and defend Van Til's
views. Bahnsen
also provides a running commentary in footnotes so that the reader is guided
through even the most difficult of Van Til's
passages.
One of the central features of Van Til's apologetic system is that it declares the unbeliever to both believe in God and not believe in God. That is, natural man believes that God exists, that he the Creator, is eternal, all-powerful and just and yet he does not, in another sense, believe these things. At first glance, it appears that these two claims contradict each other. How can somebody believe something and at the same time disbelieve the same thing? This problem has not only been seen as a great difficulty by sympathetic followers of Van Til,[16] but Van Til himself recognized the paradoxical nature of this claim posed a problem for his apologetic system. He says of this issue that it "has always been a difficult point"[17] and he recognizes the challenge that opponents of his view put forth:
It is ambiguous or meaningless, says the Arminian, to talk about the natural man as knowing God and yet not truly knowing God. Knowing is knowing. A man either knows or he does not know. He may know less or more, but if he does not "truly" know, he knows not at all.[18]
The difficulty that the Arminian points out is how can the natural man both believe in God and yet not believe in God? It is apparent that the natural man is engaged in some form of self-deception. He believes in God, but then suppresses this belief (in unrighteousness) in order to allow himself to not believe in God. The difficulty is that he is not merely pretending to not believe in God, but that he actually deceives himself into not believing in God. In other words, the unbeliever lies to himself and believes the lie he tells. Thus two difficult problems emerge. It appears that the natural man both believes p and believes -p. But this is implausible. Except for madmen, nobody consciously believes such contradictory propositions. Furthermore, how is it possible for the natural man to lie to himself and believe the lie that he is telling? After all, if he knows he is telling a lie, why would he believe it? It would seem that such a psychological condition is hardly possible.
Bahnsen tackles these difficult
problems in his doctoral dissertation, "A Conditional Resolution of the
Apparent Paradox of Self-Deception."[19] A more accessible treatment is found in his
article, "The Crucial Concept of Self-Deception in Presuppositional
Apologetics."[20] In these works, Bahnsen
shows how natural man can believe that God exists (a first-order belief) and
yet can deceive himself into believing that he does not have such a belief (a
second-order belief). Thus the natural
man does not believe both p and -p, but rather he believes p and also believes
(falsely) that he does not believe p.
Moreover, self-deception, like falling asleep, is a self-covering
intention. When self-deception is
successful, the original intention is covered in the process.
The above criticisms and difficulties are all given satisfactory answers and resolutions by Bahnsen. Where Van Til was hard to understand or disorganized or where he was too abstract and theoretical, Bahnsen brings clarity and practical illustrations. Where there were objections to the biblical warrant of Van Til's system or concerns about the apparent paradoxical corollaries that emerge from it, Bahnsen provides a clear defense and analysis.
There is one objection to Van Til's system that has yet to be addressed. And this is perhaps the most serious. This has to do with the nature of the presuppositional or transcendental argument for God's existence (TAG hereafter). It is to this objection that I shall now turn.
Despite his many assertions that there is an absolute proof
for Christianity, many critics of Van Til have
accused him of never actually stating it.
Gordon Clark, for example, asserts that if Van Til
has a certain argument for Christianity, he ought to state its premises and
give the argument step by step.[21]
Apologists from different camps have offered similar criticisms. "Evangelical Thomist" Norman Geisler alleges, "¼Van Til never really spelled out how his transcendental argument actually works."[23] Reformed epistemologist Kelly James Clark remarks in a similar vein:
Whenever I read presuppositionalists
I almost always think, "Saying it's so doesn't make it so." Saying that Christianity is the criterion of
truth (whatever that could mean), that Christian belief is the most certain
thing we know, that Christian faith is not defeasible,
and that Scripture supports these views, does not make it so. There are few apologetic approaches that are
so long on assured proclamations and so short on argument.[24]
Proponents of the "Classical" method such as R. C. Sproul and John Gerstner simply refer to Van Til's approach as fideism.[25] The misguided nature of these criticisms is amply attested to in the writings of Van Til himself. There he clearly sets forth not only the nature of his argument, but how the argument actually proceeds. The lengthy quote that follows is perhaps his best summation:
Since the
non-theist is so heartily convinced that univocal reasoning is the only
possible kind of reasoning, we must ask him to reason univocally for us in
order that we may see the consequences. In other words, we believe it to be in
harmony with and a part of the process of reasoning analogically with a
non-theist that we ask him to show us first what he can do. We may, to be sure,
offer to him at once a positive statement of our position. But this he will at
once reject as quite out of the question. So we may ask him to give us
something better. The reason he gives for rejecting our position is, in the
last analysis, that it involves self-contradiction. We see again as an
illustration of this charge the rejection of the theistic conception that God
is absolute and that he has nevertheless created this world for his glory.
This, the non-theist says, is self-contradictory. And it no doubt is, from a
non-theistic point of view. But the final question is not whether a statement
appears to be contradictory. The final question is in which framework or on
which view of reality—the Christian or the nonChristian—the law of
contradiction can have application to any fact. The non-Christian rejects the
Christian view out of hand as being contradictory. Then when he is asked to
furnish a foundation for the law of contradiction, he can offer nothing but the
idea of contingency.
What we shall have
to do then is to try to reduce our opponent's position to an absurdity. Nothing
less will do. Without God, man is completely lost in every respect,
epistemologically as well as morally and religiously. But exactly what do we
mean by reducing our opponent's position to an absurdity? He thinks he has
already reduced our position to an absurdity by the simple expedient just
spoken of. But we must point out to him that upon a theistic basis our position
is not reduced to an absurdity by indicating the "logical
difficulties" involved in the conception of creation. Upon the theistic
basis it must be contended that the human categories are but analogical of
God's categories, so that it is to be expected that human thought will not be
able to comprehend how God shall be absolute and at the same time create the
universe for his glory. If taken on the same level of existence, it is no doubt
a self-contradiction to say that a thing is full and at the same time is being
filled. But it is exactly this point that is in question—whether God is to be
thought of as on the same level with man. What the antitheist should have done
is to show that even upon a theistic basis our conception of creation involves
self-contradiction.
We must therefore give our opponents better treatment than
they give us. We must point out to them that univocal reasoning itself leads to
self-contradiction, not only from a theistic point of view, but from a
non-theistic point of view as well. It is this that we ought to mean when we
say that we must meet our enemy on their own ground. It is this that we ought
to mean when we say that we reason from the impossibility of the contrary. The
contrary is impossible only if it is self-contradictory when operating on the
basis of its own assumptions. It is this too that we should mean when we say
that we are arguing ad hominem. We do not really argue ad hominem
unless we show that someone's position involves self-contradiction, and there
is no self-contradiction unless one's reasoning is shown to be directly
contradictory of or to lead to conclusions which are contradictory of one's own
assumptions.[26]
Here we find the basic contours of TAG. It starts with human experience; such things as science, love, rationality and moral duties. It then asserts that the existence of the Christian God is the necessary precondition of such experiences. Finally, it proves this indirectly by demonstrating the impossibility of the contrary.
The criticism that Van Til has not produced an argument is, thus, without foundation. Saying, this, however, is not saying much. That Van Til offers an argument is beyond debate. That he offers a good argument is an altogether different matter. And the question of whether TAG is a good argument is perhaps behind much of the above criticism. Unfortunately, Van Til does not offer much in the way of detailed analysis of TAG. He was content to present the argument in broad strokes and leave the details aside. More problematic was his failure to address some of the common criticisms of TAG. Like much of his other work in apologetics, he left the detailed work to his followers.
In his writings and lectures, Bahnsen addressed a number of the stock criticisms of TAG. These objections fall into four broad categories: (1) the nature of TAG; (2) the uniqueness proof for the conclusion of TAG; (3) the mere sufficiency of the Christian worldview; (4) the move from the conceptual necessity God's existence to the actual existence of the Christian God. I will address these in order.[27]
Objection 1. The Nature of TAG
The first criticism has to do with the nature of TAG. Specifically, some have argued that TAG is not a unique argument form, but is reducible to the more traditional arguments for God's existence. Frame especially has advanced this criticism in his recent writings on apologetics.[28]
Van Til claims that only transcendental or indirect arguments bring us to the conclusion that the God of the Bible exists. Van Til states, "The method of reasoning by presupposition may be said to be indirect rather than direct." He explains what he means by this as follows:
The issue between believers and non-believers in Christian theism cannot be settled by a direct appeal to "facts" or "laws" whose nature and significance is already agreed upon by both parties to the debate. The question is rather as to what is the final reference-point required to make the "facts" and "laws" intelligible.
How is this to be done?
The Christian apologist must place himself upon the position of his opponent, assuming the correctness of his method merely for argument's sake, in order to show him that on such a position the "facts" are not facts and the "laws" are not laws. He must also ask the non-Christian to place himself upon the Christian position for argument's sake in order that he may be shown that only upon such a basis do "facts" and "laws" appear intelligible.[29]
Against Van Til, Frame argues that transcendental arguments may be either direct (positive) or indirect (negative). For example, in Apologetics to the Glory of God, Frame asks:
Are indirect arguments really distinct from direct arguments? In the final analysis, it doesn't make much difference whether you say "Causality, therefore God" or "Without God, no causality, therefore God."[30]
How are we to understand this? Interpreted one way these two arguments are really the same. The first is an enthymeme which when spelled-out reads: "There is causality and therefore God exists [for without God there could be no causality]. The second is also enthymematic which when spelled-out reads: "Without God there is no causality [but there is causality] therefore God exists." Understood this way, Van Til would have no disagreement.
This interpretation is not what Frame means by a direct or positive argument though. In his book on Van Til he writes:
We can certainly conceive of a positive argument that would lead to a transcendental conclusion. We might, for example, develop a causal argument for God's existence, prove that the ultimate cause of the world must have the attributes of the biblical God, and thus establish that all intelligibility in the universe derives from God.[31]
Notice that he is speaking here of a causal argument. Specifically, he is speaking of the traditional cosmological argument (an argument that concludes there must have been an Ultimate Cause, and this Ultimate Cause is God). And this is certainly something Van Til would take issue with.
The question before us then is, is the traditional cosmological argument (or other traditional arguments for God's existence) a version of the transcendental argument stated in a direct or positive way? Put differently, was Van Til right about the distinctiveness of his argument for the existence of God? or is Frame right in saying that the transcendental argument is just a restatement of traditional arguments? To answer this a few words about transcendental arguments are in order.
Transcendental arguments attempt to discover the preconditions of human experience. They do so by taking some aspect of human experience and investigating what must be true in order for that experience to be possible. Transcendental arguments typically have the following form. For x [some aspect of human experience] to be the case, y must also be the case since y is the precondition of x. Since x is the case, y is the case. The argument mentioned above serves as a clear example of a transcendental argument. For causality to be possible, God has to exist since the existence of God is the precondition of causality. Since there is causality, God exists. A corollary of this is that whenever non-believers employ the concept of causation, they are borrowing from the Christian worldview since only on a Christian worldview does causation make sense.
Does the traditional cosmological argument take this form? A brief sketch of it will prove that it does not. Essentially the argument is outlined as follows. There are causes in the world and these causes are contingent. There is either an infinite number of contingent causes or there is a finite number. Since there could not be an infinite number (an infinite chain of contingent causes is impossible) there must be a finite number. Since there is a finite number, there must be a first cause. The argument concludes by identifying this first cause as God.
Notice that this argument does not show that the precondition of causality is God. Rather, it assumes that the non-believer is perfectly justified in believing in causation and/or using the concept of causation. The non-believer may not have thought through the implications of the world being causally ordered – i.e. there must be a First Cause – but this does not mean he cannot make sense of causation. It is not arguing that the precondition of causation is God. Indeed, it assumes that human experience and understanding in general and causation in particular are perfectly intelligible outside the Christian worldview. Thus, even if the cosmological arguments were sound, the unbeliever is perfectly justified in believing in and/or using the concept of causation.
This leads to a further point. None of the traditional arguments for the existence of God (cosmological as well as others) are in fact sound. All have been repeatedly refuted (see the writings of Hume, Kant, Russell and many contemporary philosophers). And the reason for this failure is precisely because they do not presuppose the Christian worldview. Rather, the traditional arguments give the concepts of being, causation, purpose, etc. to the non-Christian; they assume that all of these are intelligible on the unbeliever's worldview. This being the case, the apologist has already conceded to the non-Christian that the world is intelligible without reference to God.
According to Frame, the traditional arguments are better than this, however. He contends that the traditional argument from motion, for example, "does not necessarily begin with the assumption that motion is intelligible apart from God."[32] Moreover, he seems to say that the traditional arguments are best understood as making this assumption. Indeed, Frame asserts that Aquinas himself believed that the world is unintelligible apart from God.[33] If this were the case, Frame's assertion that Aquinas and Van Til are not as far apart as Van Til thought would be legitimate.
Is this really the case though? Are the traditional arguments presuppositional after all? While it is certainly true that the cosmological argument (or any other traditional argument) can be presented so as to presuppose the Christian worldview, this is not how it has been historically formulated. There is not one remark in Aquinas or Bishop Butler (Frame's major examples of traditional apologists) that even hints of the idea that the God of the Bible is the necessary precondition of intelligible experience. Why, then, does Frame make this error?
As I alluded to earlier, Frame thinks that because Aquinas's
cosmological argument attempts to prove the existence of God on the basis of
causation in the world, that this may be construed as the claim that the world
is unintelligible apart from God. But
this is to equivocate on the word unintelligible. Let me explain.
The traditional cosmological argument, for example, tries to show that we could not explain the existence of the world without God. Stated another way, without positing the existence of God we would be ignorant of the origin of the universe. We would not know how it came into existence and so the universe would be, in this sense, unintelligible. The transcendental argument, however, attempts to demonstrate that we could not account for the world, causation or whatever human experience we wish to speak about without presupposing the existence of God. Without this presupposition, the world would be, in this other sense, unintelligible.
This is a difficult point and so an analogy may be helpful. I do not know how jet engines work. In my current state of ignorance, jet engines are, in one sense, unintelligible to me. Does my ignorance preclude me from believing in jet engines and intelligently using the concept in communication? Of course not. I am justified in believing in them and am quite capable of speaking about them even though I do not know the mechanics of jet engines. And so in another sense, they are perfectly intelligible to me. In the same way, the traditional arguments at best show that non-Christians are ignorant of how the universe came about. It is in this sense that it is unintelligible to them. These arguments do not show, however, that their belief in the universe, causation and so on, are unjustified. In this sense, these things are granted to be perfectly intelligible to them.
Contrary to Frame, then, the traditional arguments do not have transcendental conclusions. They may conclude that God is the transcendent cause of the universe, but this is very different from concluding that his existence is transcendentally necessary. Though subtle, this distinction stands at the very center of Van Til's methodology.
Objection 2. The Uniqueness Proof for the Conclusion of TAG
Another criticism that has arisen against TAG is that the conclusion, God exists, does not necessarily follow from the premises. This criticism has taken many forms. Perhaps the most famous is John W. Montgomery's "Once upon an A Priori...."[34] In this article, Montgomery contends that there is no way to establish that the Christian God is the necessary precondition of human experience since there is no way to eliminate all of the possible alternatives.
Even Van Til's trenchant decimations of non-Christian positions are rendered ineffective by his ultimate presuppositionalism, since ¼ all the non-Christians whom Van Til chooses to criticize could employ his own two-edged sword against him, crying ¼: "Such criticisms are irrelevant, for right reason – true interpretation of fact and genuine application of the standards of consistency – begins with commitment to my presuppositional starting point!" And even if it were possible in some fashion to destroy all existent alternative world-views but that of orthodox Christianity, the end result would still not be the necessary truth of Christianity; for in a contingent universe, there are an infinite number of possible philosophical positions, and even the fallaciousness of infinity-minus-one positions would not establish the validity of the one that remained (unless we were to introduce the gratuitous assumption that at least one had to be right!).[35]
This criticism can be construed in two ways. First, it can be seen as the last resort of a non-Christian who has just been shown the impossibility of his own worldview and also shown that the Christian worldview is able to account for human experience. At this point of desperation he says, "yes, Christianity is able to account for human experience, but there may be another worldview out there that can also provide the preconditions of human experience." This move, however, is of little or no practical value for the non-Christian. In a debate, people argue about actual worldviews not what may possibly be the case. If Christianity is shown to account for human experience and, say, naturalism, Buddhism or Islam is shown to be unable to give such an account, it is of no aid to the naturalist or Buddhist or Muslim to make recourse to some unknown worldview that may, like Christianity, provide the preconditions of intelligibility.
Bahnsen rhetorical comeback hits
the mark. Suppose a basketball player,
say Michael Jordan, beats every worthy opponent in one-on-one basketball
games. He can justifiably claim to be the
best individual basketball player in the world.
Suppose further that another jealous (and peevish) basketball player who
was previously trounced by
Second, while this criticism is of no practical value to the non-Christian, it would be, nevertheless a serious criticism of TAG if correct. The reason is easy to see. If there are an infinite number of worldviews and TAG only refutes a small slice of them, if one may speak this way, then it has not established that Christianity is the necessary precondition of human intelligibility. That is, even granting that TAG demonstrates the absurdity of all actual worldviews, it does not follow that all possible worldviews are likewise absurd.
Bahnsen's comeback is to place the one who makes this move on the horns of a dilemma (actually a "trilemma"). The "unbeliever either (1) implicitly assumes the Christian's presuppositions, (2) considers it a mystery that not everything is mysterious or nonsensical, or (3) offers a worldview in which words and reasoning are meaningful."[36] On (1) the imaginary opponent loses the debate. On (3) the Christian proceeds to refute the proffered worldview. As for (2), Bahnsen contends that this is tantamount to acknowledging defeat. He then considers the possibility of one making a blind leap of faith; one who "hold[s] out the hope that someday, somewhere, someone will furnish an adequate autonomous worldview to protect unbelievers against the compelling rationality of Christianity."[37] This, he says, is identical with (2) and since this is acknowledgment of defeat, the opponent loses the debate.
There is a problem with this defense, however. The notions of "losing the debate" and "conceding defeat" trade on an ambiguity. In this context these notions can mean one of two things. First, they can mean that since the opponent resorts to a mere theoretical possibility that there is a worldview somewhere out there that can rescue him, this is a concession that he cannot produce a worldview to compete with Christianity. He is thus defeated in the sense that can offer no account of human experience. Taken this way, Bahnsen is correct. Second, these notions can mean that this move is philosophically illegitimate because appeals to mere theoretical possibilities are of no significance when establishing the claim that something is a necessary precondition of something else. Taken this way, Bahnsen is not correct. Winning the debate and proving that Christianity is the necessary precondition of human experience are two different things.
But Bahnsen makes the further point is that this criticism misses the thrust of TAG altogether. TAG argues for the impossibility of the contrary (the non-Christian worldview) and not the impossibility of an infinite number of possible worldviews. TAG does not establish the necessity of Christianity by inductively refuting each and every possible non-Christian worldview (as finite proponents of TAG, this is an impossible task), but rather contends that the contrary of Christianity (any view that denies the Christian view of God) is shown to be impossible. And if the negation of Christianity is false, Christianity is proved true. In other words, the structure of the argument is a disjunctive syllogism. Either A or -A, -- A, therefore, A.
At this point the clever opponent will simply deny the first premise. He will contend that it should not be construed as a disjunction of a contradiction, but a simple disjunction. The argument should thus be restated along the following lines: A or B, -B, therefore, A. And once this move is made he will then contend that while the argument is valid, the first premise involves a false dilemma. That is, he will grant that given A or B and the negation of B, A does indeed follow, but nevertheless maintain that the argument is unsound because the first premise (A or B) is not true. The reason being that there are more possibilities than just A and B. Given a true first premise, A or B or C or D ... n, the negation of B merely entails that A along with the disjunction of other propositions besides B (C, D,...n) follows.
In order for this to be successful, it is incumbent upon the opponent of TAG to defend two claims. First, he must defend the contention that the original first premise is not the disjunction of a contradiction and, second, he must show that there are other possible disjuncts besides B (what we can call the view that is opposed to the Christian worldview).
Since, as far as I am aware, there is nothing in the literature on TAG that defends either of these claims I will leave them aside for the present. However, this objection will reappear in a more sophisticated form when we survey the recent philosophical literature on transcendental arguments.
Objection 3. The Mere Sufficiency of the Christian Worldview
Another criticism TAG that has been around for some time is that while it (TAG) demonstrates the sufficiency of the Christian worldview to account for human experience, it does not demonstrate the necessity of the Christian worldview. Before moving to the objection itself, it is important to first understand the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions. A necessary condition is a condition that must be met in order to explain whatever it is that one wishes to explain. This explanation can take either a causal or logical form. In terms of causality, a necessary condition for fire is oxygen. However, the presence of oxygen alone is not sufficient to cause a fire; fuel and a struck match are also needed. Taken together, these three things, oxygen, fuel and a struck match are sufficient conditions for fire. In terms of logic, the necessary condition of a categorical syllogism leading to a conclusion is a major premise. A sufficient condition is that such an argument has both a major and minor premise.
Turning back to the objection, the opponent contends that even when it is granted that the existence of God is a sufficient condition for human experience, this does not prove that this is a necessary condition for human experience. Thus far, this objections is the same as (2). The difference, however, is that where (2) merely asserted the possibility of a worldview other than Christianity that could provide the preconditions of human experience, proponents of this objections claim that while there is no actual worldview (such as naturalism or Islam) that accounts for human experience they claim to have invented a one that can, like Christianity, account for human experience. What then, is this worldview?
The invented worldview is said to be identical to Christianity except for the fact that it differs from it at one (or more) particular points of doctrine. This made up worldview may, for example, hold all things in common with Christianity except that where Christianity teaches the doctrine of the Trinity, this other worldview, call it Fristianity, asserts a quadrinity – one God in four persons. Everything else, the doctrine of revelation, salvation, and so on are all the same as the Christian worldview. Another version of this objection maintains that only the "fundamental" elements of Christianity are needed to provide the preconditions of human experience (the Trinity, the doctrine of creation, etc.), but not the "non-fundamental" elements (the fall, the atonement, the second coming, etc.)
Bahnsen's response to this objection is helpful, but not completely adequate. He contends that this type of worldview merely apes the Christian worldview and, as such, is completely dependent upon it. That is, because this worldview has its intellectual origination in Christianity, it is not a legitimate competitor of the Christian worldview. Moreover, he maintains that it is the entire Christian worldview that provides the necessary conditions of human experience, not just a portion of it. The Christian worldview as a complete and organic system is necessary.
Proponents of this criticism retort that while it may true that Fristianity is a knock-off of Christianity, the origin of the position is not relevant. Just because Fristianity is an invention that just so happens to be intellectually dependent upon Christianity, does not mean it does not pose a serious challenge to TAG. TAG, after all, claims to establish that Christianity is the necessary precondition of human experience. The Fristian worldview hypothesis is only an attempt to show that while Christianity may indeed be a sufficient precondition it is not necessary. Fristianity, so it is maintained, is also a sufficient condition. Fristianity, thus, supposedly exposes the spurious nature of TAG's conclusion.
As for Bahnsen's other claim that
it is the entire Christian worldview that is necessary, proponents of the Fristianity objection reply that this is a claim not a
proof. It is not enough to assert that
the complete Christian worldview and only the complete Christian worldview is
the necessary precondition for experience.
Objection 4. The Move from Conceptual Necessity to Necessary Existence
The final objection to TAG is perhaps the most uncommon.[38] But the infrequent use of this objection should not mislead the proponent of TAG into thinking that it is not of serious consequence. Far from it. I consider this stricture to be the most powerful argument against TAG and the most difficult to answer.
This objection revolves around the consideration that proving the conceptual necessity a worldview does not establish its ontological reality.[39] Kant, for example, argued that the notion of causation is transcendentally necessary for thought (or at least human thought). Without the concept of causality there could be no thought. But just because causality is necessary for thought does not mean, so Kant argued, that the things in themselves (ding an sich) which exist independently of our conception of them, undergo causal relations. Conceptual necessity does not guarantee ontological necessity. In the same way, assuming that TAG is sound, all that is proved, so this objection goes, is that we must, in order to be rational, believe that God exists.
Bahnsen's response to this criticism is, like (3) above not totally adequate. He contends:
...because this is an apologetical dialogue (giving reasons, expecting argument, etc.), both parties have assumed that the true viewpoint must affirm rationality. Van Til argues that if the unbeliever's worldview were true, rationality would be repudiated, whereas if Christianity were true, rationality would be affirmed and required. So while the whole argument may be stated in hypothetical terms, the conclusion is actually established as true, since the hypothetical conditions was granted from the outset by both parties. (If the unbeliever realizes this and now refuses to grant the legitimacy, demand, or necessity of rationality, he has stepped outside the boundaries of apologetics. Furthermore, he forfeits the right to assert or believe that he has repudiated rationality, since without rationality assertion and belief and unintelligible.)[40]
Bahnsen's answer is that the issue is one of rationality. If TAG establishes that Christianity is the necessary conceptual precondition of human experience (including rationality) it follows that we must hold to the Christian worldview in order to be rational. And if somebody refuses to accept the Christian worldview or God's existence, he has no foundation for rationality and, without such a foundation, has no rational basis to object that the conclusion of TAG.
This defense carries a great deal of force. It effectively undermines the unbelievers ability to rationally reject the Christian faith. But notice that this defense construes TAG not so much as a proof for God's existence, but rather as a proof for the necessity of believing the Christian worldview. The problem with this, of course, is that although Christianity may be the necessary precondition for experience, it does not follow from this that Christianity is true.
From this survey of the critical literature of TAG four major criticisms have emerged. Objection (1) is, in its present form, relatively weak. It is easily shown that TAG differs fundamentally from the traditional arguments for God's existence. Objects (1), (2) and (3), however, are more difficult to answer and Bahnsen's responses to them are not, as they presently stand, entirely satisfactory.
Thus, despite the fact that Bahnsen both clarified TAG and defended it from common criticisms, his defense is programmatic rather than exhaustive. He offers a basic outline of how it works and how it is to be defended against stock criticisms, but he leaves a few questions unanswered. Particularly, he leaves questions as to whether TAG contains a uniqueness proof of the Christian worldview, whether TAG provides the necessary and not merely sufficient conditions of human experience, and whether TAG establishes the necessity of God's existence or merely the necessity of believing that God exists.
In the last section of this paper I shall endeavor to
develop Bahnsen's programmatic remarks and offer a
fuller defense of TAG. Before I turn to
this task, however, it will be helpful to survey the recent philosophical
literature concerning transcendental arguments (TAs). This literature contains similar objections
to TAs in general that were made against TAG, but are more precisely stated and
more vigorously argued.
Though Transcendental Arguments (TAs hereafter) have been
used by various philosophers since Aristotle,[41]
it is with the publication of P. F. Strawson's Individuals,[42] that TAs
have become a prominent fixture in contemporary philosophy. The discussion of the structure and nature of
TAs has generated a good deal of controversy.
In what follows, I will overview the contemporary literature on TAs with
the aim of setting the most common criticisms of TAG in sharper focus.
Before plunging into the current debate over TAs it will
helpful to first sketch the form TAs generally take as well review a few
definitions proffered in the literature.
The aim here is not so much to analyze the nature of TAs – this would
require a paper of its own – but to get something of a feel for what kind of
arguments they are.[43]
A TA takes on (roughly) the following form: For x to
be the case, y must also be the case because y is the necessary
precondition of x; since x is the case, y must be the
case. By itself there is nothing
particularly distinguished about this form of argument. For with it I could argue that having parents
is the precondition of having grandparents and since I have grandparents I must
have parents. Though this shares a
structure similar to that of a TA, it is not a TA because it appeals to a posteriori
knowledge – in this case, knowledge of basic biological facts. TAs are distinguished from this type of
argument by the fact that they appeal only to a priori knowledge – what we can
know without any appeal to experience.
From this it follows that form alone is not the distinguishing feature
that sets TAs apart from other arguments.[44] Most recent commentators are in agreement
with this conclusion. Grayling is
representative:
[T]o argue, or reason, or proceed transcendentally, or to
employ standard philosophical techniques transcendentally, is just to argue or
proceed, etc., with a certain aim in mind and a certain subject-matter to hand
. . . there is nothing distinctive about the form of TAs, and that what is
distinctive about them is their aim and subject-matter.[45]
What, then, is the aim and subject matter of TAs? Before answering this, it is helpful to
consider what is not the aim or subject of TAs.
TAs should not be confused with paradigm-case and/or polar concept
arguments popularized by Austin, Ryle and others of
the so-called
With this aim in mind, we are now in a position to survey a few
representative definitions found in the contemporary literature. According to Anthony Brueckner
a TA is:
an argument that elucidates the conditions for the possibility of some fundamental phenomenon whose existence is unchallenged or uncontroversial in the philosophical context in which the argument is propounded. Such an argument proceeds deductively, from a premise asserting the existence of some basic phenomenon (such as meaningful discourse, conceptualization of objective states of affairs, or the practice of making promises), to a conclusion asserting the existence of some interesting, substantive enabling conditions for that phenomenon.[47]
Brueckner points to three salient
ingredients that are involved in TAs.
First they begin with some unchallenged or uncontroversial phenomenon or
experience (e.g. I speak a language or I have an idea of a single spatio-temporal system of material things). Next, from this phenomenon they proceed
deductively to a conclusion. Finally,
this conclusion is a non-trivial condition for the possibility of the
phenomenon. Grayling further refines the
nature of a TA's conclusion:
...the aim of transcendental arguments is to establish the
conditions necessary for experience, or experience of a certain kind, in
general; and, at their most controversial, to establish conclusions about the
nature and existence of an external world, or other minds, derived from paying
attention to what has to be the case for there to be experience, or for
experience to be as it is.[48]
The conclusion of a TA either tells us something about the conditions necessary for experience or something about the nature of reality. That it, the conclusion of a TA may either be conceptual or ontological.
Ross Harrison adds one more characterization of TAs:
Transcendental arguments seek to answer scepticism
by showing that the things doubted by the sceptic are
in fact preconditions for the scepticism to make
sense. Hence the scepticism
is either meaningless or false. A
transcendental argument works by finding the preconditions of meaningful
thought or judgment. For example, scepticism about other minds suggests that only the thinker
themselves might have sensations. A
transcendental argument which answered this scepticism
would show that a precondition for thinking oneself to have sensations is that
others do so as well. Expressing the scepticism involves thinking oneself to have sensations;
and the argument shows that if this thought is expressible, then it is also
false.[49]
According to
While it is true that most (though certainly not all)
contemporary TAs are used as skepticism-refuting arguments, this aim is not a
necessary feature of them. Indeed, the
view that TAs are essentially anti-skeptical in nature rests upon a historical
mistake. This mistake is revolves around
a faulty interpretation of Kant's understanding of a TA. In
the next section I offer an analysis of the nature of Kantian TAs.
Before analyzing and evaluating contemporary TAs, it is obligatory to say a few words about Kant. Contemporary proponents of TAs, such as Strawson, often cite Kant as their inspiration. The TAs they offer, however, differ in at least one fundamental way from Kantian TAs. Whereas Kant's understanding of a priori knowledge, and hence transcendental reasoning, was closely tied to his view that the forms of sensibility and concepts of the understanding in some way constitute experience,[51] contemporary TAs tend to avoid anything resembling Kant's transcendental idealism.
Because of this, a number of philosophers have accused contemporary advocates of TAs, such as Strawson, of denuding Kant's TAs of their distinctiveness. Indeed, some go so far as to claim that the contemporary reformulations do not deserve the title of "transcendental argument" at all. Before one is tempted to cast aside this whole debate as a petty etymological squabble,[52] it should be realized that more than nomenclature or lexical proprietorship is at stake. Kant is, among other things, the father of TAs.[53] Thus it would be a rather odd conclusion to state that his arguments were not TAs. Indeed, one is tempted to say that whatever Kant is doing in the first Critique he is arguing transcendentally. This is perhaps what Jaakko Hintikka is getting at when he states that "the first order of business in any discussion of such arguments is to try to see what Kant understood by the term."[54] Ross Harrison is even more explicit, "Since Kant invented the label, anything properly called a 'transcendental' argument must have some analogy to the arguments which Kant used."[55] These considerations have weight and so, taking Hintikka's advice, understanding Kant's use of transcendental arguments shall be my first order of business.
In his preface to the second edition, Kant mentions in a note that the only addition to the Critique was the Refutation of Idealism (Bxl), the purpose of which was to once and for all do away with the scandal of philosophy: that the existence of things outside us must be accepted merely on faith. A cluster of controversial issues revolve around the interpretation of Refutation that are of import for the contemporary debate about TAs. Should, for example, the Refutation be viewed as Kant's main TA? Much of the recent literature on TAs insists that is the case. But this raises an immediate question. If the Refutation is indeed Kant's main TA, how are we to explain its absence in the first edition? A related issues concerns the Refutation place in understanding Kant's transcendental project. Even it is not Kant's main TA, it appears at least to be the clearest. Should we therefore use it at a heuristic in understanding the more difficult arguments contained in the Deduction? A final issue has to is whether the Refutation is an example of a transcendental argument at all. Since the answer of this last question is needed before we tackle the other questions, it is to this I shall turn.
To help answer this question, a preliminary questions needs to be addressed. What did Kant mean by the term, 'transcendental"? Perhaps the clearest expression is found in the Introduction of the Critique:
I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is
occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects
insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori (A11/B25).[56]
Elsewhere Kant says that the only way we can know something about objects a priori is knowing what we put into them (Bxviii). He also flatly denies that the word 'transcendental' has any reference to knowledge of things; it refers only to cognitive faculties.[57] Hence, transcendental knowledge is knowledge of what our cognitive faculties "impose" upon the world. From this Hintikka concludes, "Thus a transcendental argument is for Kant one which shows the possibility of a certain type of synthetic knowledge a priori by showing how it is due to those activities of ours by means of which the knowledge in question is obtained"[58] (