van Til 501

My colleague has done some very important work that answers several of the standard criticisms of vantillian apologetics.

In my opinion, the most important one is the so-called “uniqueness” claim. That is, the question arises, how does the presuppositional method prove Christianity in its concreteness, as opposed to merely showing that something like Christianity– say, affirming a Quadrinity rather than a Trinity– is a necessary precondition of thought?

This is reprinted from a chapter in The Standard Bearer.

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130 thoughts on “van Til 501

  1. If I may add my two cents in response to John Calvin…

    1. I’d like to see where the Bible *does say* that “God” is the “necessary precondition for logic, science, and ethics.”

    Proverbs 1:7?

    You must show how Islam cannot provide the preconditions. Show that with Fristianity now.

    I agree with the others. This Fristian god hasn’t revealed Himself.

    Juts *telling* me that Christianity “does the job” and no one else does, doesn;t cut it.

    I think TAG can be demonstrated through internal critiques. Of course, if a Muslim is not persuaded by the internal critique, the issue is now one of persuasion, which is a whole different matter.

    Of course, we can’t do internal critiques on worldviews we haven’t even discovered yet—or can we? To perform an internal critique in the first place one must presuppose predication. Can a hypothetical/conceptual worldview provide knowledge? Only hypothetical or conceptual knowledge—but this doesn’t give us any certainty, whereas Christianity can. Therefore, Christianity must be true by the impossibility of the contrary. TAG works on real and conceptual (undiscovered) worldviews.

    You say, “well what happens if we do stumble upon a worldview that does provide knowledge, such as Fristianity”. Well, we already know that Christianity provides knowledge. And we know that Christianity says it is the only true worldview, therefore Fristianity is wrong.

    You say, “but what if Christianity really was wrong all along and our knowledge is actually justified due to Fristianity—we just hadn’t noticed the self-contradiction?” Well, how would we go about demonstrating that Christianity is wrong? If we hadn’t found the internal critique, then we could only know that Christianity is wrong based on Fristianity’s say so. But this is merely a begging of the question. Christianity still wins because it, and not Fristianity, is providing us with knowledge—the very preconditions necessary for Fristianity to even make a case against Christianity. Christianity is basically saying to Fristianity, “Sorry, I’m already here doing the job. You’re still out of work.”

    Ultimately, John Calvin, the conclusion of all of this is going to manifest itself not in fancy philosphical arguments but in general revelation and the work of the Holy Spirit. In the end, yes, apologetics is just evangelism. And there’s nothing wrong with that. Like Van Til once said, is there any argument other than TAG that the Holy Spirit can use more effectively? TAG is amounts to nothing less than a call to conversion—hitting right at the heart of the matter: God’s authority versus man’s authority.

    At any rate, special revelation is a *contingent* aspect of Christianity, i.e., God did not *have to* reveal himself. So it’s not clear, then, why this is *necessary* for intelligibility.

    If God had not revealed Himself then this sentence would be utterly meaningless, seeing as you couldn’t justify any of the preconditions for meaningful communications.

    So, why don;t you stop doing apologetics and just claim that the problem with all other worldviews is that they are false: Allah doesn’t exist, the Demiurge doesn’t exist, Brahma doesn’t exist, etc. They are all non-starters.

    You’re confusing epistemic justification with apologetics. Intelligibility cannot be grounded in the attributes of a non-existent God—that’s the point that Tim is trying to make. Apologetic is when we demonstrate this to the unbeliever. We don’t merely tell them “Your god doesn’t exist” and walk away. Indeed, from my experience I’ve seen that presuppositional apologetics is 5% refuting other epistemologies and 95% explaining your own. Refuting any other worldview is pie, but getting them to accept yours requires a lot of question and answer time. And, ultimately, the Holy Spirit. :)

    Keith

  2. So the refutation of Fristianity is that it’s false.

    Sorry if I find that laughable.

    There’s two claims, the stronger and the weaker.

    FS is the strong claim: The hypothesis of Fristianity (equipped with n-inity) provides us with a framework or a worldview in which intelligible experience is possible.

    FW is the weak claim: It is possible that(The hypothesis of Fristianity (equipped with n-inity) provides us with a framework or a worldview in which intelligible experience is possible).

    FS claims that the proposition P (The hypothesis of Fristianity (equipped with n-inity) provides us with a framework or a worldview in which intelligible experience is possible) is true in the *actual* world (W1), whereas FW does not claim that p is true in W1; rather, he’s claiming that p is true in some possible world, say, W 57, distinct from W1. And if even that weaker claim is true, then the Vantillian TAG is in deep trouble. So, you can’t just say, “Tell me about the worldview and we’ll see if it’s coherent,” but rather, you need to show how *it is* incoherent. So, in W 57, there is a worldview, revealed to all the “humans” of W 57, in which all the essential elements required for the preconditions of intelligibility are in it, plus it has an quadrinity. (or, n-inity). Now, how is that worldview incoherent? I bet if I told you that there was a worldview in W 58 which had all the elements of the Christian worldview required for the necessary preconditions (note: we still must establish *what* those are), but posited a singularity of persons in the Godhead, you’d have no problem refuting that. Would you even waste time asking “where did you get that worldview?” No. And that’s because it’s a stall tactic intended to push the burden back on the guy telling you about the Fristian objection. Put differently, you strike out the first guy, you intentionally walk the Fristian.

    So, in W 57 the epistemological grounds upon which the Fristian makes the objection are the revealed words of Frist. What is that worldview? Well, I’ll explain it this way, “it’s the same as yours, yet it posits a quadrinity.”

    So it has:

    (A) an ontology that can account for the possibility of rationality:e.g. the existence of an Absolute Personality, in whom unity and plurality are equally ultimate, who comprehensively pre-interprets all facts, who creates man to think his thoughts after him, etc., etc. — in short, just the sort of ontological scenario that Van Til et al have claimed to be the ‘transcendental credentials’of Christian theism;

    (B) one or more doctrines that are *contrary* to orthodox Christian theism: e.g. four Persons within the Godhead, rather than three.

    And where are the contradictions between (a) and (b)? What about (b) does not allow for one to make experience in W 57 intelligible?

    So, if it is *possible* that one could make experience intelligible in W 57 with the conjunction of (a) and (b) then it appears that the strong modal claim of the TAGster (i.e., the IMPOSSIBILITY) of the contrary.

    hope that helps,

    John Calvin

  3. I can’t tell if you’re talking to me or JB24, but I’ll comment.

    So, if it is *possible* that one could make experience intelligible in W 57 with the conjunction of (a) and (b) then it appears that the strong modal claim of the TAGster (i.e., the IMPOSSIBILITY) of the contrary.

    If you’re whole point is to refute the idea of “impossibility of the contrary” with respect to all possible worlds and in light of certain contingent attributes of God, sure, I agree. But that’s trivial, in my opinion. (I guess some others here would disagree?)

    So is this the “big” thing you’ve been hung up over? How exactly does this destory TAG, other than in light of various superfluous qualifications?

  4. Hi Keith,

    You wrote: “If you’re whole point is to refute the idea of “impossibility of the contrary” with respect to all possible worlds and in light of certain contingent attributes of God, sure, I agree. But that’s trivial, in my opinion. (I guess some others here would disagree?)”

    Yes, that has been my point. The claim made in the above post was that Butler’s paper answers the “uniqueness objection” (of which F-ianity is a variety of). I said that it didn’t.

    It’s not trivial in the sense that TAGsters *claim* that they can refute the *IMPOSSIBILITY* of the contrary. So, with your admission, I’d just say that we should make sure we’re a bit more forthcoming with TAG.

    Now, in regards to the second part of your post, you wrote,

    “So is this the “big” thing you’ve been hung up over? How exactly does this destory TAG, other than in light of various superfluous qualifications?”

    1. It wasn’t *I* who made the claim that the uniquness proof had been made. I was “hung up” on the cliam made on this blog. If people don’t want me to be “hung up” on it, then don’t write checks you can’t cash. ;-)

    2. It’s not a “superfulous” qualification. if it were, then this section is Butler’s paper should have been a few paragraphs shorter.

    How is it superfluous when it offer a defeater to Van Til’s, Bahnsen’s, and Butler’s claim that: “Unless we presuppose the ontological trinity, human experience will be unintelligible.” So, given you admission, the strong modal version of TAG has been refuted.

    3. I’ve always claimed that this doesn’t bother me practically. I’ll still use transcendental arguments, I’ll still offer presuppositional analysis, and, as I’ve said (along with Butler above), the Fristian obejction is of no practical* value to the non-Christian.

    thanks,

    John Calvin

  5. I haven’t had time to read the latest comments (meaning those posted after I last posted)so this is not intended to be a response to those. Neither is this the rest of my response to post 87–I will try to respond later in the week.

    These are just some questions/statements I thought I would throw out there in case some of them may be helpful in developing the conversation.

    * Demonstrating that a worldview is false requires knowledge of that worldview. The Fristian interjects that his worldview is the Christian worldview with a fourth person in the godhead.

    This gives us knowledge concerning many aspects of the Fristian worldview but it also leaves us ignorant to some very important aspects:

    1) If this fourth person is just an addition to the Father, the Son (Jesus), and the Holy Spirit,then we have to ask ourselves if there is anything in the triune revelation that would make the new revelation of a fourth person impossible.

    2) In what way is the fourth person distinct from the other members of the quadrinity? What functional purpose does the fourth person serve? If the other three memebers are not the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as revealed in the Christian scriptures, then who are they? What is their purpose and plan? What is their character and nature?

    3) How does the quadrune god account for unbelief?

    4) Is it a part of the Fristian argument that all men know (and evidence this knowledge) of the quadrune god (as is the case with the Christian God)?

  6. 5) If all men do not know the quadrune god in some sense as all men know the Christian God then is the quadrune god not necessary for knowledge?

    6)If the quadrune god is not necessary for knowledge then how can the quadrune god, being ultimate and the creator/definer of all things not be the necessary source and benchmark of all knolwedge?

    7)If the quadrune god is the necessary source and benchmark of all knowledge then everyone who whishes to know something must presuppose him. If they are presupposing him then a transcendental argument should be possible to demonstrate this.

  7. I actually addressed these much earlier in the thread. The below is not numbered according to your numbering above.

    At any rate, the Fristian can go agnostic on much of these.

    A few reasons being:

    1) You must show that these areas are *necessray* for knowledge.

    2) You must show that being ignorant of the areas is *necessary* for knowledge.

    3) For much of redemptive history, God’s people didn’t know the role of the Spirit, could they not account for knowledge?

    4) Maybe the spirit doesn’t do anything but humbly submits to the actions of the others. This quiet submission gains him more glory.

    5) You’d have to show that the 4th person humbly submitting and not wanting to reveal his place in everything constitutes inconsistencies which would not allow for the preconditions of knowledge.

    6) People supress the truth of the quadrune god. That’s how unbelief is accounted for.

    7) If any on your list are *necessary* for knowledge then the Fristian God has this, but you must demonstrate that they are necessary.

    8) The transcendental argument is the same as yours: take those relevant portions which are necessary for knowledge, and add a quadrinity.

    9) No one has refuted this yet in 109 posts now. Interesting.

    John Calvin

  8. JC: “I actually addressed these much earlier in the thread. The below is not numbered according to your numbering above.
    At any rate, the Fristian can go agnostic on much of these.
    A few reasons being:
    1) You must show that these areas are *necessray* for knowledge.
    2) You must show that being ignorant of the areas is *necessary* for knowledge.”

    You’re wrong. These areas can clearly be relevant or irrelevant depending on how you answer. For example, if you have no role or known action for the fourth person he is superfluous. For example, if the nature of these quadrune characters is of the nature that to lie is good or (or, conversely, to always tell the truth) then it will affect the PtI. If you can’t define who these characters are then how can you know? Does the quadrune god have a worldview that can answer the argument from unbelief? This requires more than you might think and how you answer will determine several other aspects that may affect PtI.

    You are the one asserting the quadrune god therefore it is *necessary* for you to set forth that he does have the necessary PtI.

    JC, 3) For much of redemptive history, God’s people didn’t know the role of the Spirit, could they not account for knowledge?

    I would actually argue that many people throughout redemptive history did not have the justification for their belief in God that we have today (transcendental). Some did however have direct revelation etc… If you look closely you will find that the Holy Spirit did reveal Himself and have a function in the Old Testament and therefore we know that he was never superfluous.

    JC, 4) Maybe the spirit doesn’t do anything but humbly submits to the actions of the others. This quiet submission gains him more glory.
    5) You’d have to show that the 4th person humbly submitting and not wanting to reveal his place in everything constitutes inconsistencies which would not allow for the preconditions of knowledge.

    You now have a “hidden” person of the godhead who is superfluous. This is being arbitrary. How do I know that there are not 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 persons in the godhead that like to remain hidden and do nothing? How does this bring him glory?

    JC, 6) People supress the truth of the quadrune god. That’s how unbelief is accounted for.

    Why do people suppress the truth of the quadrune god?

    JC, 7) If any on your list are *necessary* for knowledge then the Fristian God has this, but you must demonstrate that they are necessary.
    8) The transcendental argument is the same as yours: take those relevant portions which are necessary for knowledge, and add a quadrinity.

    You are assuming that all those things which are necessary for knowledge are able to be switched around from person to persons without consequence. You need to argue that this is possible and actually have a god that you can attribute these things to before you can do a victory dance. This is why I am trying to get you to unfold some kind of definition of your god. If this is the way you want to continue the discussion then I will just answer like this: the relevant portions which are necessary for knowledge are not compatible with a quadrinity.

    JC, 9) No one has refuted this yet in 109 posts now. Interesting.

    Up until post 80 something most of us were discussing a different topic. Interesting. You have yet to actually define your god besides “has necessary preconditions.” Interesting.

  9. I think you will have to modify the Fristian god from your 4th and 5th points. Having a god who delights in hiding himself rather than revealing himself and who has a passive role rather than an active role does not provide for intelligibility because you could never know if this god had more members ad infinitum who liked to remain inactive and hidden. Clearly this is creating an arbitrary conception and therefore fails as an argument against TAG.

  10. By the way, note that you could have avoided the above problem had you simply decided to answer “he has the role which provides for the necessary preconditions to intelligibility”

    If you think constructing the argument in this manner is acceptable in other areas why isn’t it acceptable in all areas?

  11. So, then refute 5, 7, 7, 8 …n persons?

    I don’t need to tell you X, Y, and Z, about this God because you need to first tell me whether X, Y, and Z, are relevant to the preconditions. For example, you *asserted* that having an n-inity didn’t allow for the preconditions. Well, why? And, if the Christian knows there’s three, then the Fristian knows there’s 4. If you think God has revealed that there are only 3, then Frist revealed that there are only 4.

    Think about what you’re requiring here. You’re saying that the Fristian has to have answers for every question under the sun, in order for his worldview to be evaluable. “How does this fourth Person relate to creation? How about providence? How about Scripture…?” But why? Because these sorts of claims are relevant to preconditions of
    intelligibility? But what’s the case for *that*? Or is it because, in general, it’s impossible for there to *be* a worldview unless you can answer these kinds of questions? But presumably, the TAGster is committed to showing that orthodox Platonism (say) is incoherent or
    otherwise a transcendental failure, and yet the Platonist doesn’t offer any answers to these detailed theological questions :-)

    I don’t see why you’re trying Butler’s shuffle, i.e., shifting the Burden. I’ve addressed this at lengeth above, and so you should familiarize yourself with the arguments I gave above so i don’t have to say things twice.

    Fristianity *will* be the same as Christianity, if the latter is construed as the subset of Christian claims required for preconditions of intelligibility (replacing Trinity with Quadrinity, of course). And if the TAGster disagrees that this is sufficient, isn’t it up to *you* to point out what claims got left out of Fristianity, which were required for preconditions of intelligibility? Why does the Fristian have to do this? Isn’t it th*you* who is making the initial claim about what is required? Why can’t you give us a straight answer here?

    As I said above:

    It seems to me that in this whole discussion there is considerable ambiguity over what “Christianity” and “Fristianity” denote. TAGsters posit “the Christian worldview” as the precondition of intelligibility. I take it that this worldview is a *subset* of characteristically Christian claims. After all, this is how Butler deals with the book of Jude. On his view, you *don’t* need the book of Jude to get preconditions of intelligibility. Nevertheless, the canonicity of Jude is a characteristic Christian claim. So Butler must be presenting a particular set of doctrines and/or a set of historical particularities distinctive of and unique to Christianity, while leaving some things out, and then saying that *that* set of revelational/historical claims provides the preconditions of intelligibility.

    I’m not quite sure what this set amounts to. Is it the Trinity alone? Is it the Trinity plus creation? Is it the Trinity plus creation plus providence plus revelation plus redemption, sans the book of Jude :-) Or what?

    The idea here is that, presumably, Butler has something specific in mind. (And no, “the whole enchilada” isn’t specific enough ;-) All right. So all the Fristian needs to do is to say that “Fristianity” is whatever subset of Christian claims the TAGster thinks we need for preconditions of intelligibility, *except that* the Trinity is a Quadrinity.

    The inevitable reply from the TAGster is: “But how does that mysterious fourth Person relate to X, and Y, and Z?” And here’s my rock-bottom reply to that: the TAGster first has to *make the case* that X, Y, and Z are in fact *relevant* to providing preconditions of intelligibility. For if they aren’t so much as relevant, then it doesn’t matter that the Fristian declines to have an opinion on those matters. In other words, the cogency of the TAGster’s reply to the Fristian is parasitic upon the cogency of the TAGster’s original argument for which “Christian” claims provide the preconditions of intelligibility. So he needs to spell these out, the Fristian will mimic him, and that is that.

    The advantage of this approach is that it gives total leeway to the TAGster. It can’t be construed as a form of prejudice at all. Whatever
    the TAGster says is required for preconditions of intelligibility, the Fristian will posit it as well, with the exception of the Trinity. Presumably, because *the TAGster* posits a subset of Christian claims, the Fristian will do so as well. If he doesn’t posit the-existence-of-the-book-of-Jude, then the Fristian won’t either.

    Now, your response that “Your fourth person is just a worthless adjunct. If he doesn’t *do* anything with respect to creation et al, then he doesn’t amount to anything. So your Fristianity is, for all *practical* purposes, no different frombChristianity. On Fristianity, the Father, Son, and Spirit continue do whatever they do within Christianity. So it’s no wonder that Fristianity might supply the preconditions of intelligibility. It’s not a genuine alternative to Christianity.”

    Notice the cost of that response: the triunity of God, as opposed to the quadunity of God, doesn’t do any special work in providing
    preconditions of intelligibility. At best, it’s some sort of *plurality* in God (more specifically, unity within plurality) that
    does the trick. But if so, shouldn’t the TAGster be a bit more forthcoming about this?

    hope that helps,

    John Calvin

  12. JC,
    I realize that you were talking about Fristianity while I was occupied with other things so let me just start from the beginning –

    JC: “But what if the Fristian god chose not to reveal the role of the fourth member at this point in redemptibe history? Are we to infer from this that the fristian people or present day Frsiatian did not have a genuine Fristian worldview?” Such a conclusion would be absurd. So, Butlker would need to show that *knowing all the members role in salvation* is a “precondition for intelligible experience.”

    Me: What would be absurd is to assert a person in the godhead without any revelation of that person. For example, I might say I am Christian and I believe in the trinity but I also believe in four other members of the godhead, they just haven’t been revealed yet. I have no justification for my belief. In order for you to meaningfully assert that there is a fourth member in the godhead you need to assert that he has revealed himself.

    JC: 1) Why is the burden of the Fristian? It is you who claims to have an argument which shows that the trinity is necessary for knowledge. That is, show how having a triune God is necessary for knowledge, or a denial is necessarily false.. What needs to be spelled out? There’s more information with the Fristian’s claims than there are in a vast majority of other worldviews you refute. In your fine and helpful chapter you make these claims:… …”

    Me: We are going to have to discuss this whole “burden of proof” thing at length. If the Xian is arguing that the trinity alone provides the necessary PtI while the quadrune does not then the Xian needs to show how. If the Fristian asserts that god is quadrune and that he has revealed himself then it is the Fristians responsibility to expound upon exactly what this means and does not mean. So far, you have refused to do that because you believe that if I assert the trinity alone provides PtI then you are exempt from any and all burdens of proof. This simply isn’t the case in arguments of worldviews, ceteris paribus.

    If the Quadrune proponent asserts that a quadrune god does not violate any PtI and the Xian asks “what about ‘X’?” then the quadrune proponent needs to show that ‘X’ is not relevant rather than just claim that it isn’t relevant because the Fristian has framed the argument to win by default. An example of this would be you stating “My god is defined by property X which provides for the PtI.” How do we know that X does not violate PtI if for the most part X is an unknown variable? Please tell me if this is a valid argument in mathematics:

    The absolute value of x is x (would look like this in mathematical notation; IxI = x)

    In case you are a little rusty on basic algebra this is an invalid statement because we don’t know if x is a negative number or not. This is no different then you stating, “The quadrune god gives the PtI,” if the quadrune god is someone you haven’t defined. For you to say, “it doesn’t matter because I have already stated that X (the unknown fourth person of the trinity in this example) does have the PtI” is absurd because we first need to define X before we can know if that is true–the same way wee need to define IxI to know if x is true of IxI.

    JC: “Why must there be a ‘different order?’ Maybe we don’t know the fourth member’s role, just as the OT saints didn’t. On the Fristian worldview, man is still saved by grace alone, through faith alone, on the basis of Christ alone. The Father elects, the son dies, etc. Is it claimed that it is ‘necessary for knowledge’ that either (a) we know how the entire Godhead is involved, or (b) that the entire Godhead is involved? If so, shouldn’t you show that?”

    Me: I would agree with you that a different order isn’t necessary. If the character of God remains the same then all actions remain the same. The problem is that you are adding a character to the character of God and you have not worked out what implications this has. Again, it is an unknown variable and so we couldn’t possibly know whether or not this violates PtI. As I have argued elsewhere, if we don’t know anything of the fourth character except that he exists then we cannot know that this fourth character does not violate PtI. Thus, the Fristian who does not know anything about the quadrune god except existence DOES NOT have the transcendental justification any more than an ignorant Christian can have transcendental justification. This means that you don’t know if the quadrune god can give PtI and therefore your argument is not a competitor to the Xians TAG.

    JC: It wouldn’t affect the doctrine of sin. And, is a postmillennial eschatology necessary for knowledge? Well (a) what if the Fristain is postmillennial, and (b) if it is, then show how postmillennialism is necessary for knowledge.

    Me: At this point you don’t seem to be saying anything at all really. Your quadrune god has no effect on the Christian worldview accept to add a superfluous character who’s function is null. Naturally, then not adding or taking away anything to the worldview this won’t make TAG ineffective. You may argue that you are adding a fourth person but this isn’t really saying anything since the fourth person doesn’t do anything or is “hidden” and it therefore changes nothing. This is like me arguing that I believe a Snuff-a-luffagus is essential to God and therefore I’m a Snufftian and have defeated TAG. When you ask me who this Snuff-a-luffagus is and what he or it does I simply say it doesn’t do anything and who it is is unimportant; what is important is that it defeats TAG, but I don’t know how since I don’t know anything about Snuff-a-luffagus except that he is Snuff-a-luffagus.

    I notice that in the same post where your above comments are written you state, “Now, to the one who asked me how I know I’m not a mindless animal picking bugs out of my sisters fur, er, um, I know it by the impossibility of the contrary! ;-)” and you then go on to address my comments. I want to clarify that I never said this; I think you got one of my posts confused with another post.

    Further down the post train you state, “The distinction to draw there is that the Fristian is not saying that this is *really* the case, but just throwing our a position that, if TAG is correct, should be able to show how it does not account for the precondiitons of intelligibility. So, what is it about being *quadrune* (since all other relevant details are the same: creation, fall, redemption, etc), that does not allow for knowledge. Is being triune *sufficient* for knowledge (and we’d need to see if the Bible *in fact* does claim that “presupposing the triung God is *necessary* for knowledge), or necessary”

    Me: I believe Tim and you already agreed that a hypothetical Fristian argument is insufficient?? I don’t know I will have to read down and double check. I agree that if TAG is correct it should be able to show how any non-Xian worldview is false. It can only internally critique a worldview if there is a worldview to critique. The problem is that before one can say yea or nay concerning the Fristian god it must know something about this god. So far you have refused to define it in a way that distinguishes it from the Xian God and subsequently the Xian worldview (c.f. my Snuff-a-luffagus analogy).

    JC: “Whenever someone tries to prove it I get vaguge notions about “the one and the many,” “the personal way the members relate to eachother,” etc. But all of that can be had by the quadune God…What are the significant portions of the Christian worldview that make it’s presupposition necessary for knowledge? What does it mean to say that “Christianity is necessarily true?” What is “Christianity?” Is it “creation?” Well, there are possible worlds where God didnt have to create, thus “creation” is a *contingent* element of “Christianity.” So, what are these *necessary* elements?”

    Me: I have already addressed the issue of contingency and necessity in a much later post. I will wait for a response before I expound anymore. You may have a good point, though I’m not sure at this point, when you ask “what is Christianity?” Why would we say that the Trinity is necessary PtI? It is who God is (His identity) that is necessary for PtI. If being triune is a part of His identity then it follows that it is, in part, necessary for PtI by nature of the fact that it is who God is. Now this *may* mean that in arguing against a monistic or quadristic god that we turn to the revelation of God rather than logical violations. For example, when I have argued with a Muslim, I have never argued that his faith is false because his monistic conception of God violates a law of logic. If Islam is true, then being a unit would be a part of God’s identity and thus it would be “necessary” in that sense. Whether it creates a logical contradiction within itself, I suppose I am still not decided. What law of logic does it violate if I say that I am a trichotomy rather than a dichotomy? None, as far as my understanding goes, it is merely counterfactual (I hope you are not a trichotomist! I don’t want to debate that also). Though, perhaps if I had a higher understanding of logic I would see that it does violate some law.

    JC: “Further, the Fristian can claim to be agnostic as to the role of the 4th person. If we’re talking about, say, the 4th members personal designation, and not knowing this is the problem, then Mr. Butler must provide an *argument* which proves that “knowing the personal designation of a member of the Godhead is *necessary* for knowledge.”

    Me: I have already addressed this in a later post. Obviously the nature of the fourth person may or may not violate PtI. If we do not know if the fourth person violates PtI then we cannot argue that the Fristian god is necessary or sufficient for PtI. This defeats the Fristian argument against TAG.

    This about brings us up to speed! or at least up to speed enough. Now let me continue to respond to post 87 which I had promised to do:

    The part I didn’t address in post 87 has been indirectly addressed by me in other areas. Nevertheless, let me respond to particular objections in this post.

    JC: First, certain commitments are unspecified by the *Christian*, but presumably this doesn’t hurt TAG. There are hundreds of areas concerning which we wished we knew how God related to them, but we don’t. The Bible is silent. At the very least, it doesn’t tell us the whole truth of the matter, but only part of it. But if that doesn’t vitiate Christianity providing intelligibility preconditions, why does it undermine Fristianity?

    Me: This is a hasty generalization fallacy. You are assuming that all areas in which the Xian and Fristian gods are silent are the same. The Xian God is functional, active, and has revealed himself. So far, you have made the quadrune god unknown or unknowable, unfunctional, and inactive.

    JC: “So think about what you’re requiring here. You’re saying that the Fristian has to have answers for every question under the sun, in order for his worldview to be evaluable. “How does this fourth Person relate to creation? How about providence? How about Scripture…?” But why? Because these sorts of claims are relevant to preconditions of intelligibility? But what’s the case for *that*?”

    Me: I have a very hard time believing that you can’t figure out how these hypothetical questions you pose relate to PtI. If you truly don’t know this then I doubt that you are familiar with TAG as you claim to be. This is why I asked you to stop being superfluous in your demands for arguments. Let’s agree to move past what we already know and work with those areas which we disagree with or don’t know about. For me to go over why God must be sovereign or the creator in order for Him to be the PtI is a waste of time since we both know and I would presume agree to this point.

    JC: So a quadrinity is an “inconsequention” difference? The claim from the Van Tillians is that “*only* upon the presupposition of the *the ontological trinity* can human predication have any meaning.

    Me: I have already attempted to deal with this above. At this point I *may* be willing to say that the statement of the trinity is simply defining a characteristic of the fact of God.

    JC: Notice the cost of that response is that the triunity of God, as opposed to the quadunity of God, doesn’t do any special work in providing preconditions of intelligibility. At best, it’s some sort of *plurality* in God (more specifically, unity within plurality) that does the trick. But if so, shouldn’t the TAGster be a bit more forthcoming about this?

    Me: Obviously, to me, it is more than the plurality within unity of God. As I have argued it relates to the nature and function of this god. Thus, I object to the quadrune god not because it doesn’t give unity and plurality but because it hasn’t said anything about who this god is and what his function is. So far you have only said that this fourth person is non-functional and doesn’t want to reveal his place in everything (but apparently anything). Again, see the Snuff-a-Luffagus analogy.

    At this point I’m going to skip over some of your correspondences with Tim H. after my 100th post. If it is necessary I will go back, read, and respond tomorrow or over the weekend when I have time. Let me now address your latest post—In responding to your earlier posts I have responded to a lot of your comments here so I will only address that which is new or puts a new spin on things.

    JC: So, then refute 5, 7, 7, 8 …n persons?

    Me: I don’t have to refute positions that don’t say anything or rule anything out. Until these persons reveal something about themselves beyond “being” then there is nothing to refute.

    JC: I don’t see why you’re trying Butler’s shuffle, i.e., shifting the Burden. I’ve addressed this at lengeth above, and so you should familiarize yourself with the arguments I gave above so i don’t have to say things twice.

    Me: This is why I went back and started from the beginning. However, I didn’t see where you shifted the burden of proof back to the Xian… at least I wasn’t convinced. See my second or third response in this post where I deal with this more.

    JC: Fristianity *will* be the same as Christianity, if the latter is construed as the subset of Christian claims required for preconditions of intelligibility (replacing Trinity with Quadrinity, of course). And if the TAGster disagrees that this is sufficient, isn’t it up to *you* to point out what claims got left out of Fristianity, which were required for preconditions of intelligibility? Why does the Fristian have to do this? Isn’t it th*you* who is making the initial claim about what is required? Why can’t you give us a straight answer here?

    Me: The problem is that you haven’t exerted yourself beyond claiming “the quadrune god has the PtI” to providing a definition for who this god is. This means you are wanting me to build my own conception of the Fristian god in which he meets these requirements… since it isn’t my argument and I don’t think it can be done without being arbitrary then I’m going to push that burden back to you.

    JC: It seems to me that in this whole discussion there is considerable ambiguity over what “Christianity” and “Fristianity” denote. TAGsters posit “the Christian worldview” as the precondition of intelligibility. I take it that this worldview is a *subset* of characteristically Christian claims. After all, this is how Butler deals with the book of Jude. On his view, you *don’t* need the book of Jude to get preconditions of intelligibility. Nevertheless, the canonicity of Jude is a characteristic Christian claim. So Butler must be presenting a particular set of doctrines and/or a set of historical particularities distinctive of and unique to Christianity, while leaving some things out, and then saying that *that* set of revelational/historical claims provides the preconditions of intelligibility.

    Me: I already addressed this stuff about the contingency of Jude as the acts of God in history being related to His character. Furthermore, there is a big difference between arguing over an action and arguing over an attribute. You must distinguish that the reason why the book of Jude being canonical is a characteristically Christian claim is because it is a result of the character of God. Ultimately, a thing is called “characteristically Christian” because it relates to God’s identity — not to an arbitrary set of doctrines or beliefs.

    JC: I’m not quite sure what this set amounts to. Is it the Trinity alone? Is it the Trinity plus creation? Is it the Trinity plus creation plus providence plus revelation plus redemption, sans the book of Jude :-) Or what?

    Me: If you are simply being rhetorical then I don’t want to get into this since these posts are long enough by themselves. If this question is genuine then we can hash this out. Let me just say that if we do hash this out I’m probably going to argue against an Aristotelian concept of essential and inessential properties when it comes to God.

    JC: The inevitable reply from the TAGster is: “But how does that mysterious fourth Person relate to X, and Y, and Z?” And here’s my rock-bottom reply to that: the TAGster first has to *make the case* that X, Y, and Z are in fact *relevant* to providing preconditions of intelligibility. For if they aren’t so much as relevant, then it doesn’t matter that the Fristian declines to have an opinion on those matters. In other words, the cogency of the TAGster’s reply to the Fristian is parasitic upon the cogency of the TAGster’s original argument for which “Christian” claims provide the preconditions of intelligibility. So he needs to spell these out, the Fristian will mimic him, and that is that.

    Me: You keep saying you don’t see how they are relevant and I keep saying how they are relevant. Is this just more rhetoric or do you really not see how a secretive god has consequence over a revelative god? Or how a functional god has consequence over a non-functional god? I know you are playing the devil’s advocate to some degree, I’m just not sure how much.

    JC: The advantage of this approach is that it gives total leeway to the TAGster. It can’t be construed as a form of prejudice at all. Whatever
    the TAGster says is required for preconditions of intelligibility, the Fristian will posit it as well, with the exception of the Trinity. Presumably, because *the TAGster* posits a subset of Christian claims, the Fristian will do so as well. If he doesn’t posit the-existence-of-the-book-of-Jude, then the Fristian won’t either.

    Me: Assuming these subsets do not have anything to do with the identity of God then you still have the problem that you have not yet given your god identity beyond “being.” I don’t see how these “sets” (if you wish to call them that) are not a part of the identity of God. The problem is then that if these are related to God’s identity then you are merely arguing for the Christian God in a different form. For example, in the two equations y = 3x – 2 and 15x – 5y = 10. Both represent the same identity of a line, the only difference is the form they take. Obviously, this does pose a problem to the quadrune objection because in positing a fourth person the Fristian must be careful not to change the identity of God and therefore must not expound upon who this god is. In otherwords, for the fourth person to work it must be inconsequential, superfluous, and as you have defined non-functional.

    JC: Notice the cost of that response: the triunity of God, as opposed to the quadunity of God, doesn’t do any special work in providing
    preconditions of intelligibility. At best, it’s some sort of *plurality* in God (more specifically, unity within plurality) that
    does the trick. But if so, shouldn’t the TAGster be a bit more forthcoming about this?

    Me: No, that is not the case at all. It is not that the triune God doesn’t do any special work in providing PtI; it is that adding a non-functional quadrunity doesn’t have any effect on God’s identity since he isn’t saying anything about God’s identity.

    Anyway, I hope we are able to condense these down and focus these posts a little more so they don’t get out of hand. Sorry for the long post and I hope that at least some of this has been helpful rather than simply repeating what has already been said.

  13. Thanks John Calvin. I appreciate the recap, seeing as I haven’t really been following this debate.

    It’s not trivial in the sense that TAGsters *claim* that they can refute the *IMPOSSIBILITY* of the contrary. So, with your admission, I’d just say that we should make sure we’re a bit more forthcoming with TAG.

    I have not read Butler’s paper (though I plan to sometime). Nevertheless, I don’t see how the main point of TAG is changed any if it is found that God is not necessarily triune. Tell me if you would agree with the following statement:

    Certain preconditions for rationality must be met in all possible worlds, but the number of persons in the Godhead is not one of these preconditions.

    the Fristian obejction is of no practical* value to the non-Christian.

    In other words, the Fristian objection is never one that the unbeliever can latch onto and use as a defeater for Christianity? Agreed.

  14. Razz,

    Correct, it is of no practical value to the non-Christian. Second, with you admission that it is not the *trinity*, per se, that is needed, taken with “all the other stuff” 9whatever they are), then you’ve admitted that the *strong modal version* of TAG has been defeated and that Butler has not slammed the door on the uniqueness objection.

    JB,

    This is the first time you’ve debated someone defending Fristianity rather than talking about it with your friends. I know how frusterating it is to deal with the Fristain argument. I too didn’t want to loose the certainty TAG gave me (I was kind of like a Clarkian papist, you could say). It’s too scary to actually have to admit that TAG isn’t the silver bullet. I know, I was there.

    Now, I could deal with your post line by line, but why? Many of your questions could be answered from reading and trying to understand my points rather than just shoot them down.

    To just say, “I’m not familiar with TAG as I claim” can be met with thbis, “Well you’re not familiar with Fristianity, that’s why you’re not getting it.”

    I also see two different positions. One seems to say that a fourth person could do the trick. But this defeats the claim I quoted above that, “*only* upon the presupposiiton of the ontological trinity is predication possible.”

    So, if you’re going to admit this, then shouldn’t TAGsters be more forthcoming?

    If you admit to the *possibility* (i.e., when you said “may”) that 4 persons united as God coul’d do the trick then you’re *tacitly* denying the *impossibility* of the contrary!

    Your other main point, which you said oftecn enough, was this:

    JB: “I have already addressed this in a later post. Obviously the nature of the fourth person may or may not violate PtI. If we do not know if the fourth person violates PtI then we cannot argue that the Fristian god is necessary or sufficient for PtI. This defeats the Fristian argument against TAG.”

    1. Not knowing whether the Fristian god is necessary or sufficient defeats Fristianity??? Argumentum ad ignorantium anyone.

    2. You’re confusing an epistemic defeater vs. an ontological one. Frist could still *be* the precondition, even if people don’t *know* it.

    3. Here’s the role of the 4th person: he always submits the the will of the others and agrees with all their most glorious actions, this quiet submission brings him glory as well.

    Now, defeat Fristianity for us. I mean, you’ve here disagreed with Bahnsen and Butler that the OT people could offer a TAG. If you want to go back and agree witht hem, then you refute your argumentative strategy – i.e., we need to know all these details about the 4th person. You see, the OT saints could’t have answered your *all* these questions about the 3rd member, but if you allow them TAG then you need to let up on me. So, you’re on the horns of a dilemma: disagree with Bahnsen, Butler, and reformed theology by saying that the OT jews didn’t have a christian worldview, or agree with them and drop your argument against me.

    Don’t you see how you keep hurting your position Jonathan. For want of the nail the kingdom was lost.

    So, either refute Fristianity (which you’ve constantly failed to do), or admit that it isn’t the *ontological trinity* that is necessary, which is what you basically did above.

    At any rate, you’ve wasted your time trying to refute me and my knowledge (and I’m not even a fristian, I just told you *about* Fristianity) of Fristianity, etc. This never even touched the ontic fact of the matter that Fristianity could do the job as well.

    If I don’t get an argument against Fristianity I’ll have to go and let you think yourself the Fristain slayer. I’ve already refuted Butler’s shuffle you keep using. You don’t buy it. Fine. But I can’t offer any more arguments, people will just need to judge for themselves. I’ve already made my case for why I don’t need to tell you all the details of the 4th person. There is nothing in this combox which will not leave the cautious, reflective, intyellectually honest person, admitting that TAG has not made its strong modal case.

    bye now,

    John Calvin

  15. ” you’ve admitted that the *strong modal version* of TAG has been defeated and that Butler has not slammed the door on the uniqueness objection.”

    I was never defending it… my whole reaction to this debate, now that I understand it, is a mere rolling of the eyes. (Not to downplay your exchanges with those trying to defend the strong modal version.) So what’s *our* version called, if not “the strong modal version”?

  16. JC: This is the first time you’ve debated someone defending Fristianity rather than talking about it with your friends. I know how frusterating it is to deal with the Fristain argument. I too didn’t want to loose the certainty TAG gave me (I was kind of like a Clarkian papist, you could say). It’s too scary to actually have to admit that TAG isn’t the silver bullet. I know, I was there.

    Me: I’ll ignore the more ad hominem nature of this. Other than that let me state that I only claimed that I wanted to make progress (and have edification) in discussing the Fristian objection (c.f. post 67).

    JC: To just say, “I’m not familiar with TAG as I claim” can be met with this, “Well you’re not familiar with Fristianity, that’s why you’re not getting it.”

    Me: So in other words you are saying that one can not know how the sovereignty of God or God being the creator (and thus definer) of all things has any significance to TAG and still be “familiar” with TAG? I suppose “familiar” is a vague word. Certainly, one wouldn’t know how to defend the fact that God is the PtI without having some grasp of the significance of these facts.

    JC: I also see two different positions. One seems to say that a fourth person could do the trick. But this defeats the claim I quoted above that, “*only* upon the presupposiiton of the ontological trinity is predication possible.”

    Me: The point of the fourth persons “possibly” doing the trick relates to the fact that it is an unknown variable. It is like you are saying the absolute value of x might equal x and then acting like this means IxI does in fact = x. Could the absolute value of x be x? Sure, it is possible but this isn’t actually saying anything. It is merely a formula that may or may not work. Likewise, you positing an unknown variable into the godhead is not saying anything, it is merely positing a formula that may or may not work. Until x represents a particular the formula is useless, much like the Fristian objection at this point. IxI = x does not qualify as a mathematical problem since it needs particulars and my contention is that the Fristian objection with an unknown quadrinity doesn’t qualify as a problem either since it needs particulars.

    JC: So, if you’re going to admit this, then shouldn’t TAGsters be more forthcoming?

    Me: I don’t think the above admission requires me to be “forthcoming” to whatever it is you think I should be “forthcoming” about. All I have admitted is that you need to define the quadrune god.

    JC: If you admit to the *possibility* (i.e., when you said “may”) that 4 persons united as God could do the trick then you’re *tacitly* denying the *impossibility* of the contrary!

    Me: Within the context of my statement it is possible that IxI = x. However this doesn’t mean anything except that IxI = x is not a good definition of absolute value and that it needs to be modified to “the number of units to zero.” My statement that the unknown fourth person in the godhead “may” give PtI, and may not, only means that this is not a well-formulated argument and that you need to refine it. The presuppositional argument presupposes the soundness of the Bible. Presupposing this soundness, we know that all non-Xian worldviews are unsound. This is demonstrated every time a worldview presents itself and it is reduced to absurdity. Positing the Christian worldview with an unknown variable to make it a non-Xian worldview doesn’t qualify as an actual worldview. If it does then I don’t see why I couldn’t argue, “What if I had a worldview that did meet the PtI but wasn’t Xian?” and that this would somehow be a good objection.

    JC: 1. Not knowing whether the Fristian god is necessary or sufficient defeats Fristianity??? Argumentum ad ignorantium anyone.

    Me: Allow me to explain: Number one, you are committing a strawman if you mean to imply that I said this means Fristianity is ontologically false. Read what I said carefully. I said that if you don’t know whether the Fristian god is necessary or sufficient defeats the Fristian argument objection to TAG. In order for you to have an objection to TAG you must know, or better demonstrate, that the Frisitian god does in fact have the necessary/sufficient conditions to knowledge. You can’t simply say that you don’t know if your god is coherent but you know it defeats the TAG’s claim to the impossibility of the contrary.

    JC: 2. You’re confusing an epistemic defeater vs. an ontological one. Frist could still *be* the precondition, even if people don’t *know* it.

    Me: No, you’re just not reading very carefully. If “Frist” could be the PtI then people would have to know it in some manner in order to have knowledge. In order for it to defeat TAG you must be able to demonstrate that it is the PtI which requires knowledge. You believe that the Fristian objection destroys the impossibility of the contrary objection, correct? Well, what if no one ever knew the Fristian objection: could they still destroy the impossibility of the contrary? Might there be some defeater to the law of non-contradiction? Just because we don’t have the epistemic knowledge of one does not mean that there isn’t an ontological one. Have I just defeated the law of non-contradiction?

    JC: 3. Here’s the role of the 4th person: he always submits the the will of the others and agrees with all their most glorious actions, this quiet submission brings him glory as well: Now, defeat Fristianity for us.

    Me: This is a homunculus argument. I can posit a 5th person of the godhead who always submits to the will of the 4th and brings him glory. Now there is a 6th person in the godhead who submits to the will of the 5th and this brings him glory. Reductio absurdum. What does it mean to submit to the will of the others? If this means that he is just passive then you still haven’t escaped a non-functional member of the godhead. Otherwise, you have the problem of the above reduction absurdum where you are simply postulating an unnecessary regress. Being unnecessary how is he the necessary PtI?

    JC: I mean, you’ve here disagreed with Bahnsen and Butler that the OT people could offer a TAG. If you want to go back and agree with them, then you refute your argumentative strategy – i.e., we need to know all these details about the 4th person. You see, the OT saints could’t have answered your *all* these questions about the 3rd member, but if you allow them TAG then you need to let up on me. So, you’re on the horns of a dilemma: disagree with Bahnsen, Butler, and reformed theology by saying that the OT jews didn’t have a christian worldview, or agree with them and drop your argument against me.

    Me: I don’t see this as any great dilemma. If Bahnsen and Butler argued that *all* OT saints could offer TAG then I would disagree with them. If they argued that some OT saints *may* have been able to offer TAG then I would agree with them. For example, David speaks of the Holy Spirit in the psalms: was he equating the Holy Spirit with the Father? We don’t know. The Psalms also speak of the “son” in a messianic sense. Does this mean that they knew who the Son was in the godhead? It doesn’t say. Thus I’ll give you back your argumentum ad ignorantiam. Further, it matters what they knew about the character of God. This has been my argument against your fourth person. If the saints of the OT didn’t know about the character of God and thought that there were superfluous persons in the godhead then I would say they didn’t have TAG. I don’t see how you can have arbitrary members of God without being arbitrary.

    JC: Don’t you see how you keep hurting your position Jonathan. For want of the nail the kingdom was lost.

    Me: No!

    JC: At any rate, you’ve wasted your time trying to refute me and my knowledge (and I’m not even a fristian, I just told you *about* Fristianity) of Fristianity, etc. This never even touched the ontic fact of the matter that Fristianity could do the job as well.

    Me: This is like saying IxI = x is a good definition of absolute value.

    JC: If I don’t get an argument against Fristianity I’ll have to go and let you think yourself the Fristain slayer. I’ve already refuted Butler’s shuffle you keep using. You don’t buy it. Fine. But I can’t offer any more arguments, people will just need to judge for themselves. I’ve already made my case for why I don’t need to tell you all the details of the 4th person. There is nothing in this combox which will not leave the cautious, reflective, intyellectually honest person, admitting that TAG has not made its strong modal case. bye now,

    Eh!

  17. A few remarks wearing my moderator (not debator) hat. I’ll come back in a bit wearing my other hat.

    Some of these posts have simply gotten too long. I believe it was Robert E. Lee who once apologized that his letter was so long; but he “didn’t have time to write a short one.” I’m also thinking of an expression used a lot in the OPC: “everything has been said, but not everyone has said it.”

    So, wait a bit, think a bit, before blurting something out. Try to make a post highly focussed, ideally just addressing one point. Give others a chance to chime in before continuing.

    A good rule of thumb for length would be, no more than can appear on the page without scrolling.

    I’m purposely not using names; I love you all; let every man examine himself.

  18. It seems to me that as Christians we should believe the crux of presuppositionalism, that God is the creator and sustainer of all things, and that without Him there would be nothing. The problem arises, I guess, when we attempt to formalize this notion into imposed philosophical categories. …that being said, I still do have a few comments I would like to mention on the debate (I haven’t read through all the comments, so I apologize in advance if anything of what I say here has already been addressed)

    John Calvin, you bring up some very interesting points, and the gist of your argument seems to be that the preconditions for intelligibility are either meet in some possible world or actually meet in this world when given a particular Fristian framework. In either case, there are two (or more) frameworks which provide the preconditions for intelligibility thus, the Christian framework is not the necessary but rather a sufficient condition for the intelligibility of all human experience. On this point, I would like to offer my thoughts:

    1. As you yourself point out “we still must establish *what* those [the preconditions for intelligibly] are.” What follows from this, then, is that these preconditions as states of affairs, have not been individuated, and on these grounds both FS and FW seem fallacious to me. If we don’t know what particular states of affairs are necessary, then we cannot say which frameworks provide those preconditions, and which do not. All that really follows from this is that the preconditions need to be individuated (though (1) just why they *need* to be, and (2) just what would satisfy this criteria, I don’t think is made very clear). In any case to go on to say that the strong modal TAG has been refuted seems to be just as bold a claim as you’re making “the impossibility of the contrary” out to be.
    2. I agree with those who are asking that the Fristian worldview be shown. You describe it as the same as ours, only it posits a quadrinity. I think the Fristian would need to show that this is logically possible, since his assertion here is that this is a possible world. There may be a possible world in which God exist as a quadrinity, but it is not clear that in this framework everything else would be the same as Christianity. This is precisely what needs to be shown.

    Anyway, that’s just my 2 cents. As I said I haven’t read through all the comments, and I haven’t read all the way through Butler’s article yet either since I haven’t had the time.

    God Bless!

  19. Jatom,

    I don’t know that JC was saying that we don’t know what the PtI (preconditions to intelligibility)are but rather he was trying to make the point that the Trinity is *not* one of those preconditions. Plenty of presuppers have outlined essential aspects for PtI. Poythress and Van Til tried to make the Trinity one of these essential aspects. JC would argue, I believe, that they only showed that plurality in unity is necessary and that there is nothing significant about the number being 3 in particular. Thus the introduction of a quadrinity.

    I have tried to argue along Butler’s line of thought (I think) that one cannot successfully introduce a quadrinity without defining it and how one defines it determines how the rest of the debate goes. JC believes it isn’t necessary to define the quadrinity beyound “has necessary PtI.”

    I mentioned something early that I don’t think caught any attention, or wasn’t worth responding to but let me ask again. What if I posed another worldview called Bristian where man was a trichotomy rather than a dichotomy. Would this change the identity of man so that when I thought I knew myself as a dichotomy I really didn’t? Also, what makes the Trinity essential and the dichotomy inessential?

    (Sorry if I misrepresented your view JC.)

  20. Thanks for clarifying. In post 103 JC said “I bet if I told you that there was a worldview in W 58 which had all the elements of the Christian worldview required for the necessary preconditions (*note: we still must establish *what* those are*)…” I took this to mean that we don’t know what the necessary preconditions are. Maybe he meant that although we don’t know what those preconditions are per se, we do at least know one attribute that isn’t one?

    I agree with you on the whole “one cannot successfully introduce a quadrinity without defining it” deal, for the simple fact that Fristianity is said to be the same on every level except for the quadrinity. If I introduced Tristianity, and *asserted* that it was the exact same as Christianity except for the fact that it was possible for God to lie (even though He never did, thus His revelation remained the exact same), I think this framework would actually turn out to be *radically different* from the Christian worldview. For one thing passages like Hebrews 6:18 would need to explained or ignored, for another, how we understood morality, morality in relation to God, God’s holiness, God in relation to His own nature, and God in relation to logic would need to be re-defined. On the whole, I think this would turn out to be a very different Christianity.

    As far as the trichotomy thing, there are trichotomist within Christendom so you wouldn’t need to introduce Bristianity. Unless you meant that man actually is a dichotomy and that in this particular possible world man was actually a trichotomy?

  21. Jatom,

    I believe JC was playing Devils Advocate to a degree with establishing the PtI. At the same time he was saying that we don’t know what the PtI are concerning Trinity versus Quadrinity.

    My Trichotomy example was meant to make a point concerning the Fristian objection. We are conceptualizing a quadrune god as something radically different than the Triune God and asserting that this destroys TAG. I’m merely asking that if adding a fourth aspect to God changes the identity of God so that those who believe in the triune God believe in a different God then shouldn’t adding a third aspect to man change the identity of man so that dichotomists believe in a different set of men than the trichotomists?

  22. Trichotomy/Dichotomy:

    Obviously part of the problem with my analogy comes in the classification of “persons.” While I am a dichotomy I am only one person whereas Trinitarians define God as 3 different persons.

    How do we define “person”? Each person in the trinity shares the same goal and will, correct? What does it mean to have “three distinct” persons?

    …I might start playing devils advocate myself.

  23. I take #106 as letting me off the hook to write on possible worlds this week, except for the partial remarks that may come out of this thread.

    In 92 and 99 I urged John C (and Bill too if he is lurking) to admit that “type 1” fristianity won’t work. It either forgets that revealing himself is a necessary part of the necessary God; or it is incoherent in claiming has revealed himself though not to anyone in particular. But revealing to someone is part of the phenomenology of revealing oneself.

    But John C you won’t make this concession, so we need to explore why.

    It seems as though you think TAG works by deducing a god apriori that would make experience intelligible, then going out there and finding, “look at that! The theology taught by the Bible matches this perfectly! Therefore, the Bible is true!” For in #109 you say

    8) The transcendental argument is the same as yours: take those relevant portions which are necessary for knowledge, and add a quadrinity.

    But TAG does not deduce a god apriori. Rather, it unpacks the thesis, “without the self-contained God Who has revealed himself, no logic or ethics.” We come in claiming to know this God, even his name, Jehovah. If God had not revealed himself to us, there would be no argument.

    The claim is elaborated differently depending on the subject being “TAGGED.” Thus, we discover that Jehovah’s three-in-oneness is the “thing” that comes to bear in unpacking the thesis as it bears on predication: “without Jehovah (who is three-in-one), no predication.”

    Note that once this is understood, it is not even necessary to oppose a hypothetical four-in-one god; you could equally well oppose a three-in-one god that was not Jehovah. Success at doing that would be just as fatal to us as success at some hypothetical four-in-one god. It is not the form we seek, but the concrete form.

    This is why I asked (#86), “is it your point, that to determine that God has revealed himself one must resort to findings that are empirical and thus not transcendental?” Since you did not take the bait, I assume that is not your “problem.”

    You have discussed variants of type-2 Fristianity (“missing the book of Jude”) and type-3 (“I know a guy who claims an alternate revelation”), but I’m still waiting to hear that you have given up on type-1. If nothing else, even if you end up showing that we have not shown uniqueness, it would be a contribution to the literature that would emerge from this thread if you would help clarify the exact “region of possibility” where it fails.

    Your only attempt to preserve “type-1” Fristianity is what you call “possible worlds.” We need to hear more about what you mean by that.

    If you mean, “Jehovah is one possible god, but there are other possible gods as well,” then the answer is: if that were so, then we would know that Jehovah was not the living and true God, and thus no God at all. For, the living and true God must himself be the source of all possibility. To suppose that there is a “possible world” where Jupiter was god would imply that there is a manifold of possibility behind God himself, of which he is one contingent instance.

    Thus, we can deconstruct the possible-world evasion transcendentally as well.

    But perhaps that’s not what you meant.

  24. Hello Everyone,

    I just discovered this blog. I also noticed that I was mentioned in comment 15 by Ron D. I am currently doing a series on Van Tillian apologetics critiquing the claim that the method provides objective, certian proof for the existence of God. Ron says that my problem is essentially ethical and not logical. Does that mean my critique is logically valid but not ethically valid? If interested, my blog address is http://www.christianlogic.com/brianbosse/.

    Sincerrly,

    Brian

  25. Well this is how we need 3 persons as compared to 1,2,4,5,6,7,etc. This is only by analogy and not necessarily how the trinity works but it does show why we would need 3 persons (though we don’t know how it works). For example, one person cannot create unity and diversity simply by agreeing on a subject because it would only be unity, two people can’t agree because it would still be unity, nor could they disagree because that would be diversity. But if 2 persons agreed on a subject, creating unity, and another person disagreed on the same subject, then you would have unity and diversity on a subject. Now one might ask why not 4 person, they can do the same thing, 3 agree and one disagrees, but you would say the 4th person is unnecessary by using occam’s razor. Therefore only needing 3 persons and that is why we need and confirm a trinity to have unity and diversity and not a “quadtrinity.”

  26. Jonathan — you would need to be able to formulate this argument without making disagreement necessary — since the persons of the Trinity never disagree. Perhaps you mean it as a heuristic — the point being there must be a “gegenstand” or third independent entity for the “two” to agree about.

    As I pointed out in #127, we must constantly remind ourself that “proving the necessity of some abstract trinity” would not necessarily lead one to Jehovah any more than a quadrinity would. Our dependance on revelation is an essential part of the argument; and revelation cannot be a merely formal concept.

    Nevertheless, heuristics such as you propose have an honorable place since Augustine, and can be helpful.

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