My colleague has done some very important work that answers several of the standard criticisms of vantillian apologetics.
In my opinion, the most important one is the so-called “uniqueness” claim. That is, the question arises, how does the presuppositional method prove Christianity in its concreteness, as opposed to merely showing that something like Christianity– say, affirming a Quadrinity rather than a Trinity– is a necessary precondition of thought?
This is reprinted from a chapter in The Standard Bearer.
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nice. where is this article originally from? where can i get sum more? more butler? viva Miguel Mayordomo! viva!
I took a quick peek of it. Is this a reproduction of Mr. Butler’s section in the festschrift? Looks good anyway, thanks.
Indeed so. I added that fact to the post. Tnx.
Thanks very much for posting this. Keep up the good work.
Hello,
1. If logic is possible then triune God.
2. Logic is possible.
3. Therefore triune God.
I didn’t see where the ariticle proved P1.
Second, doesn’t Mr. Butler’s counter merely disprove a *this world* Fristian argument? That is, in *this world* there’s no revelation from “Frist.” But what if the fristian shifts this to a *pssoible worlds* debate, claiming that in some possible world, W, there is a Fristian revelation? Then, when asked about, say, the 4th members role in creation, salvation, procession, etc., he claims it’s mysterious (just like the Christian claims certain mysteries, e.g., incarnation, trinity, etc.,).
So, though I think Mr. Butler’s argument was very helpful, I guess I’m looking to see the whole *necessary* part established a bit better.
P.S. I also noted that Mr. Butler said he’d address Michael Martin’s last salvo where he says that he’s not a materialist. Just letting you know, I’m really interested in seeing that sometime in the (near?) future!
P.P.S. Also, my good friend has been waiting for quite some time now for part 4 of Mr. Butler’s argument against Eastern Orthodoxy. Is there any way I could get the low-down and find out when we might see that?
thanks
John Calvin,
Concerning your first objection: There is a difference between proof and persuasion. A proven argument is an argument in which all of the premises are true and the argument takes a valid form. Your above syllogism is sound and valid and therefore a proof that God exists. Whether or not it is persuading is a different story. You object that Mr. Butler has not proved P1, but why didn’t you object that Mr. Butler did not prove P2? Persuading you of each premise may create an infinite regress and is rather subjective. Bahnsen goes over all this in his lectures of Christian philosophy.
I believe (1) follows from
If not God then not logic.
Also, saying “the triune God” is fine as long as that is not a merely formal concept.
Hi Jonathon and Beza,
Jonathon,
1, That modal modus ponens no more *proves* that the Christain God is the precondition for logic than does this argument:
1. If logic then quadrune God.
2 Logic.
3. Therefore quadrune God.
Now, imagine you asked me to prove P1 and I said, “Well There is a difference between proof and persuasion. A proven argument is an argument in which all of the premises are true and the argument takes a valid form. Whether or not it is persuading is a different story.”
You need to *argue* for P1. P1 is an *assertion.* I want someone to show “the *triune* God is *necessary* for logic,” not assert it.
Yes, I own almost everything Bahnsen ever wrote or said, I don’t see where he covered that.
So, though we may *believe* P1, that doesn’t translate into “we can *show* P1.
Beza,
If 1 “follows” from “if ~G then ~L” then, fine, but it’s still another unprovedn *assertion.*
And, I believe the proof of the quadrune god flows from, “if not quqdrune god, then not logic.”
If you guys *have* an argument that *shows* that the trinity is *necessary* for logic etc., then *show me* how being a *trinity* is necessary and being a quadrinity involves a *reductio.*
Thanks,
John Calvin
JonathanB said, “There is a difference between proof and persuasion. A proven argument is an argument in which all of the premises are true and the argument takes a valid form. Your above syllogism is sound and valid and therefore a proof that God exists. Whether or not it is persuading is a different story.”
Ahh I see! The typical Van Tillian dodge. Convenient, ain’t it? Maybe the proponents of those nasty, Satanic Traditional Arguments should start using “The Dodge” whenever objections are hurled their way? Then we can all have irrefutable proof without having to so much as listen to objections! Let’s all do the “Van Tillian Dodge”! :)
JonathanB said, “Persuading you of each premise may create an infinite regress and is rather subjective. Bahnsen goes over all this in his lectures of Christian philosophy.”
Sometimes I have to wonder why *some* (or probably most) Van Tillians call their ‘system’ apologetics. Why not just call it evangelism since it’s so short on argumentation? Anyhow, speak of infinite regress is *your* problem, not that of your interlocutors. Remember who’s making the grandious claims.
John– The problem with saying “if not quadrinity, then no logic” is that it is only picking up one aspect of what is necessary, namely: the unity-in-diversity of the living and true God. If one said “if no ‘God in whom unity and diversity are equally ultimate’Â then no logic,” that would be true as far as it goes. By itself, it would allow substitution of “quadrinity” for the first term. But this would neglect other aspects of the case. Namely, the living God who created man in his image and reveals himself generally and specially.” In that sense, the Quadrinity comes up short.
I think your objections would be more helpful if you would focus on the specifics of Butler’s presentation, even if only to show that some consideration were left out. That is, your objection is unpacked and addressed in detail. If it fails, it would be useful to show why it fails. It almost seems as though you are saying, “if you can’t convince me with a single three-term syllogism, then you are being arbitrary.”
Beza said, “The problem with saying “if not quadrinity, then no logic†is that it is only picking up one aspect of what is necessary, namely: the unity-in-diversity of the living and true God. If one said “if no ‘God in whom unity and diversity are equally ultimate’ then no logic,†that would be true as far as it goes. By itself, it would allow substitution of “quadrinity†for the first term. But this would neglect other aspects of the case. Namely, the living God who created man in his image and reveals himself generally and specially.†In that sense, the Quadrinity comes up short.”
So in other words assume that Christianity is necessary without the benefit of argument? Even though a Quadrinity *may* neglect ‘other aspects of the case’, have these ‘other aspects of the case’ shown to be necessary? Of course ‘fristianity’ would be different, but so what – Christianity has not shown to be necessary. What doctrines constitute the essence of Christianity and how do *these* doctrines and *only* these doctrines provide the preconditions of intelligibility?
I said, “Of course ‘fristianity’ would be different, but so what”
this should read: “If ‘fristianity’ is different, then so what”…
The former was pre-edit.
Beza,
I said what you said. If you can qualify “triune God” then so can I. So, read that as “living quadrune God who created man in his image and reveals himself generally and specially.â€
All I’m saying is that when it comes to atheism you show how it reduces to absurdity. When dealing with polytheism, you do the same. When dealing with Islam, you do the same. So, show how positing a quadrune god, with relevantly the same worldview, refutes itself.
I never said I wanted a three step syllogism.
tnaks,
John Calvin
Jonathan,
Good going. Recently Brian B. from the logic board weighed in a an old blog post of mine (below). He’re a guy who is very good with logic yet does not grasp the profundity and simplicity of TAG. I’m persuaded that the problem is ethical and not intellectual, as is the problem so many have with Calvinism.
Blessings,
Ron
p.s. Mike B’s article is very significant.
http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2006/03/impropriety-of-trying-to-prove.html
Looks like there has been some good conversation going. I’m sorry that I have not been able to partake. Maybe I’ll throw in my two-cents when I have more time. Until then, cheers.
Ron,
Hey man how are you doing? Thanks for pointing out this (First Word) blog on your page by the way, I would have never found it myself. I think you’re right about the ethical issue. Some people just refuse to get it.
I think my main request for both Bill and John is to follow the “debate rules” by actually rebutting Butler’s specific discussion of Fristianity. This can be found under IV.A. of the essay. Otherwise, it comes across a bit like “ignore that man behind the curtain; I’ve got my anti-vantillian argument #17, which no one can answer in five lines or less.”
John Calvin,
What do you think of the 21st century?
Do you shop at Wal-Mart?
Are you still fashioning that long beard and square hat?
Good posts all.
Mr. Calvin, I will try to get both the Martin and EO article out by the end of the month.
As I said at the end of my article, it was not meant to be the last word. More needs to be said.
As for the possible worlds question, five quick points for now. First, even if the argument is successful in showing the Christian God is not the necessary precondition to logic, it does show (or at least assume) that a one-in-many God is necessary. From a practical point of view, this provides little succor those who reject Christianity.
Second, as I contend in the article, the Fristian WV needs more spelling out. The appeal to the mystery of quatrinity is not the same as the Christian’s appeal to mystery of the Trinity. After hundreds of years of controversy and consideration, the Church knows where the mysteries lie in Christianity. But we are at a loss to say any such thing about the nature of a quadrune God.
Third, Frame and Poythress have done much fine work on the Trinitarian anology in science, language, logic, and other areas. If there is substance to their work, it appears that triads are a irreducible component of both our experience of the world and the world itself. In anticipation of the objection that quads may be an irreducible component of another possible world, I would make recourse to Davidson’s contention that we could not even conceptualize what that would be like. At best, we would have to map it out with our conceptual scheme and thereby lose the quad aspect of it in the process. The upshot is that only a Trinity not a quadrinity can account for our conceptual scheme, and that we could not even recognize a world as foreign as the one postulated by the Fristian.
Fourth, if Christian theism is a sufficient condition for logic, then it is also a necessary one. This is because the Bible implies that God is the fountain of all being and possibility. In other words, God’s existence is a necessary condition for logic and everything else. If the triune God’s existence were merely a sufficient condition for logic and not a necessary one, Christianity would be false since it makes the stronger claim.
This is another way of saying that if there is some possible world in which Frist exists, then it seems that the quadrinity is a necessary being; that the quadrinity exists in all possible worlds. This implies that the Trinity exists in no possible worlds, including the actual one. Thus, if the Fristian objection works, it is a proof for the non-existence of the Trinity.
Fifth, Tim and I have some deeper issues with the relationship between modal logic and the Trinity. I’ll save this for another occasion, however.
These are preliminary thoughts. The third and fourth points (the third especially) need to be developed. Hopefully there is enough to steer the debate in a clearer direction.
Beza, Jonathon, and Ron,
I am *trying* to find the argument, so for me it’s not an ethical issue. I used to be a staunch defender of the “impossibility of the contrary” argument. For now, I can’t say it has been *shown,* regardless of what I *believe.* So, let’s keep the Freudian analysis to a minimum. Otherwise, I’ll have to point out that I am just trying to be intellectually honest and you guys are automotons. :-)
Now, I said that I’d like to see someone show how the quadrune worldview (which is relevantly the same as the Christian worldview) ends up *refuting itself.* This is what you’ve done to all other worldviews, do it to this one.
Butler points out that it would be different w/respects to, say, the 4th members role in salvation. But, he also says that,
“Furthermore, for much of redemptive history God’s people did not have the privilege of reading Jude (old covenant times) and even in the era of the church, Jude’s canonicity was not universally acknowledged until the fourth century. Are we to infer from this that the old covenant people or certain second century Christians did not have a genuine Christian worldview? Such a conclusion would be absurd.”
But what if the Fristian god chose not to reveal the role of the fourth member at this point in redemptibe history? Are we to infer from this that the fristian people or present day Frsiatian did not have a genuine Fristian worldview? Such a conclusion would be absurd. So, Butlker would need to show that *knowing all the members role in salvation* is a “precondition for intelligible experience.”
So, maybe we could get some interaction. Otherwise, it comes across a bit like “ignore that man behind the curtain; I’ve got my TAG assertions and if you question them I’ll call you unethical!”
thanks,
John Calvin
Be careful how you respond now, John Calvin. Remember due to increased terror, I’m listening and watching always, I’ve got to protect freedom – I’m going to smoke out those terrorists!
Beza said, “I think my main request for both Bill and John is to follow the “debate rules†by actually rebutting Butler’s specific discussion of Fristianity.”
The last part of my previous post addressed a bit of Butler’s article. But I don’t think Butler has provided much more than you.
Neither do I see why the “details of Fristianity need to be spelled out” – remember the modal claim of the right-wing Van Tillian: the *impossibility* of the contrary. I’m not sure how one can prove an *impossibility* by refuting one worldview at a time. Also in considering this, keep in mind Butler’s dichotomy – it’s either Christianity or Non Christianity.
Ron,
You said, “I’m persuaded that the problem is ethical and not intellectual, as is the problem so many have with Calvinism.”
And proof of this is where? Is this so because you say so? Quite a slam against practically all Christians, Ron. But this is another convenient strategy – you know – claim that your opponent doesn’t get it because he is unethical (or that he is ‘the devil’ as bobbie bushay’s mom says in the Waterboy) and then all your VT troubles disappear!
I am interested in hearing an explanation as to how the Fristian wv is as you say “(which is relevantly the same as the Christian worldview)â€. For the Fristian wv is not the Christian wv (indeed they would be vastly different, after all everything we know of the Christian wv pertains to the Christian God and His creation, it’s nature etc. etc.), and if the Frist wv has been revealed on some possible planet out there, you would be begging the question from the outset by assuming that you happened to be a man made in the image of this Fristian god, and not some mindless animal, and all of this “rational†dialogue isn’t just you picking bugs out of your sister’s fur. Perhaps I’m not fully grasping everything; I do intend to re-read everything. Either way I would appreciate an explanation.
Thank you,
josh
>>And proof of this is where?
>>And proof of this is where?
Chill out fellas. I’ll grant that you’re not “unethical”. Now if you will excuse me I’ll get back to my “convenient Van Tillian dodging” “evangelism since it’s so short on argumentation” and “infinite regress.” And remember everyone, watch out for “those nasty, Satanic Traditional Arguments.”
:)
Fellas,
Let’s focus on arguments. There were a number of good points made so far, but they are getting lost in the noise.
This conversation is getting kinda long. Maybe you guys should creat a message board section for this or something? If so, name it in my honor. Anyway, let me try to catch up with some of the conversation.
In regards to post number 9:
Your quadrune syllogism is not a “proof” because the first premise is false. In order to have a good argument you need valid form and sound premises. Conversely, your initial syllogism was a “proof” because it had a valid form and sound premises.
Now if I were to “imagine you asked me to prove P1 and I said, “Well There is a difference between proof and persuasion. A proven argument is an argument in which all of the premises are true and the argument takes a valid form. Whether or not it is persuading is a different story.—
I imagine I would say, “you’re right, there is a difference between proof and persuasion. I don’t know whether or not your argument is proven. This means I don’t know; this does not mean that it isn’t proven. “Proof” isn’t a mere epistemic matter. Kudos to making such a good point! You’re a genius.”
When you say “prove it to me” you are asking for persuasion and comprehension of the proof. Whether or not you can comprehend it or be persuaded of it is irrelevant to the fact itself.
Is P1 an assertion? Yep. Is P2 an assertion? Yep. Is any premise an assertion? Yep. When I support P1 with P1a is that an assertion? Yep. If you want to reject P1a can you call it an assertion and then tell me I haven’t persuaded you of P1a? Yep…
I’m glad you own almost everything Bahnsen ever wrote or said… maybe I could borrow some stuff? I already gave reference to where he said: his lectures on Christian Philosophy after defeating the “Satanic Traditional Arguments” I believe.
As far as your response to Beza goes let me just say one thing: I don’t believe one should dissect the nature of God in that syllogism. The point of P1 is not that it is the “triunity” which makes logic possible but the “triune” God–which is simply descriptive of His being.
P.S. It is Jonathan with an “a”; Jonathon sounds like some sort of foot race.
Mr. Butler, thanks so much for the reply.MB: “Mr. Calvin, I will try to get both the Martin and EO article out by the end of the month.â€
JC: Sounds great!
MB: “As I said at the end of my article, it was not meant to be the last word. More needs to be said.â€
JC: I fully understand. I hope I’m not coming off sounding like you said your piece and that’s it, now it’s my turn. I’m just trying to say that, as it stands right now, I don’t think the impossibility of the contrary has been shown.
MB: “As for the possible worlds question, five quick points for now.
First, even if the argument is successful in showing the Christian God is not the necessary precondition to logic, it does show (or at least assume) that a one-in-many God is necessary. From a practical point of view, this provides little succor those who reject Christianity.â€
JC: I fully agree. This is why I’m not so bothered by the “Fristian objection†because, as you say, it does no other religion any practical value. But, as you also say, it does deal a serious blow to TAG, academically.
MB: “Second, as I contend in the article, the Fristian WV needs more spelling out. The appeal to the mystery of quatrinity is not the same as the Christian’s appeal to mystery of the Trinity. After hundreds of years of controversy and consideration, the Church knows where the mysteries lie in Christianity. But we are at a loss to say any such thing about the nature of a quadrune God.â€
A few points:
1) Why is the burden of the Fristian? It is you who claims to have an argument which shows that the trinity is necessary for knowledge. That is, show how having a triune God is necessary for knowledge, or a denial is necessarily false.. What needs to be spelled out? There’s more information with the Fristian’s claims than there are in a vast majority of other worldviews you refute. In your fine and helpful chapter you make these claims:
TAG: “But notice that by positing a quadrinity, the Fristian scriptures would be quite different from the Christian Scriptures. Whereas the Christian Scriptures teach that, with regard to man’s salvation, God the Father ordains, God the Son accomplishes and God the Spirit applies, the Fristian scriptures would have to teach a very different order. But exactly how would the four members of its imagined godhead be involved in man’s salvation?â€
JC: Why must there be a “different order?†Maybe we don’t know the fourth member’s role, just as the OT saints didn’t. On the Fristian worldview, man is still saved by grace alone, through faith alone, on the basis of Christ alone. The Father elects, the son dies, etc. Is it claimed that it is “necessary for knowledge†that either (a) we know how the entire Godhead is involved, or (b) that the entire Godhead is involved? If so, shouldn’t you show that?
TAG: How would the quadrinity affect the doctrine of man and sin? How would redemptive history look different? What about eschatology? This all needs to be spelled out in detail.
JC: It wouldn’t affect the doctrine of sin. And, is a postmillennial eschatology necessary for knowledge? Well (a) what if the Fristain is postmillennial, and (b) if it is, then show how postmillennialism is necessary for knowledge.
MB: “Third, Frame and Poythress have done much fine work on the Trinitarian analogy in science, language, logic, and other areas. If there is substance to their work, it appears that triads are a irreducible component of both our experience of the world and the world itself. In anticipation of the objection that quads may be an irreducible component of another possible world, I would make recourse to Davidson’s contention that we could not even conceptualize what that would be like. At best, we would have to map it out with our conceptual scheme and thereby lose the quad aspect of it in the process. The upshot is that only a Trinity not a quadrinity can account for our conceptual scheme, and that we could not even recognize a world as foreign as the one postulated by the Fristian.â€
JC: Certainly all fine and helpful stuff given to us by these modern reformed giants, but a lot of it won’t help in this debate.
For example, Poythress states,
“First, there is particularity or individuality. God is particular. The Word is particular. Each Person of the Godhead is particular. Let us call this particularity the instantiational aspect. Each Person is an instantiation of God.
Second, God exists in fellowship and communion. The Persons of the Godhead exist in association with other Persons, in context of fellowship with other Persons. We may call this aspect the associational aspect.
Third, the Persons of the Godhead are all God. They are classified using the category “God.” We may call this aspect the classificational.â€
Well, what if I brought up a fourth – the functionalaspect? One could object and say that this belongs in (1), but I don’t see how (4) would belong in (1) anymore than (2) would belong in (3).
Frame likewise talks about vestigial trinitatus, triads in nature. But to use this seems a bit self-serving and arbitrary. What about the “ultimate†clover – 4 leaf clover? Squares are 4 sided. Indeed, the best a hitter can do in a baseball game is to “hit for the cycle: hitting a single, double, triple, home run in order! In space we have stars, moons, planets and, with Pluto, “dwarf planets†which are not classified as planets (that’s four). There are 4 legged animals, or 2 armed and two legged animals (2+2 =4), no three legged ones (baring injury). All people God knows of are either (1) with Jesus, (2) in hell, (3) on earth, (4) or in His mind.
Lastly, how is substantiating your argument by “looking at the world†not an evidentialist method?
MB: “Fourth, if Christian theism is a sufficient condition for logic, then it is also a necessary one. This is because the Bible implies that God is the fountain of all being and possibility. In other words, God’s existence is a necessary condition for logic and everything else. If the triune God’s existence were merely a sufficient condition for logic and not a necessary one, Christianity would be false since it makes the stronger claim.
This is another way of saying that if there is some possible world in which Frist exists, then it seems that the quadrinity is a necessary being; that the quadrinity exists in all possible worlds. This implies that the Trinity exists in no possible worlds, including the actual one. Thus, if the Fristian objection works, it is a proof for the non-existence of the Trinity.
JC: Well, here we could make the distinction between what I believe, and what I believe I can show. Further, at this point if all we’re going to do to defeat the Fristian is quote Bible passages to him, then why bother with apologetics at all? When the atheist tells us that God does not exist, just tell him that the Bible says God does exist, and so that must be the end of the discussion.
MB: “Fifth, Tim and I have some deeper issues with the relationship between modal logic and the Trinity. I’ll save this for another occasion, however.â€
JC: Sounds good, I’d love to see these thoughts at some time in the future.
MB: “These are preliminary thoughts. The third and fourth points (the third especially) need to be developed. Hopefully there is enough to steer the debate in a clearer direction.â€
Sounds good. I await the progression of the debate. I am on your side here in my desires. I’m trying to formulate the arguments to show what we claim to be able to show. It’s just that at this point, intellectual honesty won’t allow me to make the claim that I can show what I believe. But, as I said, this isn’t too big of a problem for me apologetically. Like you said earlier, the Fristian objection does no non-Christain any good. Again, thanks for the responses Mr. Butler.
Now, to the one who asked me how I know I’m not a mindless animal picking bugs out of my sisters fur, er, um, I know it by the impossibility of the contrary! ;-)
Jonathan,
Sorry for the miss-spelling of your name.
Jonathan B: “Your quadrune syllogism is not a “proof†because the first premise is false. In order to have a good argument you need valid form and sound premises. Conversely, your initial syllogism was a “proof†because it had a valid form and sound premises.â€
JC: That’s begging the question. If it’s false, then prove that it is false via the transcendental program. That is, show how a quadrinity cannot account for the possibility of knowledge.
Jonathan B: “I imagine I would say, “you’re right, there is a difference between proof and persuasion. I don’t know whether or not your argument is proven. This means I don’t know; this does not mean that it isn’t proven. “Proof†isn’t a mere epistemic matter. Kudos to making such a good point! You’re a genius.â€
JC: No, I’m saying that you haven’t proven it. This:
1. L -> G
2. L
3. :. G
Does not prove that the triune God of scripture is necessary for logic.
BTW, why the sarcastic comment about me being a genius?
Jonathan B: “When you say “prove it to me†you are asking for persuasion and comprehension of the proof. Whether or not you can comprehend it or be persuaded of it is irrelevant to the fact itself.â€
JC: No, your senses are not deceiving you (despite what Clark tells you!), I’m asking for proof. Here’s a hint: I’m already persuaded that Christianity is the precondition for intelligibility. But, conversely, “persuasion isn’t proof.†Or, stated another way, there’s a difference between what I believe and what I believe I can show. So, I don’t think it has been proven.
Jonathan B: “Is P1 an assertion? Yep. Is P2 an assertion? Yep. Is any premise an assertion? Yep. When I support P1 with P1a is that an assertion? Yep. If you want to reject P1a can you call it an assertion and then tell me I haven’t persuaded you of P1a? Yep…â€
JC: So you don’t support any premises then? That’s kind of odd. Why not just resort to dogmatism? I won’t ask you infinite questions. Just give me a rough sketch of a defense for P1 to start with.
Jonathan B: “I’m glad you own almost everything Bahnsen ever wrote or said… maybe I could borrow some stuff? I already gave reference to where he said: his lectures on Christian Philosophy after defeating the “Satanic Traditional Arguments†I believe.â€
JC: I’m not the one who mentioned the STA, and I’m not an advocate of STA, so I think you have me confused. And, there’s a library, Mt. Olive I believe, who will let you check out any of Bahnsen’s stuff if you want to listen to any more of my favorite Christian ethicist and apologist (but not my favorite Christian philosopher – that would probably be Augustine).
Thanks for you time,
John Calvin
P.S. Someone asked about how I liked the 21st century and how my beard was. I like the 21st century very much, especially that Snoop Doggy Dog character. Also, I’ve shaved my beard, too many agents of the state confusing me for some wanted Hells Angels outlaw.
Can someone please help me here? I have not taken the time to read thoroughly the Fristian argument either here or from the Van Til list.
But, I’m somewhat confused with those who are presuppositionalists, who hold to a revelational epistemology, but would introduce a fourth person in the Godhead, when there are only three that are revealed in the scriptures.
Thanks.
Jeff, I have tried to put a simple reconstruction of the argument on my blog. Hope it helps.
It was said: “You [Ron} said, “I’m persuaded that the problem is ethical and not intellectual, as is the problem so many have with Calvinism.â€
My response: I’m persuaded of this sad commentary in the case of Brian. I’m not persuaded in the case of my five year old, or anyone else I haven’t labored with.
It was asked: “And proof of this is where?”
Are you really looking for a sound disjunctive syllogism? Doubtful, since that has been offered. Again, proof is child’s play. What so many are looking for is valid argument in which the premises are agreed to by the atheist. Now how can such an argument exist given the pre-commitment to a non-revelational worldview? Maybe look at it this way. If the atheist denies the reliability of his senses, does that mean I cannot prove to him that it is light out in the middle of the day? Is a sound argument subject to the arbitrary strictures of a skeptic after all? In the like manner, if I prove with true premises and a valid form God’s existence, does my proof somehow become unsound if the atheist refuses to accept the truth values of God’s revealed premises – even in the face of his suppressing those obvious truths in unrighteousness? Please grasp that to deny the clear authority of Scripture as a source for true premises is in one sense no more absurd than denying that I know it’s day outside. In fact, it’s even more absurd to deny Scripture since Scripture justifies justify predicating about the day! (I am not saying that I don’t know it’s day outside apart from Scripture; I am suggesting that I cannot jutisfy that knowledge apart from Scripture.)
At the end of the day, the issue has never been proof but rather an unwillingness to accept what is so obviously true by way of God’s plainly manifested revelation of Himself both in the created order and His Word. To make matters worse, the atheist, like so many Christians, employ the very tools of argumentation that are not justifiable apart from special revelation; nor do they think they need to be justified. That is what TAG zeros in on, is it not? To argue against Christianity, one must borrow from Christianity.
Proof is not the issue, for to prove God’s existence is a piece of cake, which I did above. No Christian will deny the syllogism I offered. I grant you that such an argument is not very interesting, nor does it offer very good points of discussion. However, if one were to argue that causality presupposes God’s existence and that the justification of causality presupposes Scripture, then we have something to engage the atheist on. Certainly the Christian *should not* (although he too often does) disagree with the soundness of TAG when couched in modus tollens. The atheist of course will disagree, but that’s because he does not accept the authoritative source of the premises. Accordingly, we perform reductios of his worldview, which by the way is not something peculiar to Van-Tillian apologetics. Clark and Plantinga have brilliant reductios for instance. The second step, after first showing the arbitrariness and inconsistency of the variation of the single-unbelieving worldview that is raising its ugly head, is to put forth an argument such as ~God, therefore, ~causality… Until the unbeliever is converted, he will not accept that argument – but that does not invalidate its cogency and soundness anymore than a skeptic invalidates a proper appeal to sensory experience. Notwithstanding, the atheist is confronted head on with (a) at least an explanation for a fruitful connection between his mind and the mind-independent external world, which is a common Creator who stands behind both(!); and (b)the atheist is also confronted with the fact that he cannot justify his use of absolutes.
That’s probably enough for now. Get Mike’s tapes!
I’m probaby going to bow out of this discussion since the fort does not need me to hold it down, especially on Mike and Tim’s site!
Jonathan, I’m really enjoying what I’m reading from you!
Blessings all,
Ron
Jonathan wrote, “I’m glad you own almost everything Bahnsen ever wrote or said… maybe I could borrow some stuff? I already gave reference to where he said: his lectures on Christian Philosophy after defeating the “Satanic Traditional Arguments†I believe.”
Bahnsen defeated caricatures and did not address many defenses of the TA’s. Where’s his interaction with William Lane Craig and other philosophers? At best (and I’ve listened to most of Bahnsen and own almost everything – I even digitized about 112 of his sermons for CMF), Bahnsen’s typical ‘critiques’ were to the effect that proponents of the TA’s needed to defend their premises, which they do. Does Bahnsen ever address the arguments against an infinity of causes in the Kalam Cosmological argument? You know, the ones from mathematical set theory.
One of Bahnsen’s critiques of the TA’s is that they do not prove the existence of the Christian God. But the TA’s do not *purport* to prove Christianity as a unit! Does Bahnsen establish that an argument *must prove* ‘all things Christian’? It’s not apparent to me that he did. Does Bahnsen, Van Til, or any other Van Tillian prove that when an argument is *silent* when it comes to autonomy means that the argument (and the arguer) *approves* of that autonomy (in the TA’s)? A book will be published in the near future that will address much of this. I’ll stop here since this is a bit off topic.
But as for your discussion of ‘proof vs persuasion’: For an argument to be a proof, one has to be persuaded of it’s truthfulness, does he not (in order to *know* it’s a proof)? (This does not necessarily entail that he will become a Christian.) *Christians* may indeed think that it’s a proof, but so what? We are in the context of a *debate*. This is why I said that it’s a misnomer to call the VT system *apologetics* as construed by some VT’s. It’s more suitably called evangelism.
This tactic (of sharply separating proof vs persuasion) would also *undermine* your arguments against the nasty *traditional arguments*! After all, we know that there was a beginning to the universe and that the cause of that beginning was God, who cares if the unbeliever is not persuaded!
We don’t need to defend our premises since proof is not persuasion! It’s apparent that two sets of standards are in operation here: one for TAG and another for the TA’s.
Ron,
You said, ‘Are you really looking for a sound disjunctive syllogism? Doubtful, since that has been offered. Again, proof is child’s play. What so many are looking for is valid argument in which the premises are agreed to by the atheist. Now how can such an argument exist given the pre-commitment to a non-revelational worldview? Maybe look at it this way. If the atheist denies the reliability of his senses, does that mean I cannot prove to him that it is light out in the middle of the day? Is a sound argument subject to the arbitrary strictures of a skeptic after all? In the like manner, if I prove with true premises and a valid form God’s existence, does my proof somehow become unsound if the atheist refuses to accept the truth values of God’s revealed premises – even in the face of his suppressing those obvious truths in unrighteousness? Please grasp that to deny the clear authority of Scripture as a source for true premises is in one sense no more absurd than denying that I know it’s day outside. In fact, it’s even more absurd to deny Scripture since Scripture justifies justify predicating about the day! (I am not saying that I don’t know it’s day outside apart from Scripture; I am suggesting that I cannot jutisfy that knowledge apart from Scripture.)”
Yes Ron, I know your position (and I have been called different heretical names by you for disagreeing with it). This is just another reason to call the VT system (or quasi VT in Ron’s case) evangelism and not apologetics. Remember the context. It’s debate not preaching.
Oh, I’ve got Mike’s tapes as well. ;)
My take on the proof vs persuasion issue is that it is simply a helpful regulative distinction. Hume used when he pointed out that even those that profess not to believe in an external world still jump out of the way of an oncoming bus. Such persons are persuaded though they have no proof. Conversely, if there is any proof of Christianity (whether vantillian, classical, or anything else) yet not everyone embraces it, then there is proof without persuasion. It is a helpful distinction; no more.
Dear Calvin,
Bear with me on this one JC, I know you will have some objections with my initial response but I tried to develop them more as I responded to specific objections in your last post. Also the post was so long that I put it through a Word processor to spell check it and I’m afraid it may have messed up the formatting… if that is the case I’m sorry.
JC: That’s begging the question. If it’s false, then prove that it is false via the transcendental program. That is, show how a quadrinity cannot account for the possibility of knowledge.
JB: The initial syllogism (If logic then the triune God of scripture) is a demonstration that the quadrune syllogism is false because the initial syllogism is true. Am I ultimately presupposing it is true? Yes. Presuppositionalists don’t hide the fact that we presuppose the existence of God. In fact, if you look hard enough you will see that we snuck this into our label.
When you ask me to “show how…†you are asking for persuasion. Modus ponens is as a proof.
If P then Q
P
Therefore Q
What you are trying to do is say that I haven’t convinced you that “If P then Qâ€. This is true, but I have pointed out that your acceptance of P1 is irrelevant to the truth value of the syllogism. For example,
If something exists then it is not the case that nothing exists
Something exists
Therefore, it is not the case that nothing exists
Is this a proof that something exists? According to you, no, because I haven’t supported P1 nor P2. How do you know that something exists? Can you prove it? If proof is reduced to our epistemic consent then no argument has objective value and anyone is justified in rejecting any argument. You are trying to defeat this by creating a syllogism which says:
If P then U
P
Therefore, U
Your contention is that if Syllogism 1 (S1) is a proof then S2 is a proof too and this creates a dilemma. My response is that S2 contains an assertion that is false and therefore S2 cannot be proven. This demonstrates the point that proof is not contingent on comprehension. If S2 can be proven then you can prove something that is false which would make it true.
JC: No, I’m saying that you haven’t proven it. This:
1. L Ã G
2. L
3. :. G
Does not prove that the triune God of scripture is necessary for logic.
BTW, why the sarcastic comment about me being a genius?
JB: If the premises in your syllogism are true then you have proven it. If the premises are not true then you cannot prove it. Just because you have proven the above syllogism doesn’t mean that you have been able to make people understand the syllogism.
My comment was not meant to be sarcastic. I was joking around because I had said there was a difference between proof and persuasion and you said “imagine if I said there is a difference between proof and persuasion…†get it? Anything in my posts that seems hostile isn’t meant to be, I have a dry sense of humor and it doesn’t always cross through the internet very well. I am grateful for this conversation and it is helping me flush some things out.
JC: No, your senses are not deceiving you (despite what Clark tells you!), I’m asking for proof. Here’s a hint: I’m already persuaded that Christianity is the precondition for intelligibility. But, conversely, “persuasion isn’t proof.†Or, stated another way, there’s a difference between what I believe and what I believe I can show. So, I don’t think it has been proven.
JB: Let me try to get this straight… You say you believe “If P then Q†but you don’t believe “If P then Q; P; Therefore, Q†demonstrates “If P then Q� Let me ask you a question: Is it true that “If P then Q�? If it is true then it is also true that “given P, Q� If you do not believe that modus ponens proves Q given the validity of P1 and P2 then your quibble is with modus ponens as a form of proof and not the content of the syllogism.
If you grant that modus ponens is a valid form to prove something given the soundness of the premises then you must admit that plugging in sound premises proves something about the premises. If you believe that the premises are true then you must admit that when plugged into a valid form you have a sound and valid argument regardless of ones acceptance of the premises.
You keep saying, “yeah but how do I know the premises are true?†In this, I believe whether you realize it or not, you are asking for persuasion because you are asking me to give you acceptance of the premises. Once I give you P1a (supporting premise of P1) you will ask on what grounds you should accept P1a so I give P1b and you ask for “proof†that P1b proves P1a… and I give P1c, then we move to P1d, P1e, P1f…. Thus, you have reduced the word “proof†to mean “acceptance of the assertion†in which case proof is subjective, relative, and quite unattainable and magically you can now prove something that is false.
JC: So you don’t support any premises then? That’s kind of odd. Why not just resort to dogmatism? I won’t ask you infinite questions. Just give me a rough sketch of a defense for P1 to start with.
JB: How about this; you give me a syllogism which you think proves something and I’ll use your method of reductio absurdum to show that you cannot prove anything because I’ve stripped the word of relevance.
JC: I’m not the one who mentioned the STA, and I’m not an advocate of STA, so I think you have me confused. And, there’s a library, Mt. Olive I believe, who will let you check out any of Bahnsen’s stuff if you want to listen to any more of my favorite Christian ethicist and apologist (but not my favorite Christian philosopher – that would probably be Augustine).
JB: I know you didn’t mention STA, I making light of the conversation. I hope this post is helpful in furthering our conversation. I’m a little afraid that at this point we are talking past each other and that the confusion will grow.
Bill Parcell,
Your name sounds familiar, is there a celebrity with your name?
In regards to the first section of your post 33:
I must remains silent. I’m really not sure what you are talking about when you say “Bahnsen defeated caricatures and did not address many defenses of the TA’s.†This doesn’t make sense to me because why would Bahnsen attack defenses of TAs when I thought he used a TA? The rest of this section seems to build off that and therefore, “whachu talkin’ bout Willis?â€
In regards to the second section:
BP: “For an argument to be a proof, one has to be persuaded of it’s truthfulness, does he not (in order to *know* it’s a proof)? (This does not necessarily entail that he will become a Christian.) *Christians* may indeed think that it’s a proof, but so what? We are in the context of a *debate*. This is why I said that it’s a misnomer to call the VT system *apologetics* as construed by some VT’s. It’s more suitably called evangelism.â€
JB: If you want to define proof as being “persuaded of its truthfulness†then I can’t say “noooooo!†and force you to accept a different definition but given that definition you must admit that you can prove black cats are white. In order to know it is a proof the “proof†must contain a valid form and sound premises, which means a modus ponens containing sound premises is a proof. This is simply the dilemma you get yourself into when adding the word “knowledge†to proof. Unless of course one wants to redefine knowledge as well.
I agree that “proof†in either definition as to the truth of Christianity doesn’t entail that the person will become a Christian… this is beside the point.
BP: “This tactic (of sharply separating proof vs persuasion) would also *undermine* your arguments against the nasty *traditional arguments*! After all, we know that there was a beginning to the universe and that the cause of that beginning was God, who cares if the unbeliever is not persuaded!â€
JB: The STAs (I use the term lightly) try to establish the argument autonomously. If the STAs want to posit the validity of their argument on the Bible rather than autonomous reasoning then I have no problem with that. I have never read anything about the Kalam Cosmological argument but from what I’ve heard it goes like this:
P1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause
P2: The universe began to exist
C: Thus the universe has a cause
Is this argument a proof? Yes. “Aha!†you say “now I’ve got you!†No not really, I never claimed that the above syllogism is not a proof. You must be careful as to WHAT your argument proves. It merely proves that the Universe has a cause. What the above syllogism doesn’t do is prove the Christian God of Scripture exists. If you want to reformulate the above syllogism to prove the Christian God of Scripture then be my guest… I will accept it as a proof. :)
BP: “We don’t need to defend our premises since proof is not persuasion! It’s apparent that two sets of standards are in operation here: one for TAG and another for the TA’s.â€
JB: That depends on your goal in the argument. My goal is never to persuade anyone of Christianity. I’m a Calvinist and I don’t believe it is possible for me to persuade an unregenerate man into the kingdom of God. If your goal is to prove the Christian God then the modus ponens syllogism properly formulated will do just fine. There are more sophisticated ways of proving this though. If your goal is to show someone the futility of their worldview then the modus ponens may not be appropriate. If your goal is to persuade someone… then good luck.
TJH,
I would argue, and have, that it is more than a “helpful distinction.” It is necessary to distinguish the two if one wishes to refrain from arbitrariness. If proof is synonymous with persuasion then one cannot know something that is proven for we can be persuaded of something that is false.
BP,
I understand now that you meant TAs to mean Traditional Arguments and not Transcendental Arguments…
You mentioned in response to Ron that the the context is debate. In the context of debate I would only use the “If Logic then God,” syllogism to demonstrate the distinction between proof and persuasion. I wouldn’t camp on it as my point of debate on the existence of God… though maybe I will sometime just to have some fun.
Been fun all but I have to get back to work (shcool work that is). I’ll check back later.
John (to post 20)– I didn’t use the ethical argument. Careful, please!
Ron,
I must say that I think the psychoanalyzing of my position (*without substantive interaction*) is actually “unethical!”
You talk about how easy proving God’s existence is. Well, you’ve given an argument, and the argument, *if true,* (and valid) necessarliy leads to the conclusion. But I question P1. I don’t *disbelieve* P1, I just disbelieve that you can *show* P1. Why if a Muslim, or Budhist, or Mormon, or atheist asked you to back up some claim of yours, would you do it? Sure you would! Now, why don;t I get nthe *same respect as the Muslim, Budhist, Mormon, and atheist?
If you argued that Jesus created all things, therefore, he must be uncreated otherwise he’d be creating Himself, which is impossible, then you’d have a sound argument. But what if the Mormon *questioned* you use of that verse, i.e., the accuracy of it? Would you say, “Well, my KJV says it, so it must be true you unethical Mormon?” Or, would you attempt to *back up* the translation by going to the Greek?
I for one am shocked that some here would *refuse* to back up a premise when asked, and then have the nerve to call someone (a Van Tillian like myself) unethical becuase he can’t *lie* to himself and others by claiming that he can *show* what he *believes.*
Anyway, I’m not looking convince some atheist. or a simple three step syllogism. If that’s how you want to feel about me, I guess I can’t really do anything about it.
Jeff Downs,
The distinction to draw there is that the Fristian is not saying that this is *really* the case, but just throwing our a position that, if TAG is correct, should be able to show how it does not account for the precondiitons of intelligibility. So, what is it about being *quadrune* (since all other relevant details are the same: creation, fall, redemption, etc), that does not allow for knowledge. Is being triune *sufficient* for knowledge (and we’d need to see if the Bible *in fact* does claim that “presupposing the triung God is *necessary* for knowledge), or necessary?
Tim,
I have no problem with the “proof and persuasion” thing. I use it myself at times. But, take this scenario:
If Jesus is God, then Islam is wrong.
Jesus is God.
Therefore Islam is wrong.
Now, I that’s certainly a proof, but when talking to a Muslim do we just go up and blurt out a three premise syllogism? What about when he questions P1? He doesn’t think the Bible teaches what we think it does about Jesus. Or, he’ll say the Bible is corrupted. Now, do we just *leave it at that* and say, “proof is not persuasion?” Or do we back up our premises.
I’m not talking about an infinite number of steps, but at least give me a few! :-)
So, that’s my take on how “proof is not persuasion” has been used by some people (not you or Mike) in this combox.
thank you,
John Calvin
Beza,
I didn’t say you did, I was just adressing a post to all of you. But, sorry I wasn’t more clear.
best,
Calvin
JC,
I don’t recall anyone arguing that P1 in the syllogism should never be defended. I certainly haven’t been arguing that going beyond the simple syllogism is absurd.
In your initial post you said you don’t see where P1 is proven. The point of the syllogism wasn’t to prove P1 it was to prove the stated conclusion of which P1 was a premise. Since it is a true premise then it is a sound premise to use in the syllogism to prove the conclusion of the syllogism.
Maybe this is where the confusion came in because I assumed you were talking about getting you to accept the truth of P1. Were you? If this is the case then every thing I said after that is relevent. If however you are just looking for another syllogism which concludes with P1 then more may need to be said.
As Ron said earlier, proving something is quite simple. You just need a valid form and sound premises. P1 can be proven just as easily I would assume but you wouldn’t be convinced I reckon.
JB said, “I must remains silent. I’m really not sure what you are talking about when you say “Bahnsen defeated caricatures and did not address many defenses of the TA’s.†This doesn’t make sense to me because why would Bahnsen attack defenses of TAs when I thought he used a TA? The rest of this section seems to build off that and therefore, “whachu talkin’ bout Willis?â€
TA = traditional arguments; whereas
TAG = Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God. (I see now that you realize my abbreviations)
You said, “JB: If you want to define proof as being “persuaded of its truthfulness†then I can’t say “noooooo!†and force you to accept a different definition but given that definition you must admit that you can prove black cats are white. In order to know it is a proof the “proof†must contain a valid form and sound premises, which means a modus ponens containing sound premises is a proof. This is simply the dilemma you get yourself into when adding the word “knowledge†to proof. Unless of course one wants to redefine knowledge as well.â€
My point is that one has to *know* that the argument is a proof for it to even be a proof! And that means that one must be persuaded of it’s truthfulness to at least some degree. I’m not sure why I would need to admit that ‘you can prove black cats are white’. Is there an argument for this? Maybe you think I’m separating the two but I’m not. The premises would still need to be true. In other words, proof is not *solely* persuasion. ;)
You said, “JB: The STAs (I use the term lightly) try to establish the argument autonomously.â€
How do they attempt to establish the argument autonomously? Please show it. If I use a TA and do not *mention in my particular argument* that the unbeliever presupposes the Christian worldview, how does that fact (of not mentioning my belief that there is no autonomous thought) imply that my argument operates autonomously? (it doesn’t)
JB said, “If the STAs want to posit the validity of their argument on the Bible rather than autonomous reasoning then I have no problem with that.â€
So there is no reason to assume that they are inherently autonomous?
JB said, “I have never read anything about the Kalam Cosmological argument but from what I’ve heard it goes like this:
P1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause
P2: The universe began to exist
C: Thus the universe has a cause
Is this argument a proof? Yes. “Aha!†you say “now I’ve got you!†No not really, I never claimed that the above syllogism is not a proof. You must be careful as to WHAT your argument proves. It merely proves that the Universe has a cause. What the above syllogism doesn’t do is prove the Christian God of Scripture exists. If you want to reformulate the above syllogism to prove the Christian God of Scripture then be my guest… I will accept it as a proof. :)â€
This has been addressed briefly. Does it contradict the “Christian God of Scriptureâ€? It is not inconsistent with the God of Scripture. You need to show that an argument must prove “the Christian God of Scripture†(in one swoop), how far arguments need to go, etc. This is your unargued bias as Bahnsen would note and hence begs the question. This also runs afoul of what Swinburne would call the ‘completist fallacy’. What would be fun is examining TAG and seeing if it lives up to your expectations.
You ought to at least read some defenses of the Kalam argument. It’s not as weak as Bahnsen and other VT’s would have you think. I’m not sure if Bahnsen addressed the Kalam in particular. What typically happens with VT’s is that when critiquing this TA, they refer to *the* Cosmo Arg., but this is a misrepresentation as there are *many* versions of it – including inductive ones (Swinburne).
You said, “JB: That depends on your goal in the argument. My goal is never to persuade anyone of Christianity. I’m a Calvinist and I don’t believe it is possible for me to persuade an unregenerate man into the kingdom of God. If your goal is to prove the Christian God then the modus ponens syllogism properly formulated will do just fine. There are more sophisticated ways of proving this though. If your goal is to show someone the futility of their worldview then the modus ponens may not be appropriate. If your goal is to persuade someone… then good luck.â€
I’m a Calvinist as well. I could also broadly be considered Van Tillian, an externalist (with internalist overtones) of Plantinga’s variety. But this talk of persuasion is nonsense. Was the apostle not trying to persuade since he knew the terror of the Lord? Does God not *use* persuasion though it may not be the *basis* of one’s salvation?
Don’t get me wrong. I’m *not* saying that there is *no* difference between proof vs persuasion. I’m saying that I’m tired of seeing Van Tillians use that as a crutch to support their bad arguments.
I can tell that I’m not going to get any work done today…. but conversations like these don’t happen much (at least for me) so perhaps it isn’t a wasted day.
BP: “My point is that one has to *know* that the argument is a proof for it to even be a proof! And that means that one must be persuaded of it’s truthfulness to at least some degree. I’m not sure why I would need to admit that ‘you can prove black cats are white’. Is there an argument for this? Maybe you think I’m separating the two but I’m not. The premises would still need to be true. In other words, proof is not *solely* persuasion. ;)”
JB: So you would define proof as persuasion of a valid and sound argument? This would keep you from being able to prove something that is false. However, this does not escape the subjectivity of your definition. One mans proof is another man’s trash.
You mention later that Paul persuaded men. Certainly true that God works through means and God can perhaps use a faulty argument to bring someone to salvation. Yet does this person “know God”?? Was it the evidentialist argument that gave the person knowledge of God? How can I know God inductively?
BP: “How do they attempt to establish the argument autonomously? Please show it. If I use a TA and do not *mention in my particular argument* that the unbeliever presupposes the Christian worldview, how does that fact (of not mentioning my belief that there is no autonomous thought) imply that my argument operates autonomously? (it doesn’t)”
JB: Because the Kalam argument or any evidentialist argument for that matter attempts to move from brute fact to fact with interpretation. Van Tillians, or I may speak for myself, do not maintain that autonomous thought actually exists. Van Tillians, to the contrary, argue that autonomous thought cannot exist. The fact that it cannot exist does not imply that people cannot pretend it exists and try to reason inconsistently. The point is not that there is such a thing as an autonomous argument for the existence of God but that there cannot be a (successful) autonomous argument for the existence of God.
The problem is that those who use TAs in their traditional sense are trying get the unbeliever to reason in an inconsistent and impossible manner. They pretend as though starting with induction one can reach God without starting with God who gives meaning to the world.
It also seems to me that every TA has the problem of induction because it refuses to appeal to God’s Word as the presupposition. (If it did appeal to God’s Word as the presupposition it would merely be another Presuppositional argument.)
Take for example the first premise in a Kalam argument: Everything that begins to exist has a cause. Okay, how do we know that everything that begins to exist has a cause? POI (Problem of Induction). If you would like we could start another discussion somewhere on the Kalam argument and/or the problem with TAs and autonomous reasoning.
BP: “This has been addressed briefly. Does it contradict the “Christian God of Scriptureâ€? It is not inconsistent with the God of Scripture. You need to show that an argument must prove “the Christian God of Scripture†(in one swoop), how far arguments need to go, etc. This is your unargued bias as Bahnsen would note and hence begs the question. This also runs afoul of what Swinburne would call the ‘completist fallacy’. What would be fun is examining TAG and seeing if it lives up to your expectations.”
JB: My contention is that the argument needs to prove the Christian God of Scripture at some point if that is what it is purporting to do. If you think the Kalam can do that then I would be happy to discuss it with you in detail. Heck, I’m not against finding a “proof” for the existence of God after all!
I know of at least one argument that proves God’s existence in “one swoop”–the disjunctive syllogism earlier stated… yet you don’t accept my definition of proof and I don’t accept yours… Before we could continue we need to establish what constitutes as “proof”.
BP: “You ought to at least read some defenses of the Kalam argument. It’s not as weak as Bahnsen and other VT’s would have you think. I’m not sure if Bahnsen addressed the Kalam in particular. What typically happens with VT’s is that when critiquing this TA, they refer to *the* Cosmo Arg., but this is a misrepresentation as there are *many* versions of it – including inductive ones (Swinburne).”
JB: I heard Shandon L. Guthrie use it in a debate once and he got his but kicked… in my opinion. As stated earlier, I would be happy to discuss it in more detail. The problem is that the first premise of any deductive argument must be defended inductively if not from a presuppositional basis!
BP: “I’m a Calvinist as well. I could also broadly be considered Van Tillian, an externalist (with internalist overtones) of Plantinga’s variety. But this talk of persuasion is nonsense. Was the apostle not trying to persuade since he knew the terror of the Lord? Does God not *use* persuasion though it may not be the *basis* of one’s salvation?”
JB: I already addressed some of this above. Yes, I believe God works through means and in a sense we seek to “persuade” men. Ultimately it is not I who persuades. An unregenerate man cannot be persuaded without God being the one who does the persuading.
My point was that an apologetic is as successful as its goal. I stand by my statement that I do not seek to persuade unregenerate men into the kingdom of God by way of argument.
BP: “I’m saying that I’m tired of seeing Van Tillians use that as a crutch to support their bad arguments.”
JB: What makes an argument bad? The fact that it does persuade someone regardless of its soundness? If this is the case then every time a TA is thrown out there and the atheist person doesn’t convert then it was a bad argument. Your definition of “proof” is inadequate.
You said, “JB: So you would define proof as persuasion of a valid and sound argument? This would keep you from being able to prove something that is false. However, this does not escape the subjectivity of your definition. One mans proof is another man’s trash.”
I would probably define proof much the same as yourself, except I would say that proof is hard to come by as construed by most (proof in the sense that a denial of it is only on ‘pain of irrationality’ where rationality is construed as the deliverances of reason). However, a ‘proof’ must be an item of knowledge. If it’s not then it would be dialectically useless. To be an item of knowledge, there must be a certain positive cognitive attitude toward the proposition in question (the ‘belief’ factor). This is what I mean by being ‘persuaded’. In this sense, proof includes persuasion. Now you can tell the unbeliever that proof is not persuasion and that you still hold in your hands a ‘proof’ for the existence of God. But then that begs the question against the unbeliever, unless you want to further argue your case against him. No doubt it could be a proof for the believer, but we must remember that we are in the context of a *debate* and are attempting to give arguments. If we are just giving arguments that believers would accept as a proof, then it becomes identical to evangelism and we should lose the rubric of ‘apologetics’ and other philosophical jargon.
As far as the reference to ‘subjectivity’, you are going to have to flesh this out much more.
JB said, “You mention later that Paul persuaded men. Certainly true that God works through means and God can perhaps use a faulty argument to bring someone to salvation. Yet does this person “know Godâ€?? Was it the evidentialist argument that gave the person knowledge of God? How can I know God inductively?â€
I don’t know what you mean by the first question above. But the further questions show a misrepresentation. The second question cuts both ways – was it the TAG that gave the person the knowledge of God; was it the preaching? No one has said *anything* about knowing God inductively. You have read too much of Bahnsen. :) Like Bahnsen, you may think that this is a ‘devastating’ criticism; however, this confuses *reasons for* belief with the *basis* of one’s belief. Also, it refuses to acknowledge the many uses of theistic argumentation.
You said, “JB: Because the Kalam argument or any evidentialist argument for that matter attempts to move from brute fact to fact with interpretation. Van Tillians, or I may speak for myself, do not maintain that autonomous thought actually exists. Van Tillians, to the contrary, argue that autonomous thought cannot exist. The fact that it cannot exist does not imply that people cannot pretend it exists and try to reason inconsistently. The point is not that there is such a thing as an autonomous argument for the existence of God but that there cannot be a (successful) autonomous argument for the existence of God.â€
Again, these are assertions. How can the Kalam attempt to move from brute fact to interpreted fact when the proponent of the Kalam does not hold to brute fact? How is the premis “whatever begins to exist has a cause of it’s existence’ inherently a brute fact? Where is the argument? I do not hold that ‘autonomous thought’ exists either, yet I still fail to see exactly how this commits my use of the TA’s to autonomy. As far as an argument being ‘successful’, you will need to explain this much more.
You said, “The problem is that those who use TAs in their traditional sense are trying get the unbeliever to reason in an inconsistent and impossible manner. They pretend as though starting with induction one can reach God without starting with God who gives meaning to the world.â€
How is that inconsistent and impossible for the unbeliever? See Romans 1 here and see what it says about how nature reveals the existence of God – how it reveals God’s *eternal attributes*. But this is again a misrepresentation of the TA’s – not all premis are argued for inductively, some try analytically.
You said, “It also seems to me that every TA has the problem of induction because it refuses to appeal to God’s Word as the presupposition. (If it did appeal to God’s Word as the presupposition it would merely be another Presuppositional argument.)â€
Why assume that the POI is a problem for TA’s. If I’m not arguing the POI and the unbeliever is not either, then what’s the problem? I may still hold that he cannot find a good reason to assume the uniformity of nature, but even *if* my argument assumes that he can, does that mean he can do so autonomously? Why does every argument need to attempt to prove these basic assumptions? Again this begs the question as stated earlier.
*Or are you considering that I cannot obtain conclusive justification through the use of induction? Since I am not an epistemological infallibilist, this would need supplemental argumentation from you.
You said, “Take for example the first premise in a Kalam argument: Everything that begins to exist has a cause. Okay, how do we know that everything that begins to exist has a cause? POI (Problem of Induction). If you would like we could start another discussion somewhere on the Kalam argument and/or the problem with TAs and autonomous reasoning.â€
See above. I wasn’t sure at first how you were using the POI.
You said, “JB: My contention is that the argument needs to prove the Christian God of Scripture at some point if that is what it is purporting to do. If you think the Kalam can do that then I would be happy to discuss it with you in detail. Heck, I’m not against finding a “proof†for the existence of God after all!â€
This is the contention that you need to argue for. I noted previously that it was not the intention of the Kalam, and I have not found a person who holds that the Kalam proves the Christian God. Moreland and others hold that it can prove a personal god – they think there would need to be supplemental argumentation (a requirement that doesn’t escape the right-wing VT) to get closer to the Christian God. So critiquing the Kalam because it doesn’t prove the existence of the Christian God is akin to criticizing an apple for not tasting like an orange. You first need to show why an apple needs to taste like an orange.
You said, “I know of at least one argument that proves God’s existence in “one swoopâ€â€“the disjunctive syllogism earlier stated… yet you don’t accept my definition of proof and I don’t accept yours… Before we could continue we need to establish what constitutes as “proofâ€.â€
What disjunct? C or NC; ~NC therefore C? or something similar? Please. There’s so many assumptions in there that need arguing for. For instance, why C and NC? Why should anyone accept that? Because Jesus says so (I know that’s Ron’s answer)- but remember our context? This begs so many questions without further elaboration (even as I’ve seen from Butler).
You said, “JB: I heard Shandon L. Guthrie use it in a debate once and he got his but kicked… in my opinion. As stated earlier, I would be happy to discuss it in more detail. The problem is that the first premise of any deductive argument must be defended inductively if not from a presuppositional basis!â€
Well this has nothing to do with anything. Someone lost a debate in your opinion, so what? Remember oral debates are typically won by those quicker on their feet and positions cannot be fully explained due to time constraints.
Nevertheless, why not ask where you can obtain a copy of the Butler vs Krueger debate? I’ve tried to locate it but it seems unavailable. I’ve heard that Krueger won (even by Christians sympathetic to VT), and wanted to see for myself, but was told by CMF that they could not locate it. Hmmm…. Other details are missing….
You said, “JB: I already addressed some of this above. Yes, I believe God works through means and in a sense we seek to “persuade†men. Ultimately it is not I who persuades. An unregenerate man cannot be persuaded without God being the one who does the persuading.â€
My point was that an apologetic is as successful as its goal. I stand by my statement that I do not seek to persuade unregenerate men into the kingdom of God by way of argument.â€
Basically you have no point or contention against persuasion. Saying that it’s not you who persuades is superfluous, since we are both Calvinists.
You said, “JB: What makes an argument bad? The fact that it does persuade someone regardless of its soundness? If this is the case then every time a TA is thrown out there and the atheist person doesn’t convert then it was a bad argument. Your definition of “proof†is inadequate.â€
One indication is when Christians are asked to explain how does logic presuppose the existence of God – the questions that I asked earlier: What constitutes the essential doctrines of Christianity and how do these doctrines and *only* these doctrines provide the preconditions of intelligibility – and instead of meeting challenges, they employ “The Dodgeâ€. ;)
Most anything would constitute as proof on your definition and would consequently seem to be useless for *apologetical* purposes (though not evangelistic purposes).
Bill said: Yes Ron, I know your position (and I have been called different heretical names by you for disagreeing with it).
Ron States: Interesting. Do I know you?
Bill said: This is just another reason to call the VT system (or quasi VT in Ron’s case) evangelism and not apologetics. Remember the context. It’s debate not preaching.
Ron: An argument would be nice.
John said: …must say that I think the psychoanalyzing of my position (*without substantive interaction*) is actually “unethical!â€
Ron States: You have a problem John. You’re either careless or not willing to actually internalize what I have written. In either case, I have not psychoanalyzed your position.
John Stated: Well, you’ve given an argument, and the argument, *if true,* (and valid) necessarliy leads to the conclusion. But I question P1. I don’t *disbelieve* P1, I just disbelieve that you can *show* P1.
Ron States: If you question P1, it’s because you’re an unbeliever. As for my ability to “show†P1, I can easily do that but you reject the plain testimony of God’s revelation. Accordingly, I would not use with an unbeliver such an argument as: God exists or nothing exist; not nothing exists; therefore God exists. My only point in even mentioning such an argument is to show to the *believer* that proof is child’s play and that the problem is not with proof per se but with persuasion.
TAG, however, is a different type of deductive argument, which concerns itself with the preconditions of intelligible experience. TAG is put forth as a deductive argument, as I did on my blog, which I’ve provided a link for. The unbeliever will of course not accept the second premise of the proof I set forth on my blog, which is why the Christian eventually will turn to an internal critique of the opposing view, showing it be arbitrary and inconsistent; then the Christian will show how Christianity –if true – provides the necessary preconditions for predication. (Obviously the Christian knows that Christianity is in fact true, and thereby knows that TAG is indeed sound.) In the final analyses, the unbeliever, if honest, will at least acknowledge that his worldview reduces to skepticism and that if Christianity is in fact true, then it indeed provides a justification for knowledge, reality and ethics. Accordingly, the honest unbeliever, if not converted, will continue to hope against hope and reject what he knows in his heart of hearts to be the truth. In such cases, the apologist’s work is done.
John Asks: Why if a Muslim, or Budhist, or Mormon, or atheist asked you to back up some claim of yours, would you do it? Sure you would! Now, why don;t I get nthe *same respect as the Muslim, Budhist, Mormon, and atheist?
Ron replies: I have no idea what you are talking about. The rest of your post about Mormons and the such was just rambling so I’ll pass.
Ron
Bill stated: “I noted previously that it was not the intention of the Kalam, and I have not found a person who holds that the Kalam proves the Christian God. Moreland and others hold that it can prove a personal god – they think there would need to be supplemental argumentation (a requirement that doesn’t escape the right-wing VT) to get closer to the Christian God.”
Since there is only one God – the Christian God -then any argument that conlcudes “god” is false. Moreover, how does one justify the intelligibilty of causality apart from a Van Tillian apologetic and a Van Tillian justification for the inductive principle. Even granting the use of argumentation apart from a philosophical justification for predication, how does one move from a conceptual necessity for god to the living God?
It was remarked by Bill: “So critiquing the Kalam because it doesn’t prove the existence of the Christian God is akin to criticizing an apple for not tasting like an orange. You first need to show why an apple needs to taste like an orange.”
It’s not the same thing at all since apples and oranges both exist. Unknown gods do not. To prove an unknown God is to prove a mere concept without a justification for proof itself.
Ron
Ron,
You are repeating issues that I’ve addressed.
Ron said, “An argument would be nice.”
That’s what I’ve been asking from you guys. I’ve explained this at length in my other posts.
You said, “Since there is only one God – the Christian God -then any argument that conlcudes “god†is false.”
Where’s the argument? As a side note, notice how Ron starts out with “there’s only one God”, but even if I agree with him, it would not prove his case. If I conclude with a god that has certain atttributes in agreement with the Christian God, then my argument is not *false*. Are you saying that one must know *all* of God’s attributes to know the true God (this could get interesting with OT saints)?
My argument may be underdetermined and incomplete, but not false. This type of objection begs the question as has been stated by 1) assuming the ‘completist fallacy’ and 2) by not arguing that arguments must prove “specifically Christian theism”.
You said, “Moreover, how does one justify the intelligibilty of causality apart from a Van Tillian apologetic and a Van Tillian justification for the inductive principle. Even granting the use of argumentation apart from a philosophical justification for predication, how does one move from a conceptual necessity for god to the living God?”
I’m not sure what the relevance of conceptual necessity is in the current context. But I’ve addressed your other worries in my latest post to JB.
You said, “It’s not the same thing at all since apples and oranges both exist. Unknown gods do not. To prove an unknown God is to prove a mere concept without a justification for proof itself.”
Yes it is the same (existence has nothing to do with this). If I *am not* making that claim for my argument, then why make the *non satisfaction* of that claim a criticism of my argument? You need to argue that my argument *must* accept this claim. As has been stated already, why must every argument have a ‘justification for proof itself’ and why must every argument argue for basic presuppositions (and unless it does then it is inherently autonomous)?
I don’t know if I would say that you know me, but we’ve had conversations elsewhere.
To Post #46
Bill, allow me to group some things together to keep this from getting too spread out. Since some of this will not be in the proper order please read where I have grouped your comments together to check for context.
BP: “I would probably define proof much the same as yourself, except I would say that proof is hard to come by as construed by most (proof in the sense that a denial of it is only on ‘pain of irrationality’ where rationality is construed as the deliverances of reason). However, a ‘proof’ must be an item of knowledge. If it’s not then it would be dialectically useless. To be an item of knowledge, there must be a certain positive cognitive attitude toward the proposition in question (the ‘belief’ factor). This is what I mean by being ‘persuaded’. In this sense, proof includes persuasion… As far as the reference to ‘subjectivity’, you are going to have to flesh this out much more… Most anything would constitute as proof on your definition and would consequently seem to be useless for *apologetical* purposes (though not evangelistic purposes).â€
JB: Okay, here is why this is subjective and why I find this definition inadequate. If you ask for me to prove that one can measure a correlation coefficient how would I prove this to you? What if I were to give you the formula r = NEXY minus (EX)(EY) divided by the square root of NEX squared minus EX squared times NEXY squared minus EY squared. Does this formula prove that one can measure a correlation coefficient? Indeed it does. Do you understand it? Maybe, but what if I was to show this to a 10 year old, would he be able to understand it? No. Does this mean that it is no longer a proof? Is proof a quality of the person or is it a quality of a sound argument? It seems to me that if it is the quality of a sound argument then it doesn’t matter if the person understands it or not. If it is not considered a proof because someone doesn’t understand it then “proof†is no longer a quality of an argument but a quality of the person in question. You said that my definition of proof allows for anything to constitute as proof. This is untrue. Only an argument with sound premises constitutes as proof in my definition. You are right that in order for something to be an object of knowledge it must be understood in some way. This merely means that for one to know that something is proven they must understand it in some way.
BP: “Now you can tell the unbeliever that proof is not persuasion and that you still hold in your hands a ‘proof’ for the existence of God. But then that begs the question against the unbeliever, unless you want to further argue your case against him. No doubt it could be a proof for the believer, but we must remember that we are in the context of a *debate* and are attempting to give arguments. If we are just giving arguments that believers would accept as a proof, then it becomes identical to evangelism and we should lose the rubric of ‘apologetics’ and other philosophical jargon.â€
JB: You are assuming that I go around giving people a “If something exists then God exists†syllogism as an apologetic. This is absurd. If someone in middle school were to ask me “is it possible to measure a correlation coefficient†I would not say, “Sure! Just do r = NEXY…†First, I have never gone out looking for an apologetic debate. Second, I have never had the same apologetical conversation with any two people. Usually when it gets into apologetics it is because the other person brought it up and I just take it from where he introduced it. Naturally, even if I was going to give a simple modus ponens argument for God’s existence I wouldn’t just say “Welp there it is. Guess I answered all your questions. See ya-later!†The fact is that this whole thing about proof being contained in a simple syllogism merely points out the distinction between proof and persuasion. Did you ever hear Bahnsen, Butler, or Wilson give the syllogism in any of their formal debates? By the way, did you ever hear me say that in a debate I that syllogism would be appropriate? Did anyone on this website say that? I don’t know maybe they did but I didn’t haven’t seen it. If so, point it out to me.
BP: “I don’t know what you mean by the first question above. But the further questions show a misrepresentation. The second question cuts both ways – was it the TAG that gave the person the knowledge of God; was it the preaching? No one has said *anything* about knowing God inductively. You have read too much of Bahnsen. :) Like Bahnsen, you may think that this is a ‘devastating’ criticism; however, this confuses *reasons for* belief with the *basis* of one’s belief. Also, it refuses to acknowledge the many uses of theistic argumentation.â€
BP: Again, these are assertions. How can the Kalam attempt to move from brute fact to interpreted fact when the proponent of the Kalam does not hold to brute fact?
JB: By being inconsistent.
BP: How is the premis “whatever begins to exist has a cause of it’s existence’ inherently a brute fact? Where is the argument? I do not hold that ‘autonomous thought’ exists either, yet I still fail to see exactly how this commits my use of the TA’s to autonomy. As far as an argument being ‘successful’, you will need to explain this much more.â€
JB: The phrase in itself is not an appeal to brute fact. It needs a context. For example, it depends on how you answer the question, “how do you know that whatever begins to exist has a cause?†If you ultimately appeal to God’s word then it is a Presuppositional argument. If you don’t then it is just a TA that is appeal to autonomous thinking. I mentioned elsewhere that “success†of the argument depends on WHY you are setting the argument forth. If I set forth an argument to see how smart someone is and I end up know they are pretty smart or pretty dumb then I have been successful. The context of which I related it to TAs was in your definition of “proof†which includes persuasion.
BP: “How is that inconsistent and impossible for the unbeliever? See Romans 1 here and see what it says about how nature reveals the existence of God – how it reveals God’s *eternal attributes*. But this is again a misrepresentation of the TA’s – not all premis are argued for inductively, some try analytically.â€
Hmm… I’ve read Romans 1… I’m not sure that it is saying what you want it to or that I understand why you referred me to Romans 1. I am only aware of 1 argument that is analytical, the Ontological argument. Maybe you could point me to some others that you think are sound.
BP: “Why assume that the POI is a problem for TA’s. If I’m not arguing the POI and the unbeliever is not either, then what’s the problem? I may still hold that he cannot find a good reason to assume the uniformity of nature, but even *if* my argument assumes that he can, does that mean he can do so autonomously? Why does every argument need to attempt to prove these basic assumptions? Again this begs the question as stated earlier.â€
JB: Okay, POI is a problem for all non-analytical TAs. It doesn’t matter that you haven’t brought out the POI or the unbeliever hasn’t brought out the POI; it still exists within the TAs. The problem is that you are using an argument that is seriously flawed. If the person you are debating is smart enough to point this out you will simply have to abandon the TA. Could you demonstrate how this begs the question… I’m not getting it.
BP: “*Or are you considering that I cannot obtain conclusive justification through the use of induction? Since I am not an epistemological infallibilist, this would need supplemental argumentation from you… I noted previously that it was not the intention of the Kalam, and I have not found a person who holds that the Kalam proves the Christian God. Moreland and others hold that it can prove a personal god – they think there would need to be supplemental argumentation (a requirement that doesn’t escape the right-wing VT) to get closer to the Christian God. So critiquing the Kalam because it doesn’t prove the existence of the Christian God is akin to criticizing an apple for not tasting like an orange. You first need to show why an apple needs to taste like an orange.â€
JB: I’m not familiar with epistemological infallibilism, I’m guessing that is where you believe it is not necessary to have conclusive justification for a belief? It may not be the immediate intention of the Kalam argument to prove the Christian God’s existence but surely you would jest to assert that the ultimate goal of setting forth the Kalam is not to prove the Christian God’s existence. So would your goal be to get a “probabilistic†argument for the existence of God? I think this is impossible. I’ll have to post something on my blog about this when I have more time. Right now I am skeptical as to whether or not the Kalam argument can even prove agential causation… still we would have to discuss this in more detail. In fact… I think you would have quite a dilemma on your hands consider your definition of proof and what you want the Kalam argument to prove.
BP: What disjunct? C or NC; ~NC therefore C? or something similar? Please. There’s so many assumptions in there that need arguing for. For instance, why C and NC? Why should anyone accept that? Because Jesus says so (I know that’s Ron’s answer)- but remember our context? This begs so many questions without further elaboration (even as I’ve seen from Butler).
JB: I meant to be referring to the modus ponens, not the modus tollendo ponens, not that it makes a huge difference. Anyway, how many assumptions are there in the proof of r = NEXY…�? The only assumptions I would imagine you are referring to are assumptions of understanding. This is irrelevant. As I said, we need to first settle the issue of proof.
BP: “Well this has nothing to do with anything. Someone lost a debate in your opinion, so what? Remember oral debates are typically won by those quicker on their feet and positions cannot be fully explained due to time constraints… Nevertheless, why not ask where you can obtain a copy of the Butler vs Krueger debate? I’ve tried to locate it but it seems unavailable. I’ve heard that Krueger won (even by Christians sympathetic to VT), and wanted to see for myself, but was told by CMF that they could not locate it. Hmmm…. Other details are missing…. â€
JB: I know Guthrie losing the debate doesn’t necessarily mean anything about the particular argument, but it seems to me foolish to say it has nothing to do with the argument. The atheist brought out some excellent points that I don’t think the argument could patch up. Obviously it depends on WHY they lost the debate and not just that they lost the debate. You can loose a debate because you had the burden of proof and ran out of time to answer objections, you can loose a debate because you got flustered at the opponents constant red herrings, you can loose a debate because the audience becomes sympathetic toward your opponent by appeal to emotion etc… etc… Or you can lose a debate because the opponent brought up a logical defeater and you weren’t able to answer it.
BP: “Basically you have no point or contention against persuasion. Saying that it’s not you who persuades is superfluous, since we are both Calvinists.â€
JB: I’m not sure you understood why I said what you are here responding too. I said something about how I don’t persuade men. You then said something about Paul persuading men. I then qualified my statement by saying that ultimately it is God who persuades… Of course I don’t have a contention with persuasion… I have a contention with confusing persuasion with proof. I’m glad we are both Calvinists, but now I can’t even remember why we are talking about this.
BP: One indication is when Christians are asked to explain how does logic presuppose the existence of God – the questions that I asked earlier: What constitutes the essential doctrines of Christianity and how do these doctrines and *only* these doctrines provide the preconditions of intelligibility – and instead of meeting challenges, they employ “The Dodgeâ€. ;)
JB: So is this reply supposed to demonstrate what “The Dodge†looks like in action?