My colleague has done some very important work that answers several of the standard criticisms of vantillian apologetics.
In my opinion, the most important one is the so-called “uniqueness” claim. That is, the question arises, how does the presuppositional method prove Christianity in its concreteness, as opposed to merely showing that something like Christianity– say, affirming a Quadrinity rather than a Trinity– is a necessary precondition of thought?
This is reprinted from a chapter in The Standard Bearer.
Study, enjoy, and interact. Click here to start.
Ron, good to see you posting again.
P.S. Do I get a prize for having the 50th post?
B: As a side note, notice how Ron starts out with “there’s only one Godâ€, but even if I agree with him, it would not prove his case.
Bill,
You do agree with me if you’re a Christian. As a Christian are you saying that you can’t prove there is one God? It’s getting clear to me that you really don’t know what constitutes a proof. OR you’re not sure the Bible is authoritative and can justify premises. You decide.
B: If I conclude with a god that has certain atttributes in agreement with the Christian God, then my argument is not *false*.
Bill,
For starters, what authority will you appeal to justify the intelligibility of causality? Argue to a single first cause that is Spirit and Divine, and not a conceptual necessity; justify the very tools of argumentation that you will need to arrive at such a conclusion. Or do you want a pass on all of that? Justify anything, Bill.
B: My argument may be underdetermined and incomplete, but not false.
Bill,
First off, what is your argument? No matter what it is, if it concludes something “close to the Christian God” then it is false that it is the Christian God that is being proved. If all you mean by “close to” is that the conclusion shares the same attributes as God, then I’ll ask you whether the conclusion includes that these attributes are possessed by a person, let alone Person. If so, how is that justified apart from revelation, which you may not appeal to given that your apologetic does not allow you to smuggle in the foundation for all true premises.
B: Yes it is the same (existence has nothing to do with this).
Bill,
Existence has nothing to do with this? Are you trying to argue for a god who might not exist?
I’m afraid your in a bit too deep.
Ron
“Ron, good to see you posting again.
P.S. Do I get a prize for having the 50th post?”
No Jonathan. However, you should get a prize for laboring the way you do with anti-Van Tillians!
Ron
JB,
This is my last post. You are not interacting with many of my points. I’m not going into much detail in this post.
JB: Okay, here is why this is subjective and why I find this definition inadequate. If you ask for me to prove that one can measure a correlation coefficient how would I prove this to you? What if I were to give you the formula r = NEXY minus (EX)(EY) divided by the square root of NEX squared minus EX squared times NEXY squared minus EY squared. Does this formula prove that one can measure a correlation coefficient? Indeed it does. Do you understand it? Maybe, but what if I was to show this to a 10 year old, would he be able to understand it? No. Does this mean that it is no longer a proof? Is proof a quality of the person or is it a quality of a sound argument? It seems to me that if it is the quality of a sound argument then it doesn’t matter if the person understands it or not. If it is not considered a proof because someone doesn’t understand it then “proof†is no longer a quality of an argument but a quality of the person in question. You said that my definition of proof allows for anything to constitute as proof. This is untrue. Only an argument with sound premises constitutes as proof in my definition. You are right that in order for something to be an object of knowledge it must be understood in some way. This merely means that for one to know that something is proven they must understand it in some way.
BP:
1) you are equivocating between persuasion and understanding.
2) you are begging the question by assuming that a lack of understanding is the problem with why TAG is not a silver bullet proof.
3) I would say that proof is better construed as person-relative much as ‘belief’ is. I think William Alston argues this position. But one *must* consider the context of being in a debate.
4) When I said that it allows anything as proof, I figured you would make the truth qualification yourself.
5) Even if there are no proofs, that would still not mean that theistic arguments are useless (including TAG). One must consider the role of epistemic value in different arguments.
JB: You are assuming that I go around giving people a “If something exists then God exists†syllogism as an apologetic. This is absurd. If someone in middle school were to ask me “is it possible to measure a correlation coefficient†I would not say, “Sure! Just do r = NEXY…†First, I have never gone out looking for an apologetic debate. Second, I have never had the same apologetical conversation with any two people. Usually when it gets into apologetics it is because the other person brought it up and I just take it from where he introduced it. Naturally, even if I was going to give a simple modus ponens argument for God’s existence I wouldn’t just say “Welp there it is. Guess I answered all your questions. See ya-later!†The fact is that this whole thing about proof being contained in a simple syllogism merely points out the distinction between proof and persuasion. Did you ever hear Bahnsen, Butler, or Wilson give the syllogism in any of their formal debates? By the way, did you ever hear me say that in a debate I that syllogism would be appropriate? Did anyone on this website say that? I don’t know maybe they did but I didn’t haven’t seen it. If so, point it out to me.
BP: This misses my point *completely*. Where in the world did my objections rest on you giving a “syllogism”?
JB: By being inconsistent.”
BP: No it’s not. ;)
JB: The phrase in itself is not an appeal to brute fact. It needs a context. For example, it depends on how you answer the question, “how do you know that whatever begins to exist has a cause?†If you ultimately appeal to God’s word then it is a Presuppositional argument. If you don’t then it is just a TA that is appeal to autonomous thinking. I mentioned elsewhere that “success†of the argument depends on WHY you are setting the argument forth. If I set forth an argument to see how smart someone is and I end up know they are pretty smart or pretty dumb then I have been successful. The context of which I related it to TAs was in your definition of “proof†which includes persuasion.
BP: Well this is a repeat of your assertion. To sum up it’s “If it not a presuppositional argument then it appeals to autonomous thinking.” You are doing nothing but telling me how it is.
JB: “Hmm… I’ve read Romans 1… I’m not sure that it is saying what you want it to or that I understand why you referred me to Romans 1. I am only aware of 1 argument that is analytical, the Ontological argument. Maybe you could point me to some others that you think are sound.”
BP: Well we disagree on Romans 1. But some argue that the Kalam *could* be analytically grounded by everything that begins to exist having a cause. Whether I or anyone else thinks it’s sound is beside the point in the current context of strawmanning the TAs.
JB: Okay, POI is a problem for all non-analytical TAs. It doesn’t matter that you haven’t brought out the POI or the unbeliever hasn’t brought out the POI; it still exists within the TAs. The problem is that you are using an argument that is seriously flawed. If the person you are debating is smart enough to point this out you will simply have to abandon the TA. Could you demonstrate how this begs the question… I’m not getting it.
BP: Why is it a problem for the TAs? Whether this problem exists or not, if I grant the unbeliever induction (though not autonomous induction) and he does not object to it either, then I still fail to see how there would be a problem in the current context I have stated. It may not provide the *strongest* justification and someone may be able to rationally reject my argument, but I’m not sure of any argument in philosophy that could not be rationally rejected. Plantinga points this out in God and Other Minds. It begs the question by assuming that all arguments must be such that they attempt to prove the basic assumptions of rationality.
JB: I’m not familiar with epistemological infallibilism, I’m guessing that is where you believe it is not necessary to have conclusive justification for a belief? It may not be the immediate intention of the Kalam argument to prove the Christian God’s existence but surely you would jest to assert that the ultimate goal of setting forth the Kalam is not to prove the Christian God’s existence. So would your goal be to get a “probabilistic†argument for the existence of God? I think this is impossible. I’ll have to post something on my blog about this when I have more time. Right now I am skeptical as to whether or not the Kalam argument can even prove agential causation… still we would have to discuss this in more detail. In fact… I think you would have quite a dilemma on your hands consider your definition of proof and what you want the Kalam argument to prove.
BP:
1. Epistemic infallibilism is the view that in order to have knowledge, one must have conclusive justification for that knowledge (think Descartes) or that one cannot possibly be incorrect in thinking an object of knowledge is true. Most epistemologists are fallibilists.
2. Cumulative argumentation…
3. Why would you blog about the Kalam when you haven’t studied it?
JB: I meant to be referring to the modus ponens, not the modus tollendo ponens, not that it makes a huge difference. Anyway, how many assumptions are there in the proof of r = NEXY…�? The only assumptions I would imagine you are referring to are assumptions of understanding. This is irrelevant. As I said, we need to first settle the issue of proof.
BP: No I am not referring to understanding. For instance, why assume that there are only two worldviews that can provide the ontological conditions for intelligibility? There’s alot of unpacking that I should do here, but I don’t have the time nor the desire anymore. The old Van Til lists will cure many of your anxieties. :)
JB: I know Guthrie losing the debate doesn’t necessarily mean anything about the particular argument, but it seems to me foolish to say it has nothing to do with the argument. The atheist brought out some excellent points that I don’t think the argument could patch up. Obviously it depends on WHY they lost the debate and not just that they lost the debate. You can loose a debate because you had the burden of proof and ran out of time to answer objections, you can loose a debate because you got flustered at the opponents constant red herrings, you can loose a debate because the audience becomes sympathetic toward your opponent by appeal to emotion etc… etc… Or you can lose a debate because the opponent brought up a logical defeater and you weren’t able to answer it.
BP: Well if you want to bring this up again then I invite you to read the exchanges of many Van Tillians on the internet. Doug Wilson’s debate with Theodore Drange is another place to go (doug shouldn’t be debating professional philosophers). Plus, I would not exactly put much weight on Bahnsen’s debates either – Stein or Tabash were not philosophers. Stein used *terrible* arguments against the TAs.
What about all the debates W.L. Craig has won? He crushed Richard Taylor and others.
JB: I’m not sure you understood why I said what you are here responding too. I said something about how I don’t persuade men. You then said something about Paul persuading men. I then qualified my statement by saying that ultimately it is God who persuades… Of course I don’t have a contention with persuasion… I have a contention with confusing persuasion with proof. I’m glad we are both Calvinists, but now I can’t even remember why we are talking about this.
BP: Paul said that *he* attempted to persuade men. The assumption is that God would persuade men through him. But it was obviously his goal to persuade men. On the contrary, you said, “…My goal is never to persuade anyone of Christianity. I’m a Calvinist and I don’t believe it is possible for me to persuade an unregenerate man into the kingdom of God. If your goal is to *prove* the Christian God then the modus ponens syllogism properly formulated will do just fine. There are more sophisticated ways of *proving* this though. If your goal is to *show someone* the futility of their worldview then the modus ponens may not be appropriate. If your goal is to *persuade* someone… then good luck.â€
See here how you are apparently widely separating proof and persuasion.
JB: So is this reply supposed to demonstrate what “The Dodge†looks like in action?
BP: I replied to your question. Maybe your current reply is another instance of “The Dodge”, who knows…
I’ll respond once someone gives us reason to beliebe P1 in the original argument.
I think it’s laughable to say that if I question P1 that I’m not a Christian. All that does is make you guys who say that look foolish.
You can *assume* that the Bible teaches that “if logic then triune God.” Prove it.
Whenever someone tries to prove it I get vaguge notions about “the one and the many,” “the personal way the members relate to eachother,” etc. But all of that can be had by the quadune God.
What are the significant portions of the Christian worldview that make it’s presupposition necessary for knowledge? What does it mean to say that “Christianity is necessarily true?” What is “Christianity?” Is it “creation?” Well, there are possible worlds where God didnt have to create, thus “creation” is a *contingent* element of “Christianity.” So, what are these *necessary* elements?
Further, the Fristian can claim to be agnostic as to the role of the 4th person. If we’re talking about, say, the 4th members personal designation, and not knowing this is the problem, then Mr. Butler must provide an *argument* which proves that “knowing the personal designation of a member of the Godhead is *necessary* for knowledge.
As it stands, the Fristian can fall back on Butler’s “book-of-Jude” out. Since Butler admits that the book of Jude is not necessary for knowledge, then the Fristian can make this same claim at *any* of the points of qualification Butler asks for. Thus Butler’s attempt to shift the burden has now been put back on him.
Looking at the quality of some of the commenters claims, it’s no wonder why Bahnsen’s version of presuppositionalism is fading away.
You’ll win no friends by calling Christian brothers and sisters who are asking “where’s the beef” a bunch of non-Christian, un-ethical, devil worshipers. Stop with the threats. Stop with the bullying tactics. Put your thinking caps on and actually prove what you claim.
thanks,
John Calvin
I wish we could have this conversation on a nicer tone. I also feel a little bad about the thread being side tracked with the debate over persuasion between me and bill. I’d like to address the Fristian issue but I won’t be able to post anymore till tomorrow night.
Have a good night all. We are all trying to defend the same God at the end of the night… I hope. (And I don’t want to hear anyone compain “are you saying God needs our help in defense!?) :)
This board is strange. Posts pop up in ‘different places’ after other posts are at the bottom.
Ron: You do agree with me if you’re a Christian. As a Christian are you saying that you can’t prove there is one God? It’s getting clear to me that you really don’t know what constitutes a proof. OR you’re not sure the Bible is authoritative and can justify premises. You decide.
Do what? It’s clear to me that you don’t want to argue for your position. Are the epithets about to come now? Just call your ‘system’ evangelism and I”ll be ok. ;)
Ron: For starters, what authority will you appeal to justify the intelligibility of causality? Argue to a single first cause that is Spirit and Divine, and not a conceptual necessity; justify the very tools of argumentation that you will need to arrive at such a conclusion. Or do you want a pass on all of that? Justify anything, Bill.
For starters *address* my post!
Ron: First off, what is your argument? No matter what it is, if it concludes something “close to the Christian God†then it is false that it is the Christian God that is being proved. If all you mean by “close to†is that the conclusion shares the same attributes as God, then I’ll ask you whether the conclusion includes that these attributes are possessed by a person, let alone Person. If so, how is that justified apart from revelation, which you may not appeal to given that your apologetic does not allow you to smuggle in the foundation for all true premises.
Nice bait and switch Ronnie McDonnie. Deal with underdetermination and that I am not making the claim that the Kalam proves the Christian God. If something is underdetermined it’s not false. Convenient how you left out the part of my post that addresses your begging the question.
Ron: Existence has nothing to do with this? Are you trying to argue for a god who might not exist?
You are a professional strawmanner Ron. This is about claims the arguments are attempting to prove. If you want to prove that my argument *must* prove the existence of the Christian God, then be my guest.
Ron: I’m afraid your in a bit too deep.
Ahh I knew it was coming! This is one of Ron’s famous sayings when people don’t agree with him. He’s said it to me on a number of occassions. Too bad you can’t selectively decide which posts are shown….
This is another problem with some Van Tillians – Full Disclosure (to use an accounting term).
Bill and John Calvin, forgive me for not wading through all 57 comments, but what is your epistemology, in brief? As Ron has asked, how do you justify anything? Thanks.
“Nice bait and switch Ronnie McDonnie. Deal with underdetermination and that I am not making the claim that the Kalam proves the Christian God. If something is underdetermined it’s not false. Convenient how you left out the part of my post that addresses your begging the question.”
Bill,
I didn’t leave out that part of the post. I asked if that is all you mean by “close to” the Christian God, then I’ll ask you whether there is a justification for induction. If there isn’t, then why should I accept your premises as rational since induction presupposes rationality, which is something worldview doesn’t afford you? Even your deductive argument, which is based upon unjustifed inferred-premises, does not comport with a non-revelational epistemology for how do you expect to justify universal laws without universal experience? In fact, you would need more than universal experience; you would need to know how things *are* and not how thing have always been or always will be! Your philosophical basis for logic is purely *a posteriori*, is it not? How do you get from unjustified sensory experience and the alleged necessity of causality to epistemic certainty?
For the sake of argument, let me grant for a moment that you have proved a portion of God’s attributes. You have not justified a philosophy of fact. Consequently, you cannot *justify* your knoweledge of the facts you think know or think you have proved. Even if you were to have proved that there is a single, first cause that is omnipotent, what have you proved regarding God? Given your theory of knowledge, all you would have “proved” (I am using that term in its widest sense) is that the start of the universe has a cause that certain fanatics index to a personal God. You would not have proved an attribute of God, for you wouldn’t have proved that God even exists! How can an attribute be attributed to God when God doesn’t exist? God is a person and you haven’t proved that such a person is omnipotent.
Granting you all the philosophical freebies you have required, you would have only proved that some alleged attribute of a God who might not exist exists! That is hardly a proof for a real attribute of an existing God, let alone the actual existance of God.
Ron
I want to offer a traditional apologetic for God’s existence. So what I’ll do is:
1. Make a universal statement about causality based upon an inductive principle, which I cannot justify
2. Pump inferences that I cannot justify into a logical formulation that I cannot justify since I’ve never observed every instance of the deductive argument I want to employ
3. Draw a conclusion that exceeds the scope of my premises
Here’s my apologetic:
Although I cannot justify causality, there is causality – I just know it. Given that causality that I know is real but cannot justify, I assert that the universe also had a cause that is an attribute of the god who I cannot prove exists. If he does exist, he shares the same attribute of that entity that caused the world.
—-
What I, also, find amusing is that Craig believes in libertarian free will (LFW), yet LFW allows for choices to come into existence without a cause!
Ron
Well as I’ve said before, Ron, I’m a Van Tillian (broadly speaking) and an externalist of Plantinga’s variety with internalist overtones – it’s apparent that you don’t know my ‘theory of knowledge’ with all of your pontificating above. Consequently, this issue of me being able to ‘justify basic assumptions’ is a non issue *in this case*. Practically all of your discussion above is *irrelevant* in the current context.
You need to address *why* it is necessary for *every* argument to be committed to arguing presuppositionally and if it is not, then it’s inherently autonomous. I’ve elsewhere referred to the ‘completist fallacy’ as discussed by Swinburne.
Finally, you do not want to get into epistemic certainty. We had a bit of this convo before on your blog, but you would not even discuss what you meant by the term.
Ron,
You’re assuming an internlaist and infallibalist constraint on knowledge,
Bill Parecell has said that he denies that. He’s said he’s largly Plantinganian. So, to bring up “justification” and assume internalism and infallibalism is to beg the question.
So, you should first justify those epistemological conditions rather than just assuming them.
So, regarding internalism how would you answer the infinite regress argument, and how would you answer Bergamann’s paper “A Dilemma For Internalists?” How about the other critiques of internalism? Can my 5 yr old “justify” his belief that I am his dad? Doubtful. Does he not therefore know that I am his dad? Sure he does. An externalist account can accomodate this.
So, in order to move the debate along between Ron and yourself, I think you should cover the things I mentioned above.
Now, razzendacuban asked me “what is my epsitemology.” Thta question is way, way, way too broad. Do you want a tome on what my views are on all epistemological matters?
Should I say, “I’m a revelational epistemologist?” Okay. But what does that say about justification, warrant, externalism, internalism, etc? Anyway, I’m some Bahnsen, some Frame, some Plantinga, some Wood, some Quine, some Williams, etc.
But your question has no effect on the Fristian argument. Say I’m not a Fristian. Say no one is a Fristian, it’s imaginary. You still have the *argument* to deal with.
The Fristian program is calling TAGsters bluff. It is *claimed* that there is an argument for the *impossibility* of the contrary. We want it. Whenever I question the TAGster as to *which parts* are necessary I get different answers. Whenever I question why the 8triune* God is necessary, I get vague notions of “persons, ” “one and the many are resolved, ” etc., but all of those could be had by the Fristian also. So, *what* is it that is necessary about the Christian worldview, and how does this reduce the Fristian concept to absurdity.
To push the burden back on to the Fristian is a move that I don’t accept. One, because it is *you* who claims to have the argument and so you should be able to show how my quadrune god reduces to absurdity, and two, I can go agnostic on many of the questions about the 4th person. If that’s a problem then *you guys* need to show how going silent on those points are *necessary* for knowledge.
So, the Fristian worldview is significantly the same as the Christian one. That is, I’m claiming that all the things you say are *necessary* for intelligibility are had by my position. If you think that they are not, then you need to show that there is something *necessary* about a *triune* God whereas a quadune god reduces to foolishness.
thanks,
John Calvin
What I’m reading reduces to: I’m a skeptic, so to bring up absolute truth is to beg the question. You must play on my arbitrary field, which I don’t even know exists.
So long guys.
Ron
My last post above was to Bill. I hadn’t read Calvin’s, which was quite telling (to me anyway).
John Calvin wrote: “Can my 5 yr old “justify†his belief that I am his dad? Doubtful. Does he not therefore know that I am his dad? Sure he does. An externalist account can accomodate this.”
Friends,
That demonstrates NO understanding of presuppositionalism. Knowledge entails justified true belief. Accordingly, one can certainly have knowledge without being capable or even willing to offer a justification for his knowledge. For instance, all men know God exists. Apart from Scritpure, however, man cannot *justify* that knowledge. Notwithstanding, he believes that God exists; it’s true that God exists; and it’s true that God has given all men a justification to believe certain truths about God’s existence. Notwithstanding, at best, all man would be able to offer apart from Scripture would be a conceptual need for such a Precondition of intelligible experience (i.e. God). Although man *knows* God exists, man needs *special* revelation to offer a cogent defense (i.e. a *justification*) of that knowledge of God, (man and things). Conceptual necessity does not imply ontological status! As Tim wrote *STUDY*, enjoy, interact — But do study!
Ron
Ron,
Before you critique TA’s, read a book on them. I noticed your ‘blog’ entry and would have commented there, but you probably would not post it due to your selectivity.
Also, is there an argument that makes the Kalam an “Arminian” argument (or any traditional argument ‘arminian’)? I’m not aware of *any* Arminians in this particular discussion. If I employ the Kalam in a situation, am I now an Arminian? Perhaps that is just another bully tactic which is typical of your argumentative strategy. You know, call the other person “arminian” or a “naturalist” and you win! Brilliant!
I really can’t stomach to read your latest to John Calvin.
So Ron, *STUDY* the TAs and epistemology.
Razz,
If you are a real person (and not Ron talking to himself), please study philosophy from *philosophers*, not Ron. :) You’ll save yourself much frustration and possibly embarrassment when confronted with philosophically trained atheists.
Bye.
To Post #54
BP, sorry for any formatting errors. I’m getting quite confused by the BPs and JBs. I remembered that Bill Parcels is a football coach right? From now on I’m attaching his face to your comments in my mind.
BP: “This is my last post. You are not interacting with many of my points. I’m not going into much detail in this post.â€
JB: There were only one or two things I didn’t address in my last response because I didn’t think they were relevant. Please point out what I’m not “interacting with†and I’ll see what I can do… otherwise it just sounds like you mean that I’m not agreeing with you so you quite.
BP: 1) you are equivocating between persuasion and understanding.
JB: Granted persuasion is not synonymous with understanding—I was using understanding to refer to comprehension which is certainly a factor necessary for persuasion in most cases. This equivocation does not ruin my argument in any way… If I come up to you and say “Gwafus hasmo dally shally!†can I persuade you of anything? No, for in order for you to be persuaded you must first have some understanding of the thing. Thus I believe my example of the correlation coefficient stands. You said yourself that for something to be an object of knowledge that it must be understood. Are you now saying that I can have something proven to me without gaining any understanding or knowledge?
BP: 2) you are begging the question by assuming that a lack of understanding is the problem with why TAG is not a silver bullet proof.
JB: Your use of the word “begging the question†is way too liberal. As far as I am concerned begging the question involves assuming the position to be proved. The very definition of “proof†is what we are debating and thus some question begging is going to happen. Secondly, I can only beg the question in that sense if what I was trying to prove is that “TAG is not a silver bullet proof because people don’t have understandingâ€â€”(I’m really not sure what “silver bullet proof†means unless you meant silver bullet ‘of’ proof…) notice something very important here: you don’t even understand what I am arguing! You are implying that I would argue that TAG is not a ‘silver bullet of proof†because people don’t understand TAG and therefore don’t accept it as a proof. This means that I would have to define proof as persuasion. I am in fact arguing that it is a silver bullet of proof despite its unacceptance whether for ethical reasons or lack of understanding. If you still think I’m begging the question then explain how. If you simply mean that I’m not backing up assertions then I could easily wager the same to you ad infinitum (you haven’t backed up P1, you haven’t backed up P1a, you haven’t backed up P1b, you haven’t backed up P1c…)
BP: 3) I would say that proof is better construed as person-relative much as ‘belief’ is. I think William Alston argues this position. But one *must* consider the context of being in a debate.
JB: As I said before, if proof is subject relative then “proof†of “an argument†is a property of the subject and not of the argument—this is absurd and makes having a sound argument unnecessary.
BP: 4) When I said that it allows anything as proof, I figured you would make the truth qualification yourself.
JB: Doesn’t this just mean that anything that is true can be proven? What’s your point and what is the context of this comment?
BP: 5) Even if there are no proofs, that would still not mean that theistic arguments are useless (including TAG). One must consider the role of epistemic value in different arguments.
JB: Sure, but epistemic value isn’t magical pixy dust that turns an unproven argument into a proven argument.
BP: This misses my point *completely*. Where in the world did my objections rest on you giving a “syllogism�
JB: Are you trying to tell me that you don’t object to the fact that the following syllogism is a proof regardless of one’s acceptance or persuasion of it?:
If Something exists then God exists
Something exists
Therefore, God exists
I could bring out the fact that since all men *know* God then all men *are* persuaded by this argument, they simply suppress it in unrighteousness. Then again… maybe I better not say that because then we could debate the meaning of “persuasion.â€
BP: No it’s not. ;)
JB: Yes it is. 8)
BP: Well this is a repeat of your assertion. To sum up it’s “If it not a presuppositional argument then it appeals to autonomous thinking.†You are doing nothing but telling me how it is.
JB: No, this isn’t just a repeat… maybe you are skim reading this and missing some of my statements. I said the argument as a simple syllogism of “all that begins to exist†is not an autonomous argument by default—it needs a context. What makes it an autonomous argument is how one answers the question “how do you know all that…†If you think this is simply saying “it is an autonomous argument because it is an autonomous argument†then we are having a serious communication/comprehension breakdown. You have tried to say it isn’t autonomous because you don’t think it is autonomous regardless that it might be presented as an autonomous argument. This is like saying that I couldn’t be telling a lie when I was thinking of the truth.
JB: “Hmm… I’ve read Romans 1… I’m not sure that it is saying what you want it to or that I understand why you referred me to Romans 1. I am only aware of 1 argument that is analytical, the Ontological argument. Maybe you could point me to some others that you think are sound.â€
BP: Well we disagree on Romans 1. But some argue that the Kalam *could* be analytically grounded by everything that begins to exist having a cause. Whether I or anyone else thinks it’s sound is beside the point in the current context of strawmanning the TAs.
JB: I suppose I would agree that one doesn’t observe causality and thus it may be considered an analytical concept. This is made very clear in correlational studies where causality cannot be determined despite the theoretical ability to make perfect predictions. Even at the experimental level when controlling for variables one may not be sure that there is not a third confounding variable controlling the dependent and independent variable. It seems to me that analytically grounded arguments are open to more debate with the atheist than empirically grounded arguments so I wouldn’t concede that this adds any value to the Kalam argument. Our conversation at several points is starting to get too muddled to be worth arguing about… your strawman accusation being one of them.
BP: Why is it a problem for the TAs? Whether this problem exists or not, if I grant the unbeliever induction (though not autonomous induction) and he does not object to it either, then I still fail to see how there would be a problem in the current context I have stated. It may not provide the *strongest* justification and someone may be able to rationally reject my argument, but I’m not sure of any argument in philosophy that could not be rationally rejected. Plantinga points this out in God and Other Minds. It begs the question by assuming that all arguments must be such that they attempt to prove the basic assumptions of rationality.
JB: You can only say it is a “problem†depending on what your goal is. If your goal is to use an argument that is faulty despite the fact then there is no problem. If your goal is to build an argument that wont get you into trouble outside of Presuppositionalism then there is a problem. Of course using an inductive argument wont get you into trouble if the atheist doesn’t know about the POI… but is this being honest with the atheist if he is placing his trust in the argument? There you go again, throwing around “begs the questionâ€â€¦ All arguments must ultimately rely on that fact. In your latest comment, you advise Razz to study philosophers to save himself from embarrassment when confronted with philosophically trained atheists. I would use this same line of thought against inductive arguments. The real problem we may be having is that you believe it is possible to build a “probability†case (or cumulative case) and I don’t believe this is possible. Am I correct in this assumption? I think we should discuss this fact somewhere else since it seems a little side tracked from the Fristian topic. I have a blog that I would be willing to open up discussion on TAs and methodology if you would like (without the hostilities) or if you have some place in mind?
BP: 1. Epistemic infallibilism is the view that in order to have knowledge, one must have conclusive justification for that knowledge (think Descartes) or that one cannot possibly be incorrect in thinking an object of knowledge is true. Most epistemologists are fallibilists.
3. Why would you blog about the Kalam when you haven’t studied it?
JB: 1. I would like to discuss this more.
3. I went and bought a copy of W.L. Craig’s Kalam Cosmological argument. When I got home I immediately flipped to the back of the book looking for a golden ticket that read “1 Admission to Discuss the Kalam Argument with Billâ€â€¦ it wasn’t there… maybe I bought the wrong book. Maybe if I read the book a fairy will appear and grant me permission to discuss this argument on blogs.
BP: No I am not referring to understanding. For instance, why assume that there are only two worldviews that can provide the ontological conditions for intelligibility? There’s alot of unpacking that I should do here, but I don’t have the time nor the desire anymore. The old Van Til lists will cure many of your anxieties. :)
JB: Where did I say there were two worldviews that provide ontological conditions for intelligibility?
JB: I know Guthrie losing the debate doesn’t necessarily mean anything about the particular argument, but it seems to me foolish to say it has nothing to do with the argument. The atheist brought out some excellent points that I don’t think the argument could patch up. Obviously it depends on WHY they lost the debate and not just that they lost the debate. You can loose a debate because you had the burden of proof and ran out of time to answer objections, you can loose a debate because you got flustered at the opponents constant red herrings, you can loose a debate because the audience becomes sympathetic toward your opponent by appeal to emotion etc… etc… Or you can lose a debate because the opponent brought up a logical defeater and you weren’t able to answer it.
BP: Paul said that *he* attempted to persuade men. The assumption is that God would persuade men through him. But it was obviously his goal to persuade men. On the contrary, you said, “…My goal is never to persuade anyone of Christianity. I’m a Calvinist and I don’t believe it is possible for me to persuade an unregenerate man into the kingdom of God. If your goal is to *prove* the Christian God then the modus ponens syllogism properly formulated will do just fine. There are more sophisticated ways of *proving* this though. If your goal is to *show someone* the futility of their worldview then the modus ponens may not be appropriate. If your goal is to *persuade* someone… then good luck.â€
See here how you are apparently widely separating proof and persuasion.
JB: You are merely clarifying or stating stuff that I implied with Paul persuading men. In fact I specifically stated in post 45: “I believe God works through means and in a sense we seek to “persuade†men. Ultimately it is not I who persuades. An unregenerate man cannot be persuaded without God being the one who does the persuading.†I never said that people could not be persuaded by proof. I’m not sure how you could confuse the idea that because people can be persuaded by proof that proof must equal persuasion.
BP: I replied to your question. Maybe your current reply is another instance of “The Dodgeâ€, who knows…
JB: You replied to my question by saying it was a dodge and I said saying my question is a dodge is a dodge and now you are saying that my pointing that out is a dodge… Bill, are you dodging the issue here what?
Post 66,
Concerning the Fristian Objectoin. I don’t want this discussion to go like the persuasion discussion so I will accept all blame for all hostility by all persons on this blog and apologize and ask forgiveness. Now, can we start off anew and discuss the Fristian Objection towards edification and progress?
These are good distinctions to draw Tim. May I throw out some thoughts and see how they are critiqued?
2. It seems to me that if this quadrinity or any other Divine property were to be suggested as an extension of the Xian God then we would not have a problem at all concerning His existence and the TAG in particular. Afterall, Arminian Xians disagree with Calvinists as to specifics concerning God’s action and sphere of influince yet this doesn’t affect the validity of TAG.
Might we say though that if some MSS read “God is quadrune” whereas others read “God is triune” that the quadrune/triune debate is a non-fundamental of the faith (hypothetically)–all things being equal?
3. If this “God” is exactly like the Xian God in every way except in quadrinity then what makes us think that we have two different Gods? Adding knowledge of a property of an eternal Being is not creating a new being or changing a being, it is merely chaning our knowledge of this eternal being.
In otherwords, it is not as though there is the “Fristian god” and the Xian God but that one of these groups of people were mistaken concerning a property of God. In order for this to be meaningful we need to be able to distinguish when knowledge of an object’s property is the difference between knowing and not knowing the object. (i.e. If my wife dyes her hair blond but I don’t know it was dye, do I not know my wife?)
Let me just add then that it seems to me that, if anything, the Fristian Objection demonstrates the strength of the TAG argument by having to mock the Xian God in order to create another “possibly” viable account of intelligibility. It’s like me painting a picture and saying, “this picture is the only standard for all subsequent pictures” and then someone taking a photocopy of the picture and adding a duck and saying “Ha! What now?!”… my answer is that this person has merely demonstrated my point that the original picture is the standard for all subsequent pictures.
I’m interested in hearing your criticisms–keep it sassy… I mean pithy.
It also seems to me that one of the problems is in the fact that this objection is a hypothetical objection. The objection may be formulated in such a way as to automotically win the day.
What I mean is that the Fristian objector is either implying or stating specifically that this is a situation in which we could not know which God was contrived and which God was not or that we could not know which God was the true God.
Basically, it is asking “If you couldn’t know which god was God, how could you know which god was God?” Naturally, if the scenario is constructed to say that we could not know then we could not know. But what exactly is it that takes away our knowledge? I suppose this goes back to Mr. Butler’s comment that the Fristian objection needs to be flushed out first.
Ron,
Before I respond to you, would you mind telling me what you mean by “justification?”
thanks,
John Calvin
That is, you’re making a distinction between S knowing P and S’s *justification* for knowing P.
I’d like to ask: (a) what a justification of knowledge amounts to and (b) why theism (or, more specifically, “trinitarian theism”) alone can give us what we need in that respect.
thanks,
John Calvin
Jonathan,
“I suppose this goes back to Mr. Butler’s comment that the Fristian objection needs to be flushed out first.”
I’ve tried to address this shifting of the burden of proof above.
TAGsters posit “the Christian worldview” as the precondition of intelligibility. I take it that this worldview is a *subset* of characteristically Christian claims. After all, this is how Butler deals with the book of Jude. On his view, you *don’t* need the book of Jude to get preconditions of intelligibility.
So Butler must be presenting a particular set of doctrines and/or a set of historical particularities distinctive of and unique to Christianity, while leaving some things out, and then saying that *that* set of revelational/historical claims provides the preconditions of intelligibility.
What does this amount to? The trinity? The trinity plus creation? The trinity plus creation, redemption, and revelation etc., sans the book of Jude?!
The idea here is that, presumably, Butler has something specific in mind. All right. So all the Fristian needs to do is to say that “Fristianity” is whatever subset of Christian claims the TAGster thinks we need for preconditions of intelligibility, *except that* the Trinity is a Quadrinity.
Now your reply to that is: “But how does this fourth person relate to the other members, what is his personal designation, what was his role in creation, etc.” My reply to that is that the TAGster first has to *make the case* that X, Y, and Z are in fact *relevant* to providing preconditions of intelligibility.
So, let’s get some actual interaction here. I posited a worldview. I’ve avoided Butler’s shifting of the burden of proof. I want what you do to everyone else. You show how the Muslims can’t account for the preconditions for intelligibility, you show how the Mormons can’t do this. You show that the atheists can’t do this. You, allegedly, show how they refute themselves. How their worldview *cannot* account for the preconditions of intelligibility. Now, a new batter has stepped up to the plate. Will you finally stike him out, or will I keep getting intentionally walked? ;-)
thanks,
John Calvin
Now, razzendacuban asked me “what is my epsitemology.†Thta question is way, way, way too broad. Do you want a tome on what my views are on all epistemological matters?
You could use the names of the views…
Should I say, “I’m a revelational epistemologist?†Okay. But what does that say about justification, warrant, externalism, internalism, etc? Anyway, I’m some Bahnsen, some Frame, some Plantinga, some Wood, some Quine, some Williams, etc.
You have spent a lot of time attacking Ron’s position, but you have yet to positive something in the positive regarding your own position. Debating you then becomes analogous to crushing a jellyfish. You have no skeleton—what are you? You say you are A, B, C, D, E, F, and G with all sorts of qualifications on the interactions between them. Why would you even enter a debate, then, knowing that you’re opponent can never ultimately defeat you—never actually knowing what you are? How can I respect your charges against Ron’s position when you will not specify your own? Hopefully you see why I asked my questions.
——-
Razz,
If you are a real person (and not Ron talking to himself), please study philosophy from *philosophers*, not Ron. :) You’ll save yourself much frustration and possibly embarrassment when confronted with philosophically trained atheists.
Right, because those philosophically trained atheists are an intimidating bunch… by the way, how would you know whether I’ve interacted with any? You might be surprised! :)
Ron is sometimes frustrating in that he often times gives an answer without explaining step-by-step how he got there. (Of course, he will explain anything you ask of him.) With that in mind, really do think through what he’s saying. He’s understands Van Til very well.
-razz
John,
One can know something without being able or willing to articulate a justification for that which is known. For instance, all professing atheists *know* that God exists. A professing atheist who has read God’s self-attesting word is simply *unwilling* to (though he could if he wanted to) put forth a justification for his knowledge of God. A professing atheist who has *not* read the Bible or heard the truth of the Bible is not unwilling but simply lacks the *ability* to put forth a justification for his true belief in God. Here’s the point: The unbeliever is always *justified* in his true belief about God because God bears witness of himself to all men everywhere, which is why all men are culpable. Notwithstanding, what is there to appeal to for a justification of such true belief other than God’s *special* revelation of himself, which today is only found in Scripture? The man who never heard God’s word knows that God exists. How does he know that? We learn the answer to that question in Scripture – for that answer is not found in general revelation. Man’s justification for his belief in the truth of God comes from God’s witness of himself through conscience and the created order. I hope you can see that man has a justification for what he knows without being able to know what that justification is (unless Scripture informs him). You are suggesting that man through reason can justify his a-priori belief in God. Traditional arguments suggest that man can *justify* his a-priori knowledge of God by purely a-posteriori methods. There’s a lot more that could be said, but it’s clear that I’m not getting through. In any case, I’m out of pocket for a few days so I’ll have to leave you to the other good Van Tillians on this site. The only point I care to make is that non-Van Tillians employ the same starting point in their reasoning as the rank humanist and Arminian. They assume logic without a justification for universals. They assume induction before establishing a revelational doctrine of providence. And even with all the freebies, their conclusion that God exists exceeds the scope of the premises.
Grace and peace,
Ron
JB,
First, I didn’t mean to sound ‘hostile’ towards you! I can sometimes be overly sarcastic so I apologize if it came across that way to you. I did get annoyed with Ron, but apologize if I came across as an ‘ass’ (as Bahnsen would say) to him.
I sometimes throw a little humor (or a bad attempt at it) to spice things up a bit.
JB: BP, sorry for any formatting errors. I’m getting quite confused by the BPs and JBs. I remembered that Bill Parcels is a football coach right? From now on I’m attaching his face to your comments in my mind.
BP: No problem. Yes he’s a football coach. I don’t even care for football that much, so I don’t why i chose him!
JB: There were only one or two things I didn’t address in my last response because I didn’t think they were relevant. Please point out what I’m not “interacting with†and I’ll see what I can do… otherwise it just sounds like you mean that I’m not agreeing with you so you quite.
BP: I’m not going to peruse the old posts and count them up.
JB: Granted persuasion is not synonymous with understanding—I was using understanding to refer to comprehension which is certainly a factor necessary for persuasion in most cases. This equivocation does not ruin my argument in any way… If I come up to you and say “Gwafus hasmo dally shally!†can I persuade you of anything? No, for in order for you to be persuaded you must first have some understanding of the thing. Thus I believe my example of the correlation coefficient stands. You said yourself that for something to be an object of knowledge that it must be understood. Are you now saying that I can have something proven to me without gaining any understanding or knowledge?
BP: No I’m not saying that. What I meant was that persuasion (I must be convinced) is needed as it goes ‘further’ than understanding. Proof must include more than just understanding – it must be believed. One can understand an argument yet not be convinced of it. And in the context of debate one offers arguments in order to convince. In preaching and evangelism, one offers assertions and quotes Bible verses typically. In the 2 different contexts, agreement between the parties comes at varying places. My point has been against those who use the dichotomy of proof vs persuasion as an excuse to *not* argue for their assertions (i.e., not establish some agreement). This does not escape the right-wing VT and is why he would find some agreement by using the laws of logic or something else typically taken for granted. In the case of a moral absolutist vs a moral relativist, one would show the absurdity of relativism by discussing the torture of innocents, typically held by most.
JB: Your use of the word “begging the question†is way too liberal. As far as I am concerned begging the question involves assuming the position to be proved. The very definition of “proof†is what we are debating and thus some question begging is going to happen.
Yes it may be liberal but I think that it’s been happening all through these discussions. This takes the form of assertions that are not backed up.
JB: ….I am in fact arguing that it is a silver bullet of proof despite its unacceptance whether for ethical reasons or lack of understanding. If you still think I’m begging the question then explain how. If you simply mean that I’m not backing up assertions then I could easily wager the same to you ad infinitum (you haven’t backed up P1, you haven’t backed up P1a, you haven’t backed up P1b, you haven’t backed up P1c…).
BP: I know this is what you are arguing (the first sentence above)! I’m not implying what you think I was. This begs the question against the unbeliever, which I have explained on more than one occassion.
To say that you can turn it back on me is nothing more than saying, “I know you are but what am I”? ;) Seriously, in this instance, *you* are the one making the claims. Arguments/proof typically look for some area of agreement between the participants – if this happens, there is *no need* to assume that an infinite regress will result. If one wants to play the skeptic, then he can be rebutted (but not necessarily refuted).
JB: As I said before, if proof is subject relative then “proof†of “an argument†is a property of the subject and not of the argument—this is absurd and makes having a sound argument unnecessary.
BP: No it’s not. Not if there needs to be a relationship to truth. The same can be said for epistemic justification and belief – they, epistemic justification and proof, both point to the truth of an object of knowledge. For instance, Person A is justified, whether testimonially, inferentially, rationally, or whatever, in accepting the truth of Proposition A. Person B may for some reason not have justification for this proposition and would not accept it. This is what I mean by person-relative.
JB: Doesn’t this just mean that anything that is true can be proven? What’s your point and what is the context of this comment?
BP: What it means is that anything that *I* think is true can be proven, without regard for my interlocutors. If I am not going to come back to some agreement with the unbeliever, (i.e., that there are at bottom two worldviews), then I can prove what I think is true – not addressing what the unbeliever thinks or his protestations.
JB: Sure, but epistemic value isn’t magical pixy dust that turns an unproven argument into a proven argument.
BP: In the context of my statement, an argument could have epistemic value whether it’s construed as a proof or not on various definitions of proof. So talk of turning an unproven arg into a proven arg is not relevant.
JB: Are you trying to tell me that you don’t object to the fact that the following syllogism is a proof regardless of one’s acceptance or persuasion of it?:
If Something exists then God exists
Something exists
Therefore, God exists
I could bring out the fact that since all men *know* God then all men *are* persuaded by this argument, they simply suppress it in unrighteousness. Then again… maybe I better not say that because then we could debate the meaning of “persuasion.â€
BP: Well this is officially getting confusing. My statement was that I am *not* assuming you go around giving syllogisms – I was objecting to your statement, “You are assuming that I go around giving people a “If something exists then God exists†syllogism as an apologetic. This is absurd.” – which you said in your post prior to this one.
JB: No, this isn’t just a repeat… maybe you are skim reading this and missing some of my statements. I said the argument as a simple syllogism of “all that begins to exist†is not an autonomous argument by default—it needs a context.
BP: **But I have given it a context in several posts now!
JB: What makes it an autonomous argument is how one answers the question “how do you know all that…â€
BP: And my point has been this need not come up in a debate situation! If it does, then it can be addressed.
JB: If you think this is simply saying “it is an autonomous argument because it is an autonomous argument†then we are having a serious communication/comprehension breakdown.
BP: I said, “To sum up it’s “If it’s not a presuppositional argument, then it appeals to autonomous thinking.” This is *not* equivalent to the above.
JB: You have tried to say it isn’t autonomous because you don’t think it is autonomous regardless that it might be presented as an autonomous argument. This is like saying that I couldn’t be telling a lie when I was thinking of the truth.
BP: If you still think that is what I’m saying then we definitely have a communication difficulty.
JB: ….It seems to me that analytically grounded arguments are open to more debate with the atheist than empirically grounded arguments so I wouldn’t concede that this adds any value to the Kalam argument. Our conversation at several points is starting to get too muddled to be worth arguing about… your strawman accusation being one of them.
BP: It’s getting muddled alright… JB, I was correcting the strawman that *you* made concerning the TA’s – that they *have* to be inductively grounded. Whether this ‘adds value’ or not or is successful or not (you would probably say that inductive grounding is not successful), it is still a misrepresentation. This is what I was pointing out. Your comment about ‘adding value’ is *irrelevant* in the context of my pointing out your misrepresentation, whichever type of grounding you think is not successful.
JB: You can only say it is a “problem†depending on what your goal is. If your goal is to use an argument that is faulty despite the fact then there is no problem. If your goal is to build an argument that wont get you into trouble outside of Presuppositionalism then there is a problem.
BP: Again, how is it faulty?
JB: Of course using an inductive argument wont get you into trouble if the atheist doesn’t know about the POI…”
Or if it’s not an issue in the discussion.
JB: but is this being honest with the atheist if he is placing his trust in the argument?
BP: I don’t see it as being dishonest.
JB: There you go again, throwing around “begs the questionâ€â€¦
BP: In all honesty, most VT’s on the net have gotten the reputation of being “psycho-assertionists”. If this is all that happens, then it is appropriate. Some have even compared VT’s with Randroids (Ayn Rand followers)!
JB: All arguments must ultimately rely on that fact. In your latest comment, you advise Razz to study philosophers to save himself from embarrassment when confronted with philosophically trained atheists. I would use this same line of thought against inductive arguments.”
Ok…
JB: The real problem we may be having is that you believe it is possible to build a “probability†case (or cumulative case) and I don’t believe this is possible. Am I correct in this assumption? I think we should discuss this fact somewhere else since it seems a little side tracked from the Fristian topic. I have a blog that I would be willing to open up discussion on TAs and methodology if you would like (without the hostilities) or if you have some place in mind?
BP: Yes I do think that one can. As a matter of fact, I think that TAG would fit right in there in building that probable case, since I have yet to see the ‘impossibility of the contrary’ established by way of argument.
JB: 1. I would like to discuss this more.
BP: It’s discussed in most Companions and Intro’s to epistemology.
JB: 3. I went and bought a copy of W.L. Craig’s Kalam Cosmological argument. When I got home I immediately flipped to the back of the book looking for a golden ticket that read “1 Admission to Discuss the Kalam Argument with Billâ€â€¦ it wasn’t there… maybe I bought the wrong book. Maybe if I read the book a fairy will appear and grant me permission to discuss this argument on blogs.
BP: I wasn’t trying to be a smarty pants. :) I was suggesting that it would be wise to know the different nuances of the TAs before one begins one’s discussion.
JB: Where did I say there were two worldviews that provide ontological conditions for intelligibility?
BP: I should have said there are only two worldviews that can *possibly* provide the ontological preconditions for intelligibility. For one, the disjunctive syllogism. This was also how Bahnsen, Butler, and VT attempted to prove the ‘impossibility of the contrary’. *Roughly*, Bahnsen would say that at bottom there are only two worldviews, when he was questioned about all the other worldviews out there. Of course, he divided the NC worldview into 3 subclasses of unbelieving worldviews composed of further worldviews and attempted to refute a few in each. Then it was stated that the NC WV could not provide the preconditions of intelligibility. This reduction is made to avoid having to refute a practically unlimited amount of worldviews.
JB: You are merely clarifying or stating stuff that I implied with Paul persuading men. In fact I specifically stated in post 45: “I believe God works through means and in a sense we seek to “persuade†men. Ultimately it is not I who persuades. An unregenerate man cannot be persuaded without God being the one who does the persuading.†I never said that people could not be persuaded by proof. I’m not sure how you could confuse the idea that because people can be persuaded by proof that proof must equal persuasion.
BP: I quoted what I did to add context to the discussion. You said, “but now I can’t even remember why we are talking about this.” So I was *providing* the context. Anyhow, since I am not *equating* proof with persuasion, I’m not sure how I could confuse them – we’ve been over this.
JB: You replied to my question by saying it was a dodge and I said saying my question is a dodge is a dodge and now you are saying that my pointing that out is a dodge… Bill, are you dodging the issue here what?
BP: I said that he said that she said that JB said that it was a dodge? do what? ;) JUST KIDDING.
Seriously, I replied to your question by giving an indication of a bad argument. I even posed questions about TAG and stated that *using* the proof vs persuasion strategy to avoid defending your argument is *indicative* of a bad argument (i.e., refusing to defend premisses). How that is a dodge beats me.
John Calvin said, “Now your reply to that is: “But how does this fourth person relate to the other members, what is his personal designation, what was his role in creation, etc.†My reply to that is that the TAGster first has to *make the case* that X, Y, and Z are in fact *relevant* to providing preconditions of intelligibility.”
Exactly. These are key assumptions for the TAGster.
razz said, “Right, because those philosophically trained atheists are an intimidating bunch… by the way, how would you know whether I’ve interacted with any? You might be surprised! :)”
I said prior to this, “If you are a real person (and not Ron talking to himself), please study philosophy from *philosophers*, not Ron. :) You’ll save yourself much frustration and possibly embarrassment when confronted with philosophically trained atheists.”
It’s not implied that I know whether you have interacted or not with any in the above. Maybe you have maybe you haven’t, who knows? But you might save yourself some embarrassment if you do interact with any. ;)
I posted this last night but then deleted it to wait until this morning. I think that explains the reference I see in #67. (You guys are too quick for me!) My apologies.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
I would like a bit more clarification from John C. and Bill P. on this Fristianity objection.
I can imagine three different ways Fristianity might be introduced as a counterexample to TAG.
1. A hypothetical system that someone proposes as an imaginary “what if?â€
2. An extension of Christianity that accepts the Bible and its teaching but adds: “but maybe God is actually [this that or the other] e.g. ‘a quadrinity though he has only revealed himself so far as a Trinity.’â€
3. An actual historical claimant to be revelation of the living and true God, meeting the conditions we have outlined as necessary to ground logic, science, and ethics, but in fact totally different than the Bible.
I have seen hints of all three of these here and there, but would be interested to see it unpacked a bit more.
If you say, “it doesn’t matter which of the three,†then I would peg that as #1.
At this point I am not arguing, I’m just trying to understand.
BP,
So basically you’re wrong and I’m right… right?
Just kidding, but I’m going to cut out this resopns-vs-respons type of post since it is getting too long.
Proof and Persuasion:
You say proof is persuasion of a sound argument. I said this means that proof is a property of the subject rather than the argument. You said this isn’t true because the argument has to have certain conditions.
Now I’m saying that it doesn’t matter that the “proof” has to have certain conditions–this would be true of anything in which the variable still depends on the subject. These conditions are irrelevant to some and relevant to others what makes the relevant or irrelevant is the subject, not the argument. Therefore, while it is true that the proof must have certain conditions (namely, being in the form of an argument, being understandable, and being persuading) these conditions are subjective and not objective.
This means we can never ask the question “has it been proven?” Has the fact that 5x-2x=3x been proven? According to you the question doesn’t make any sense because it assumes that proof is something not dependent on persons. I would contend 5x-2x=3x may have been demonstrated to me at a certain time and I was then persuaded of the fact but that is not the time it was proven. In order for it to be proof it would need to be in some argument or logical form such as: when the base variables are the same you add or subtract the coefficients and therefore 5x-2x=3x. Now someone may not be persuaded that I am telling the truth but I contend that this is not relevant to the fact that the fact is proven. I may go on to give supplementary arguments but this is not to say that my proof isn’t proof but that the proof isn’t persuading. You may think that according to my definition anything true can be proven and I would agree, but according to your definition no truth may be provable. For you the controlling factor of whether something can be proven or not is dependent on the subject. Thus, I stand by my statement that this makes proof a property of the subject and not of the argument–no argument has any “proof value.” Now admittedly in a debate we seek to do more than just “prove” something as I use the term–we seek to demonstrate the argument in a way that is understandable and persuading.
Razzandacuban said,
“You have spent a lot of time attacking Ron’s position, but you have yet to positive something in the positive regarding your own position. Debating you then becomes analogous to crushing a jellyfish. You have no skeleton—what are you? You say you are A, B, C, D, E, F, and G with all sorts of qualifications on the interactions between them. Why would you even enter a debate, then, knowing that you’re opponent can never ultimately defeat you—never actually knowing what you are? How can I respect your charges against Ron’s position when you will not specify your own? Hopefully you see why I asked my questions.â€
JC: Hi Razz.
I, personally, am a Christian who is trying to honor my Lord by being intellectually honest (whatever is not of faith is sin). I have taken classes from BTS (and from Mike personally). I am heavily influenced by Bahnsen. I am a presupposition list (and so is John Frame!). I am very Plantinganian in my theory of knowledge (revelation being my ultimate standard of knowledge). I am theonomic in my ethics. I am partial preterist with respects to my eschatological interpretive schema. I ma a reluctant postmillennialist, subject to becoming an amillennial idealist contingent upon what further studies. With respects to universals, I am more Augustinian, holding to Theistic Conceptual Realism (I.e., God’s a conceptualist, man’s a realist). I have not yet made up my mind whether I will hold to scientific anti-realism as opposed to realism (an anti-realism of a Byl variety, not a Gordon Clarkian). I am a 5 point Calvinist, traducian, infralapsarian, and paedobaptist. I do not believe in exclusive Pslamody, I do not believe images of Jesus are always necessarily wrong (especially if they are pedagogical). I am still looking into it, but at this time I am closer to Cartesian dualism (w/respects to the body/soul question) than either (a) Thomistic dualism or (d) substantival monism. I’m about 5 ft. 8 in., brown hair, and I live in California for now. Does that tell you enough to move me up the food chain and get me a skeleton to hold up my sagging skin?
But you see, all that doesn’t matter! That has *nothing* to do with the Fristian argument. It’s still an *argument* and is *still* sitting out there for potential refutation. What is the *Fristian* position? I told you already. It is *the same* as all the elements of Christianity which allow for the preconditions for intelligibility, except it posits a quadrinity. Now, if the burden of proof shift is attempted, I’ve also rebutted that above.
I hope that answers things for you?
Ron,
Nowhere in your answer did you answer my questions I asked. I asked you to define what you meant by ‘justification.’ I also mentioned that,, “you’re making a distinction between S knowing P and S’s *justification* for knowing P. I’d like to ask: (a) what a justification of knowledge amounts to and (b) why theism (or, more specifically, “trinitarian theismâ€) alone can give us what we need in that respect.
You further mentioned some stuff about the traditional arguments and Armenians. I have not *once* in this thread ever said anything about traditional arguments. You’re confusing me with Bill Parcells. What I have done, consistently, is to argue against the uniqueness proof of the strong modal version of TAG. And you have *consistently* failed to interact with my arguments.
Tim asked,
“I can imagine three different ways Fristianity might be introduced as a counterexample to TAG.
1. A hypothetical system that someone proposes as an imaginary “what if?â€
2. An extension of Christianity that accepts the Bible and its teaching but adds: “but maybe God is actually [this that or the other] e.g. ‘a quadrinity though he has only revealed himself so far as a Trinity.’â€
3. An actual historical claimant to be revelation of the living and true God, meeting the conditions we have outlined as necessary to ground logic, science, and ethics, but in fact totally different than the Bible.â€
Hi Tim,
It’s closest to (1). (2) Is interesting, because that’s another problem. (3) would have to be explained more. I’m not saying it’s an *actual* position, but a *possible* one and since your argument is from the *impossibility* of the contrary, you should be able to refute my heretical hypothetical. Also, when I’ve seen other TAGsters refute (3) they delve into evidential apologetics.
Be that as it may, I’m just calling the TAGsters bluff. I’m asking for the same sort of refutation you offer everyone else. Offer an internal critique, and show the Fristian worldview cannot account for the preconditions of intelligibility.
At this point, Butler has advanced the debate to the point where he has thrown the burden back onto the Fristian. Above I have shown why I reject that move, and shifted the burden back on to the TAGster.
And, just so there’s no confusion, I love Butler’s article and thought it was a very helpful addition to the literature on TAG. In fact, I got a copy of it before the book even came out – all of us in Butler’s class did. Back then I thought it answered the questions. I held on to the strong modal claim for about 4 -5 years, I’ve just recently switched over.
Hope that helped,
Thanks all,
John Calvin
JC,
You are asking “how does the Christian God provide the necessary conditions to intelligibility?†or “how does the Christian God *alone* provide the necessary conditions to intelligibility?â€? Granting that there can only be one absolute sovereign being that provides the precondition to intelligibility you may ask *which* god alone is the true God but it seems faulty to ask “how does the Christian God *alone* provide the…â€
So basically you are saying take only those elements of Christianity that provide for the preconditions of intelligibility (since there are obviously some that don’t such as the color of Jesus’ hair on his earthly ministry) and strip away historical contexts of God’s action? For example, God’s unchanging character is an essential quality to intelligibility but how this has been played out in history is not. Thus you would have an immutable God but one who possibly decided not to have the fall of man? If you are going to make the Fristian God identical to the Xian God in all ways except a quadrinity then I would argue that all acts of God in history are necessarily the same. God’s actions are determined by his character and if one is not changing the character of God then one would not be changing the actions of God in history. If you are going to argue that the quadrune god changes the character of god in such a way that his actions change then it would be your responsibility to spell out where this change occurs.
You are trying to shift all burden of proof to the Christian but I don’t see where this is valid. We have two competing worldviews and thus all things being equal we both have the same burden of proof. If I were to treat you the same as the Muslim or the Unitarian then I would say how do you know God is quadrune?
If you are arguing “what if I have a god who gives the necessary preconditions to intelligibility but is different in one inconsequential aspect?†then if it is inconsequential then what makes you think this is a different God rather than that you are mistaken concerning one of His inconsequential traits? This doesn’t defeat TAG since He is still the only precondition for intelligibility—remember you are not creating two gods but adding an inconsequential property to God in which TAG still stands.
It seems to me that those things (at least) which are necessary to intelligibility would be immutability, revelation, creation, absolute sovereignty, and the absolute nature of God. I believe there are more but let’s start with this. Now assuming that these things are true
But you might save yourself some embarrassment if you do interact with any. ;)
Ummm… OK… is there some point you’re trying to make or do you randomly jab people for no specific reason?
JB,
This is getting too long and taking up too much time.
I’ve addressed most of your above. As I’ve said before, my *main* contention is with those who use this in an attempt to not further their argument.
I will add that it comes down to *who* does it need to be a proof for. If you want to restrict proof solely to Christians in the context of a debate, then I think it’s somewhat a misnomer to call it a debate – and this is what *appears* to be happening in some instances. I’m not saying that it could not be a proof for you (just like you could be justified in believing a proposition while someone else is not – and again it’s not *solely* dependent on the subject but on truth as well, just as justification). It’s as though you are saying that I’ve proved it but I can’t prove that it’s a proof to my interlocutor. Now I’m not *equating* the two because in *another* sense your interlocutor could admit that it’s a proof but not be persuaded to become a Christian (I hold that his Christian belief would come through the sensus divinitatus) – see below also. How this entails that I can’t ask “has it been proven” is beyond me.
JB: I would contend 5x-2x=3x may have been demonstrated to me at a certain time and I was then persuaded of the fact but that is not the time it was proven.
BP: But my point is that you are *not* proving it to your interlocutor – if persuasion is included in some sense within proof. Who else are you trying to prove it to? Yourself? You may prove it to yourself again and again, but as I’ve said, apologetics is carried on in a debate format.
JB: I would contend 5x-2x=3x may have been demonstrated to me at a certain time and I was then persuaded of the fact but that is not the time it was proven.
BP: If I don’t *know* that it’s been demonstrated, is it fair to claim that it has been demonstrated to me? If you now claim that it doesn’t have to be demonstrated to me, then why give the demonstration in the first place? Why even begin with the pretext of argument? It could have been demonstrated to yourself and you embrace it as a proof, and in this sense, I also think there could be proof without persuasion (just like there may be justification for you to believe a particular prop but I may not have that justification for the same prop). But is that useful in the context of a debate? It’s like you are trying to ‘sneak’ the claim that it’s a proof in there without having to prove that it is.
JB: You may think that according to my definition anything true can be proven and I would agree, but according to your definition no truth may be provable. For you the controlling factor of whether something can be proven or not is dependent on the subject.
BP: Please reread what I’ve said about the analogy to justification. As for anything being proven true on your position, you’ve left off the rest of what I said.
Razz: Ummm… OK… is there some point you’re trying to make or do you randomly jab people for no specific reason?
BP: Well, my point was that I was not assuming to know who you had interacted with as you claimed. Is that a jab?
JB, Ron, Razz, JC, Tim,
I’m out. You can have the last word JB. Apologies if I was viewed as too harsh and hostile.
Later,
Bill Parcels
Bill,
Some of our disagreements are coming in because you are using the termp “prove it to me” or “prove it to him” or “proving it to your interlocutor.” When the word “proof” is used in this context it means to persuade of the fact–this does not necessitate the person you persuaded to consent to the fact. I simply think this is a loose use of the term. Sure it is apporopriate in casual use but to be more precise I believe a distinction should be made.
When I am having a debate I may say that I am trying to “prove” it to my interlocutor but what I really mean is that I am trying to persuade him that this *is proof* not that it *will be become proof* once he grants it so.
Later. God-bless.
John C (#79):
Then it strikes me that the obvious defeater to your hypothetical is that its god is not the self-contained (thus: hidden) God who reveals himself.
Is it your point, that to determine that God has revealed himself one must resort to findings that are empirical and thus not transcendental?
Hi Jonathan B,
You wrote/asked,
JB: “JC, You are asking “how does the Christian God provide the necessary conditions to intelligibility?†or “how does the Christian God *alone* provide the necessary conditions to intelligibility?â€? Granting that there can only be one absolute sovereign being that provides the precondition to intelligibility you may ask *which* god alone is the true God but it seems faulty to ask “how does the Christian God *alone* provide the…â€
JC: I think both. It is not faulty to ask about the uniqueness claim because if Fristianity *also* does the job then it appears that Christianity is (at best) *sufficient* for knowledge, but not necessary.
JB: “So basically you are saying take only those elements of Christianity that provide for the preconditions of intelligibility (since there are obviously some that don’t such as the color of Jesus’ hair on his earthly ministry) and strip away historical contexts of God’s action? For example, God’s unchanging character is an essential quality to intelligibility but how this has been played out in history is not. Thus you would have an immutable God but one who possibly decided not to have the fall of man? If you are going to make the Fristian God identical to the Xian God in all ways except a quadrinity then I would argue that all acts of God in history are necessarily the same. God’s actions are determined by his character and if one is not changing the character of God then one would not be changing the actions of God in history. If you are going to argue that the quadrune god changes the character of god in such a way that his actions change then it would be your responsibility to spell out where this change occurs.â€
JC: I don’t think so, for as Butler says,
“For example, rather than positing something as problematic as a quadrinity, the objector may simply invent a religion identical to Christianity except, say, that the book of Jude was never written and thus has no place in its canon. But this is not a worldview that is relevantly different from the Christian worldview. For all it really does is ask us to think counterfactually about the Christian canon. That is, the answer we give to the counterfactual question, “Did God have to inspire Jude to write his epistle?” of course not. Furthermore, for much of redemptive history God’s people did not have the privilege of reading Jude (old covenant times) and even in the era of the church, Jude’s canonicity was not universally acknowledged until the fourth century. Are we to infer from this that the old covenant people or certain second century Christians did not have a genuine Christian worldview? Such a conclusion would be absurd.â€
Second, maybe you *would* argue, but you *didn’t* so far.
Third, it is false to say that *all* of God’s actions necessarily had to happen in all possible worlds. God didn’t have to create.
Fourth, you need to show any of these areas that you have in mind, that are not had by the Fristian, are necessary for intelligibility. That is, I can use “the-book-of-Jude rejoinder on you, if it’s good enough for Butler, it’s good enough for me. So, you must show that my change is *relevant* to not allowing for the pre-conditions.
JB: “You are trying to shift all burden of proof to the Christian but I don’t see where this is valid. We have two competing worldviews and thus all things being equal we both have the same burden of proof. If I were to treat you the same as the Muslim or the Unitarian then I would say how do you know God is quadrune?
JC: No, it’s up to you to show that Fristian ignorance here is *relevant* to intelligibility issues. As I put it earlier, on the Fristian alternative to Christianity, what is missing here that fails to provide the preconditions for intelligibility? What is added here that precludes the preconditions for intelligibility?” Surely any proponent of TAG would have *something* to say on this issue. After all, he claims that the Trinity is necessary for intelligibility. And one thing is clear on the Fristian view: there is no Trinity. So he should have *more than enough* material to show why Fristianity fails to provide the preconditions of intelligibility. Well, what’s the argument then?
Is the idea that since certain commitments are unspecified by the Fristian, that therefore his Fristian worldview cannot be properly assessed? But why think such a thing? Consider the following two points against this inference:
First, certain commitments are unspecified by the *Christian*, but presumably this doesn’t hurt TAG. There are hundreds of areas concerning which we wished we knew how God related to them, but we don’t. The Bible is silent. At the very least, it doesn’t tell us the whole truth of the matter, but only part of it. But if that doesn’t vitiate Christianity providing intelligibility preconditions, why does it undermine Fristianity?
Second, it’s not enough to show that certain commitments are unspecified by the Fristian. It must also be shown that Fristian ignorance is relevant to intelligibility issues. At the very least, the TAG proponent should be able to claim, “Well, because you can’t tell me what you believe about X, it’s unclear whether you have conditions for unintelligibility,” and then *argue* for that claim. Otherwise he’s just pontificating to noone about nothing.. After all, it’s the proponent of TAG who says that Christianity *does* provide the preconditions of intelligibility. Presumably, this means *he knows what those preconditions are*. Well, then: are they to be found in the Fristian story — gaps and all — or are they not? Surely he can render a judgment here. If he can’t, he has no business going around saying Christianity satisfies the preconditions of intelligibility, when he can’t so much as specify what they are!
So think about what you’re requiring here. You’re saying that the Fristian has to have answers for every question under the sun, in order for his worldview to be evaluable. “How does this fourth Person relate to creation? How about providence? How about Scripture…?” But why? Because these sorts of claims are relevant to preconditions of intelligibility? But what’s the case for *that*? Or is it because, in general, it’s impossible for there to *be* a worldview unless you can answer these kinds of questions? But presumably, the TAGster is committed to showing that orthodox Platonism (say) is incoherent or otherwise a transcendental failure, and yet the Platonist doesn’t offer any answers to these detailed theological questions :-)
JB: “If you are arguing “what if I have a god who gives the necessary preconditions to intelligibility but is different in one inconsequential aspect?†then if it is inconsequential then what makes you think this is a different God rather than that you are mistaken concerning one of His inconsequential traits? This doesn’t defeat TAG since He is still the only precondition for intelligibility—remember you are not creating two gods but adding an inconsequential property to God in which TAG still stands.â€
So a quadrinity is an “inconsequention†difference? The claim from the Van Tillians is that “*only* upon the presupposition of the *the ontological trinity* can human predication have any meaning.
What’s the cost of the response that the quadrinity isn’t a substantial difference? Notice the cost of that response is that the triunity of God, as opposed to the quadunity of God, doesn’t do any special work in providing preconditions of intelligibility. At best, it’s some sort of *plurality* in God (more specifically, unity within plurality) that does the trick. But if so, shouldn’t the TAGster be a bit more forthcoming about this?
And so what happens to Butler’s claim in his article that:
“Without the ontological Trinity as the fount of all being, there is no possibility of unifying the particulars of human experience. Without the combined doctrines of the Trinity and man being God’s image bearer there is no possibility of predication and thus language.â€
The above would appear false, then.
JB: “It seems to me that those things (at least) which are necessary to intelligibility would be immutability, revelation, creation, absolute sovereignty, and the absolute nature of God. I believe there are more but let’s start with this. Now assuming that these things are true.
JC: Okay, where is the one-in-many??? If the above was *all* that were necessary then how would you resolve the problem of the-one-and-many? Or, does “absolute *nature* of God include the “trinity?†If so, where the reductio that a quadrinity, with all of the above in some possible world, minus the trinity, cannot account for the pre-conditions?
So, take a worldview that has the above (I.e., the criteria you mentioned), minus the trinity in place of a quadrinity, and show how that worldview cannot account for the preconditions. You should more than enough ammo to go on. So, then next move should be refutation, not pontification.
Thanks,
John Calvin
Tim,
Maybe you could re-state your objection since I obviously didn’t understand what you were getting at.
My position is that you have not refuted this worldview: A worldview which posits all the same necessary preconditions for intelligibility as yours does, excpet mine has a quadrinity.
By *actual* I took it to mean that you were putting it in a this world context, thus you’d ask to see the actual physical Bible.
But I would just push it into a possible world’s debate.
Furthermore, is *having* the Bible necessary for intelligibility? It’s logically possible that God could, say in the great apostacy, have all the Bible’s found and burned. Would this mean that Christianity was not the preconditions necessary for intelligibility.
Are you saying that one must have all the 66 books of the Bible? No, because even Mr. Butler denies this.
Are you saying that God must be *able* to reveal Himself?
What part of your claim was *relevant* for the preconditions of intelligibility which mine does not have? This was not all together clear for me. Sorry, I’m a bit slow sometimes.
thanks
John Calvin
The claim is that the actual, living God who has revealed himself [generally and specially] is a necessary precondition for logic, ethics, and so forth. It is not that we “deduce” some formal properties that some god “needs” to ground things that are dear to us.
A transcendental argument takes certain things as givens, without further debate, such as sensory experience, or logic, and asks, what are the preconditions for that. Likewise, my view of vantillianism at least is that we “accept the world” so to speak. We know what the options are, something about history and geography, and so forth.
In the argument, one must dig deeper depending on what the level of problem is. The Bible tells the story of all humanity from the beginning to the end. It couples into the tribes we know about, that are still living. If the Bible taught that all men descended from the Greeks around the time of Socrates, I would reject it. It might appear that I am therefore setting myself up as a higher authority than the Bible; but I would say rather, it is that the Bible is both self-attesting and self-verifying, thereby showing its marks of divine authorship. But the self-verifying aspect couples into the whole world which is part of what is discussed in the Bible. If it was different (in a radical way) than it is, we would reject it. Rightly so, because it would not be the word of God.
Here “Bible” is being used as shorthand for “divine revelation.”
The living and true God is both universal and concrete. The counterfeits lack one or the other of those characteristics.
Hi Tim,
Thanks for the refresher course in presuppositional apologetics.
At any rate, how did what you say refute the qudrinity claims I’ve been making in this combox?
Problems:
1. I’d like to see where the Bible *does say* that “God” is the “necessary precondition for logic, science, and ethics.”
2. That’s the claim of the quadrune God.
3. If you can show the truth of thew Bible by archeology and history, well then so much the worse for your complaints against the evidentialists.
The problem is, “if the *Bible* taught that the all men descended from the greeks” then’d you need to accept it because *Let God be true, for all men are liars.” If *God*, who can never lie, says something, so much the worse for your “intuitions.”
4. If you can refute other religions with evidentialist arguments, why bother with the presuppositionalism. I mean, Muhammad said some false things (according to the Bible and history). Now, why don;t you just mention that to the muslim and be done with it? Well, because as a good presuppositionalist, the Muslim with say that if Allah said it, it must be true. Just like *you* would say. So you must refute him at *the presuppositional level.* You must show how Islam cannot provide the preconditions. Show that with Fristianity now.
The Fristian god is both universal and concrete. He solves the one-and-many problem. Fristianity tells of a creation, fall, and redemption,
Again, can someone refute the Fristian worldview.
Just telling me what TAG says isn’t a refutation.
Juts *telling* me that Christianity “does the job” and no one else does, doesn;t cut it.
Look, we should all admit that, at this point, no one has solved the uniqueness proof problem.
No one has shown *which elements* of Christianity are the ones *necessary* for intelligibility.
As Michael Butler said, his “article was not meant to be the last word.”
Fine, let’s do more work. Let’s have iron sharpen iron. But let’s not pretend that we have shown the strong modal claim – the IMPOSSIBILITY of the contrary.
There’s much work needed to be done. I know how emotionally scary this time can be, but being intellectually honest is the right thing to do here.
thanks,
John Calvin
The problem with the Fristian God is that he doesn’t exist. There is no evidence for him. He has not revealed himself. There are no Fristians.
It’s a non-starter.
Maybe I wasn’t clear enough before (#86, 89). The problem with option (1) Fristianity [see post #77] is that that god lacks the quality of having revealed himself.
If, on the contrary, one claims that there is evidence that he has revealed himself, then I suggest the discussion has shifted to option 3. But before going to option 3, can we all agree that option 1 won’t work?
Tim,
Maybe I wasn’t clear enough, I’ll push the debate into a possible worlds scenario.
I also might not have been clear as to pointing out that what you meant by “reveals himself” was ambiguous. The Fristian God is the god who reveals himself.
Now, you’ll say, “where’s the revelation?” (1) I can go possible worlds, (2) this isn’t the same claim as you made. *Now you’re claiming* that we must *have* the revelation from God in order for God to be the precondition for intelligibility. But I offered a defeater to this, you didn’t offer a defeater-defeater.
That is, these two propositions are different:
i) God must be the self-contained God who reveals himself.
ii) We must have the revelation from God.
See the difference.
Now, we can ask, “what does it mean to say that “having the revelation is the precondition for experience?” Does that mean all 66 books? No, even Mr. Butler pointed out that that was wrong. Does it mean to have at least one book? It’s not clear at all.
Then, when you make it clear, you’ll have to show how this is *relevant* to the preconditions of intelligibility. How does physically having one book make triune God all of a sudden the preconditions for intelligibility?
At any rate, special revelation is a *contingent* aspect of Christianity, i.e., God did not *have to* reveal himself. So it’s not clear, then, why this is *necessary* for intelligibility. If God would not have given man special revelatiuon would the Christian worldview not be the pre-condition for intelligibility?
You might say that then we would have no *knowledge* of the worldview so then we would not *know* that it was the precondition for intelligibility. Well (1) this does not mean that Christianity is *not* the precondition of intelligibility (not knowing that it is is not the same as the ontological fatc that it is), and (2) I’ve given you the info needed to refute the Fristian worldview:
It is just like the Christian worldview in all areas pertaining to intelligibility, except we posit a trinity.
Moreover, say that you’ve found an inconsistency. The Fristain will call this an apparent inconsistency and go the Van Tillian paradox route. Paradox, then, is a feature of the Fristian worldview.
So, sorry for not being clear, but it’s not clear to me how you’ve so much as dented the Fristian worldview.
If Michael Butler says that his article is “not the last word” then why assume that you’re going to solve the problem by reasserting TAG in a combox? I don’t understand.
thanks,
John Calvin
Tim said,
“The problem with the Fristian God is that he doesn’t exist. There is no evidence for him. He has not revealed himself. There are no Fristians.
It’s a non-starter.”
Well, by the law of non-contradiction, sin;t this the case with all worldviews?
So, why don;t you stop doing apologetics and just claim that the problem with all other worldviews is that they are false: Allah doesn’t exist, the Demiurge doesn’t exist, Brahma doesn’t exist, etc. They are all non-starters.
Is this apologetics Tim? No. It’s not.
sincerely,
John Calvin
John– you need to learn how to distinguish rhetoric from thesis, and elliptical remarks from fully qualified ones. Otherwise, these posts turn into epistles, which are tedious to read.
If I said to a Muslim, “Allah doesn’t exist; he has not revealed himself; there is no one who claims to have heard from Allah,” that would be easily falsifiable. There is evidence to the contrary. Then, we would have to examine that evidence.
Likewise, if my opponent said, “there is no Christ, he has not revealed himself; there are no Christians,” that would be easily falsifiable.
But for you to say, “I’m making up a god who by definition has revealed himself, even though not to anyone,” I say that is nonsense.
While evidence will not by itself settle the conflicting claims, the absence of evidence that the Fristian god [type 1] has revealed himself is decisive. It becomes an arbitrary claim without any warrant whatsoever.
Will you stipulate that when we say it is necessary that “God has revealed himself”, as one aspect of what is proved in TAG, that we do not mean, “revealed himself to angels, Martians, or only himself,” but we mean he has revealed himself to men? Just to make sure we agree on what is being debated at this point.
Tim,
Since you’re the one who posited the IMPOSSIBILITY of the contrary, then it does not good to point to a *this world* argument for Christianity.
When you say “revealed Himself to men” are you counting the book of Jude? Butler says that’s not needed for the intelligibility of experience.
At any rate, you need to show how a worldview which posits all the things you say are necessary for the intelligibility of human experience, minus the trinity for a quadrinity, can’t account for the preconditions of intelligible experience.
I’m not claiming that there is an actual revelation in this world. Furthermore, it is not a *necessary* feature of Christianity that God reveal Himself, he could have remained silent.
Maybe you could just refute the Fristian claim. I’ve already moved tghe debate past Butler’s article.
I think I’ll have to bow out if we don’t get a refutation.
thanks,
John Calvin
John– I checked my posts, and I don’t find a single one where I mentioned the impossibility of the contrary.
My project has been more modest: to suggest that the Fristian objection can be divided into three classes. After you signed on to type 1, I simply pointed out how that one seems to fail.
I’ll say it again, for the fourth time: it is nonsensical to say, “there exists a god that I define here (…) who moreover, has by definition revealed himself; but not to anyone in particular.”
I’m suggesting that “revealed himself” in that defintion is incoherent.
Thus, it is not necessary to enter into possible worlds digressions.
However, I am going to outline the basic problem with the “possible world” approach next week. If you are still around, you can jump back in.
Tim,
I look forward to the outline of the problem.
Sorry for the confusion, but your original post said that Butler’s article answered the uniquness objection. That’s what I came here to discuss You have to know that I have been on the defensive, arguing against (at least) 4 different people (as well as getting called immoral and non-Christian! :-)). So, I was under the impression that we were discussing the uniqueness proof. I think I have pointed out that Butlter’s paper didn’t offer the death blow to Fristianity. But, if you list the “necessary preconditions of intelligibility” I’ll print up a “revelation” from Frist.
If you don’t know *what those are* then it doesn’t make any sense to argue TAG. So, you should know what they are, and then we’ll see if one takes X, Y, and Z, while adding a quadrinity, they can account for the preconditions.
Lastly, take me as someone telling you about another person who has a revelation from Frist. I tell you about this guy, his argument, his worldview, etc. I then ask you, as my resident apologist at my church, to tell me how to answer this person. So, if I told you that it had all the relevant preconditions for experience that Christianity had (we still need to lable those, what *are* they?), but he said god was quadrune, how would you refute it? Or, say that Frist has revealed himself to this guy and his wife. That is, two people have the revelation (just loke Adam and Eve did).
(Now, maybe you mean that it is necessary that God reveal himself to 193 people (at least!). But what is the case *for that?* (And how would Adam and Eve have been affected? Would they not be able to account for the preconditions?) So, say I tell you about a tough run-in I had with a guy who posited another religion. He did this in some part of Africa. I can’t find him, but I remember what he told me. And, the worldview is: “The same as yours in all relevant areas pertaining to the preconditions, but he has a quadrinity. Again, how would you refute it?)
Basically, if Christianity provides the preconditions, so does Fristianity. Unless, of course, you can show that having a trinity, *specifically* is needed, but a quadrinity runs into incoherence.
thanks,
John Calvin
Again, that shifts your claim to Type #3. That’s why I asked, in #92, if everyone was on board that type #1 (the purely formal hyptothetical) won’t work.
To post # 87
Hi JC, I only have time for a partial response right now so I will only be addressing two points.
1) JC: I think both. It is not faulty to ask about the uniqueness claim because if Fristianity *also* does the job then it appears that Christianity is (at best) *sufficient* for knowledge, but not necessary.
Me: I don’t think you can have this luxury unless you are trying to destroy knowledge rather than preserve knowledge. If you are trying to destroy knowledge then the Fristian god is no opponent to the Christian and TAG. If you are trying to preserve knowledge then you must ask *which* god alone is the true God, rather than assert “my god gives preconditions to intelligibility (PTI) *too*.†Allow me to explain: There cannot be more than one PTI otherwise it destroys knowledge. That is, there can only be one truth. So, if we have “logic can be accounted for by proposition X,†and “logic can be accounted for by proposition Y†and logic is actually only derived from one source then how do we know which source that is, if both are actually equal? The fact would be that both *are not* actually equal despite some or all of us being confused to think they are. Therefore, by positing a hypothetical in which both are equal you are destroying the PTI. This reduced to absurdity and skepticism. We cannot know what the precondition is and cannot know what the truth is therefore how do we know that logic is real at all? How then is this Fristian objection a better objection than the atheist simply flat out denying that there is such a thing as logic and intelligibility? I will touch on this later but for now let me just conclude that one must therefore be asking *which* god alone is the true God. In order to save knowledge you must have *one* true God that meets certain criterion.
In case you still don’t see what I’m getting at let me word this somewhat differently. There cannot be two *sufficient* conditions for knowledge since if this were a *fact* then it would by default defeat itself and thus there is *no* sufficient condition for knowledge. How so? The Christian God claims to be the only God, if the Fristian god is the Christian God in quadrune clothing then it too claims to be the only God. If you wish to preserve the law of non-contradiction then both cannot be true, thus, one is false. If you are going to assert that a false concept can give sufficient grounds to knowledge then you have created a serious quagmire because how can you know whether you believe the true sufficient reason or the false sufficient reason? Thus, you have already lost intelligibility. The only other option is to give up the law of non-contradiction and thus loose intelligibility anyway. Therefore, you can’t ask an intelligible question if the question is “why is the Christian God alone the necessary PTI?†You may do the following: state, “The Christian God is not a necessary PTI.†Ask, “Which god is the true God?†Conclude, “There are no grounds to intelligibility.†Or ask, “Which God provides the PTI?†How can you have a valid argument if you don’t even know what you’re asking/proposing?
2) JC: I don’t think so, for as Butler says,….Second, maybe you *would* argue, but you *didn’t* so far…Third, it is false to say that *all* of God’s actions necessarily had to happen in all possible worlds. God didn’t have to create…Fourth, you need to show any of these areas that you have in mind, that are not had by the Fristian, are necessary for intelligibility.
Me: Getting into arguments of modal logic are going to get sticky. To save us “some†complications let me take the position that all things are determined by right of Divine foreknowledge. Thus, nothing could *be* contrary regardless of our cognitive ability to think in terms of counterfactuals—I will argue that even our counterfactuals are determined to happen in the manner they do. So in this respect I will depart with Butler *in a sense*, modally I can think of God not having Jude in the canon but this does not mean that God could have not had Jude in the canon.
Secondly, you are strawmanning me because I never said that *all* of God’s actions necessarily had to happen in all possible worlds. I said all of God’s actions *in history*.
With the above in mind I stand by my comment that all things are determined and could not have been otherwise. Now you say that I have not “argued†this yet. Look JC, let’s not be absurd you aren’t stupid and I’m sure you know the arguments for determinism and the problems you will run into if you say that actions, thoughts, etc. are not determined by the character of the being in question. Can a good tree bear bad fruit? If you are going to ask for me to support ever assertion then I will do the same with you (maybe you *would* argue that God didn’t have to create, but you *didn’t* so far…). This would just be wasting our time, let us be adults here.
JC: That is, I can use “the-book-of-Jude rejoinder on you, if it’s good enough for Butler, it’s good enough for me. So, you must show that my change is *relevant* to not allowing for the pre-conditions.
Me: Please read what I said carefully. I said “*If* you are going to argue that the quadrune god changes the character of god in such a way that his actions change…†Surely you can understand that in order to interact in an argument you must first *have* an argument. I just said that we shouldn’t be nitpicking that the other has to constantly provide an argument but this is certainly an area that you are going to have to develop if you want to have this discussion. How would you like it if I said “Okay, so maybe you have a good definition of logic, but what if my definition was better? Huh?†this would be a stupid rejoinder because it doesn’t have any value unless I say how it is better. If you want to change the Fristian god then don’t just tell me its changed, tell me how. Am I supposed to spell out the characteristics of your Fristian god for you? Notice that in the text, which you are responding to, I never asserted that the Fristian god did not have PTI, I merely said that if it is an inconsequential property to His character than all acts in history must remain the same and that if it is consequential to his character then in what way.
I’ll get to the rest sometime around Wednesday or the end of the week hopefully.